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LACANIAN FILM THEORY AND POST-THEORY 
Section I: The Excision 
 Psychoanalytic film theory—more specifically, film theory influenced by Lacanian 
psychoanalysis—has all but disappeared from the field of film and media studies today. Lacanian 
psychoanalysis prominently influenced the prolific theorizations about film in the 1960s and 
1970s—for instance, Apparatus theory, Feminist film theory, Suture theory, Marxist film theory, 
to name a few. However, in its current state, Lacanian film theory finds its place only in the 
margins of the discipline of film studies, as evidenced by the limited number of books and journal 
articles devoted to this approach—and this endeavor is undertaken by only a handful of scholars. 
These contemporary Lacanian scholars—such as, Slavoj Žižek, Joan Copjec, Todd McGowan, 
Mladen Dolar, Alenka Zupančič, Lee Edelman—remain dedicated to the Lacanian field, but are 
rarely included in the so-called mainstream of film studies. In other words, recent works on 
Lacanian film theory circulate within a coterie, and as a result, often suffer from intellectual 
myopia, whereby the dissemination and discussion of their potential contribution to film studies 
remain enclosed. The singular notable exception to the limited appeal of Lacanian film theory can 
be found in the works of Slavoj Žižek, who wields immense popular appeal outside of academia. 
However, in his self-assumed role as a “public intellectual,” Žižek has also drawn significant 
criticism—some of which is indeed justified—for producing, what David 
2	  
	  
Bordwell has called, “free-associative film interpretation.”1 Indeed, Žižek is one of the putative 
figures through which Noël Carroll and David Bordwell construct their opposition to Lacanian 
film theory—which they label “Grand Theory”—in their influential 1996 book Post-Theory: 
Reconstructing Film Studies.2  
 In Post-Theory, Bordwell and Carroll called for a total rejection of psychoanalytic film 
theory, primarily on the grounds that such theorization is incoherent and unreliable, and insisted 
on the centrality of film as an empirical object which could be studied through scientific methods, 
as opposed to the alleged speculative method of psychoanalytic film theory. In fact, the authors 
clearly point out in the introduction to Post-Theory that—even though their goal is not to produce 
another version of unified film theory—the principle that organizes the volume is that “solid film 
scholarship can proceed without employing the psychoanalytic frameworks routinely mandated 
by the cinema studies establishment.”3 Although Bordwell and Carroll do not clearly define what 
they mean by “Theory” or “Grand Theory,” they are emphatic in pointing out an alternative 
approach to cinema that depends upon “logical reflection, empirical research, or a combination of 
both,” in order to move away from the “ethereal speculations of Grand Theory.”4 In his 
introduction, Bordwell identifies two versions of “Grand Theory”: namely, subject-position 
theory, or psychoanalysis, and culturalism (3-4). Against the “overreaching theoretical 
commitments” of the aforementioned modes, Bordwell proposes “middle-level research”: a third 
stance, which “tackles more localized film-based problems” (3-4). Bordwell goes on to argue that 
subject-position theory depends on certain assumptions, which should be challenged on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 . David Bordwell, “Slavoj Žižek: Say Anything,”David Bordwell’s Website on Cinema, 
April 2005, http://www.davidbordwell.net/essays/zizek.php. 
 
 2 . David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies 
(Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996). 
 
 3 . Ibid., xiii. 
 
 4 . Ibid., xiv. 
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grounds of their logical flaws: for instance, the recognition of subjectivity in representation 
requires a priori notion of subjectivity; or, Lacan’s insistence on misrecognition as the basis of 
subjectivity leads to an infinite regress (8). Bordwell also points out that the “culturalist” model 
of theory later challenged the ascendancy of subject-position theory on the grounds that 
subjectivity is socially determined, and that, as a result, there is room for “agency” within this 
framework (8). Bordwell then criticizes the culturalist model by pointing out that it is also a 
version of Grand Theory, which makes broad and unfounded claims much like its predecessor, 
the subject-position theory. Thus, against the versions of Grand Theory, Bordwell champions 
middle-level research, which purports to study particular problems regarding cinema in a 
historically informed manner, and avoids making broad claims through the solution of specific 
problems. That this mode of research actively rejects broad speculations is evident in Bordwell’s 
example in support of middle-level research: 
Contrary to what many believe, a study of United Artists’ business practices or 
the standardizations of continuity editing or the activities of women in early film 
audiences need carry no determining philosophical assumptions about 
subjectivity or culture, no univocal metaphysical or epistemological or political 
presumptions—in short, no commitment to Grand Theory. (29) 
This rejection of the speculative mode in favor of a historical or empirical one can also be found 
in Bordwell’s 1989 book Making Meaning.5 Interestingly—and perhaps not surprisingly—such 
rejection of psychoanalytic film theory quickly turned into an ejection of theory as such from film 
studies. As David Rodowick points out in his essay, “An Elegy for Theory,” the turn away from 
psychoanalytic film theory coincided with a rejection of the speculative and conceptual work of 
film theory. Rodowick elucidates this point by referring to Bordwell’s work in the following way: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 . David Bordwell, Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of 




  By 1989, however, Bordwell’s attack on interpretation and his promotion of 
cognitivism as a model of “middle-level research” recast theory with respect to 
three particular propositions. First, his appeal to middle-level research calls for 
pulling back from broader concerns of ideology and culture to refocus attention 
on film’s intrinsic structure and functions. Second, he promotes a comparable 
turn from psychoanalytic theories of the subject to the study of filmic 
comprehension as grounded in empirically delimitable mental and perceptual 
structures. Finally, his renewed emphasis on history also signals a withdrawal 
from high-level conceptual concerns to refocus research on the fundamental data 
of films themselves and the primary documentation generated from their 
production contexts.6 
Rodowick’s analysis of the propositions of Post-Theory alerts us to the grounds on which the idea 
of a film theory could be rejected by Bordwell and Carroll’s historical poetics and analytical 
philosophy alike. The proponents of Post-Theory rejected a theory of film on the grounds that this 
model of thinking about film works to affirm certain a priori concepts or assumptions—rather 
than testing such hypothesis—whereby films become mere examples and not an avenue to 
produce new and verifiable knowledge. In other words, Post-Theorists accuse film theory for the 
lack of scientific rigor in its methodologies. At the same time, as Rodowick further points out, 
analytical philosophy rejected the idea of film theory—and in so doing, allied itself with Post-
Theory—because, from the position of analytical philosophy, film theory is neither a legitimate 
scientific approach nor a valid philosophical inquiry. This is so because unlike scientific 
methodologies, film theory does not engage in the production of empirical data regarding the 
nature and effects of film through sustained research, even though it claims to test the hypothesis 
that guides it against specific external phenomena—i.e. specific films. On the other hand, film 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 6 . David Norman Rodowick, “An Elegy for Theory,” October 122 (2007): 96. 
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theory is seen as far from the concerns of philosophy proper because unlike philosophical 
methods—which centers on testing the limits of prior knowledge through intense self-
investigation, rather than through the investigation of phenomena that are outside of the inquiring 
self—film theory seeks to study natural objective entities—i.e. films. In other words, according to 
analytical philosophy, film theory is wholly illegitimate because it is invested in the study of 
empirical phenomena, but falls short in the rigor necessary for such scientific investigations. 
Remarkably, even though Post-Theory and analytical philosophy formed an alliance against film 
theory throughout the 1990s, the former found the claims of film theory to be too broad or too 
Grand, while the latter found the methodologies of film theory to be too limited, too narrow. 
 Rodowick’s defense of film theory demands that a rejection, tout court, of theory on the 
grounds that it is too broad or that it lacks the vigor of both scientific and philosophical inquiry is 
neither productive nor entirely justified. In answering the accusation that film theory receives 
from the quarters of Post-Theory and analytical philosophy alike, Rodowick is succinct: 
Film theories, like all humanistic investigation, concern human activities and thus 
presume a high degree of prior, even self-, knowledge and examination. Like any 
cultural activity, cinema is a human creation and thus is embedded in practices 
and institutions that form the basis of our quotidian existence. We may not have 
conscious knowledge of these practices and institutions, nor any desire to 
construct theories about them in the form of propositions or concepts, yet we act 
on and through them in coherent and consistent ways. This is why cultural 
theories are able to solicit agreement in the absence of empirical research and 
experimentation. Their power and plausibility is based on the extent to which 
they seem to clarify for us what we already know and do on a daily basis. Here 
6	  
	  
we need no external examination beyond the critical investigation of our own 
practices as they evolve historically.7 
Here, Rodowick’s attempt is to not so much defend theory as such, but very specifically to defend 
a theory of film. Three crucial points become evident in this passage: 1) film theory is closely 
aligned to philosophy because it studies film, the experience of which depends on one’s 
grounding in self-examination and a prior knowledge of culture; 2) film theory does not require 
empirical data-gathering and interpretation in order to become coherent and legitimate because it 
is grounded in a set of common human experiences; and 3) the prior knowledge of culture within 
which common human experience is founded—one that film actively solicits—is often 
unconscious, yet it produces coherence and consistency. Based on these points, Rodowick argues 
that film theory should be thought of, more properly, as an “aesthetic or [as] philosophy.”8 In this 
way, Rodowick wants move away film theory from Post-Theory’s demand for “middle-level 
research,” and instead wants to clear a much broader terrain in which film theory can continue the 
work of philosophy. For Rodowick, the task of film theory is, very specifically, to produce 
speculative and “propositional claims,” supported by “clear, authoritative self-justification,” with 
regard to the time-dependent transformation of cultural phenomena, in the process of which the 
theorist herself undergoes self-transformation (101). In other words, Rodowick shows that even 
though Post-Theory privileges an empirical approach to the historicity of film, maintaining such 
scientific-objective distance from that which Post-Theory wants to study cannot account for 
cultural knowledge, which “evolves in the context of multiple, diverse, and conflicting social 
interactions that require constant reevaluation on a human time scale” (101). The validity and the 
relevance of the propositional claims of film theory, therefore, will not derive from narrow, or 
limited claims, that are admittedly open to fallibility, made by an investigator who remains at a 
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8 . Ibid.  
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distance from that which he studies; rather, film theory can contribute to philosophical thought 
because film compels us to “evaluate our styles of knowing with the examination of our modes of 
existence and their possibilities of transformation” (Rodowick 2007, 101). Referring to Stanley 
Cavell’s and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophical investigations of cinema, Rodowick argues that, as a 
cultural product of Modernity, cinema is eminently philosophical because it compels philosophy 
to return to “problems of movement and time in relation to thought and the image” in the 
contemporary time (106). In other words, following Cavell and Deleuze, Rodowick claims that 
film facilitates philosophy not because of the specificity of its medium, but because film allows 
us to understand “how our current ways of being in the world and relating to it are “cinematic”” 
(107). 
 Rodowick’s turn to Deleuze and Cavell in defense of film theory takes into account the 
distinctions and connections set up by Deleuze—Rodowick specifically draws on the Cinema 
books and What is Philosophy?—between “concepts, images and functions” in the three vital 
areas “human creation”: namely, art, philosophy and science (Rodowick 2007, 101-3). Rodowick 
points out, following Deleuze, that while it is the task of philosophy to produce concepts, art 
produces images or “sensuous aggregates,” and science creates functions (Rodowick 2007, 102). 
However, function—produced by science—relates thought to natural phenomena, and therefore 
remains “abstract and general, its generality deriving from its time-independence” (Rodowick 
2007, 103). Whereas, concepts—produced by philosophy—are “abstract yet singular” that are 
specific, time-dependent and akin to images produced by (Rodowick 2007, 104). Because cinema 
is a form or art that gives expression to concepts through specific spatio-temporal connections, 
Rodowick argues that philosophy and cinema are closely linked. It is for this reason that he 
champions Deleuze in defense of a theory of cinema. The specific import of Deleuze in this 
regard—Rodowick, however, does not make this point clear in this essay—is that in Deleuze’s 
formulations, a theory of cinema becomes a philosophy of cinema, at once abstract and singular; 
8	  
	  
unlike the psychoanalytic model, which—because it produces the subject as a fixed, rather than a 
metamorphic entity—is invested in the production of function, much like the methods of science, 
as Peter Hallward has pointed out in his essay “You Can’t Have it Both Ways: Deleuze or 
Lacan.”9  
 Similarly, Rodowick’s turn to Cavell—in order to support a philosophy of cinema—calls 
attention to the ways in which Cavell attempts to “balance the concerns of epistemology and 
ethics” (Rodowick 2007, 106). According to Rodowick, Cavell’s engagement with cinema brings 
to the foreground the ways in which cinema “presents philosophy’s historical dilemma” regarding 
the relationship between one’s perception of the world and skepticism (107). However, in 
Cavell’s view, cinema—because of its reliance on movement, in the temporal sense—overcomes 
the problem of skepticism that had plagued epistemology, and thereby “opens the possibility of 
once again being present to self or acknowledging how we may again become present to 
ourselves” (Rodowick 1996, 107). Thus, Rodowick prefers this model, because a rethinking of 
cinema along the lines of Cavell allows one to account for the historical specificity of cinema, 
and to retain a sense of positivity or agency in one’s perceptual relation to the world; unlike 
psychoanalysis, which insists on the subject, whose construction could be seen as being 
dependent upon a skeptical, or lack-oriented, relation to the experiential domain. 
 Contemporary Lacanian film theorists have echoed both Rodowick’s concerns regarding 
the status of film theory and his proposition that film theory ought to closely align itself with 
philosophy, leaving behind the narrowness that had plagued it. Todd McGowan and Sheila 
Kunkle’s anthology, Lacan and Contemporary Film responds to the accusations leveled against 
Lacanian or psychoanalytic film theory by the proponents of Post-Theory by attempting to revise 
what they see as a certain “narrowness” in film studies’ approach to Lacanian psychoanalysis—
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one that led to the deligitimation of Lacanian psychoanalysis in film theory.10 McGowan and 
Kunkle propose a “break from the previous incarnation of Lacanian film theory,” in order to 
develop a Lacanian analysis of film that is adequate to the exigencies of contemporary film.”11 
The authors go on to suggest that “the narrowness of Lacanian film theory manifested itself 
chiefly in two ways: in the way that film theory appropriated Lacanian psychoanalysis and in the 
way that film theory approached cinematic experience,” and accordingly, call for a significant 
broadening of Lacanian ideas with regard to film studies.12 Similarly, in The Fright of Real Tears, 
Slavoj Žižek argues, in response to the claims of Post-Theory, that “the reading of Lacan 
operative in the 70s and 80s was a reductive one—there is ‘another Lacan’ reference to whom can 
contribute to the revitalisation of the cinema theory (and of critical thought in general) today.”13  
In the same vein, in his 2007 book, The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan, McGowan points 
out that psychoanalytic film theory today is in a weakened and degraded state, not because of “its 
overreliance on purely psychoanalytic concepts, but because of its deviation from these 
concepts.”14 Thus, much like Žižek, McGowan argues that the problem with Lacanian film theory 
is that it is “not Lacanian enough,” and that the proper response to Post-Theory’s accusations is to 
“proffer a genuinely Lacanian film theory.”15  
 It should be evident from the preceding paragraphs that contemporary Lacanian film 
theory finds itself marginalized, and therefore attempts reposition itself in the so-called 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 . Todd McGowan and Sheila Kunkle, introduction to Lacan and Contemporary Film 
(New York: Other Press, 2004), xii. 
 
11 . Ibid, xiii. 
 
12 . Ibid. 
 
13 . Slavoj Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears (London: BFI, 2001), 7. 
 
 14 . Todd McGowan, The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2007), 5 
 
15 . McGowan, “Looking for the Gaze: Lacanian Film Theory and its Vicissitudes,” 
Cinema Journal 42, no. 3 (2003): 44. 
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mainstream of film studies. In the next section of this introduction I will briefly summarize the 
trajectory of Lacanian film theory. However, before providing a summative account of the ways 
in which contemporary Lacanian film theory has responded to its limitation, I want to clarify my 
position and purpose in this dissertation. This dissertation is an entirely Lacanian project. My goal 
in this dissertation is to show that Lacanian theory can significantly enrich film theory and steer 
one’s engagement with film in the direction of philosophy—away from the “middle-level 
research” of Post-Theory. Thus, in this dissertation, I extensively engage with contemporary 
Lacanian film theory—such as the works of Žižek, McGowan, Joan Copjec, Mladen Dolar and 
Hugh Manon. Admittedly, my intervention in Lacanian film theory—which I will elaborate 
momentarily—is indebted to the works of these theorists. At the same time, however, I offer 
detailed and original readings of some of Lacan’s own writings, which are crucial in the 
development of film theory. In so doing, I not only explicate Lacan’s writing that has not been 
taken up by Lacanian film theory, but also, I touch upon a significant part of the clinical side of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis—namely, the aspect of “topology” in the Lacanian oeuvre. The basic 
argument of this dissertation is this: in theorizing about cinema, there is way to rethink the 
question of subjectivity without taking recourse in the ideas of spectatorship and identification—
championed by early Lacanian film theory—and this path runs through the subject’s 
fundamentally skewed relation to what the subject—under the sway of objet petit a—sees as its 
Other.  
Section II: Many Lacans: A Review of Psychoanalytic Film Theory 
 Although it is difficult to set up a strict timeline—i.e. first…then, and so forth—of 
psychoanalytic film theory, or, more specifically, of Lacanian film theory, one could say that a 
thought—whose trajectory indicated the opening up of the strictly clinical domain of 
psychoanalysis to include that which lies outside the psyche—regarding the relationship of the 
subject to the chain of signifiers of its discourse paved the path for a psychoanalytic film theory. 
11	  
	  
This thought, regarding the ways in which the subject relates to its signifiers through suture, was 
the subject of Jacques-Alain Miller’s first and seminal short article, entitled “Suture: Elements of 
the Logic of the Signifier,” written in response to Lacan’s seminar of 1965. In this essay, Miller 
introduces the term “suture” in the following way:  
Suture names the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse; we shall see 
that it figures there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a stand-in. For, 
while there lacking, it is not purely and simply absent. Suture, by extension—the 
general relation of lack to the structure—of which it is an element, inasmuch as it 
implies the position of a taking-the-place-of.16 
Miller’s analysis orients the subject in relation to its discourse, or the chain of signifiers specific 
to the subject, in a topological way. Suture, for Miller, is the relation—between the subject and 
the signifier—which, because it is essentially lacking, allows the subject to take place in 
discourse. Miller’s argument regarding suture addresses the topological relation between inside 
and outside, or included and excluded, in a nuanced and complex manner. While Miller located 
the subject in the lacking-ness of the domain of the signifier through the concept of suture, it was 
Jean-Pierre Oudart who adapted “suture” as a key term through which to understand the 
relationship between the subject and cinema.  
Oudart’s essay, “Cinema and Suture,” first published in Cahiers du Cinéma in 1969, 
adapted the concept of suture—from the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis via Miller—to the 
study of the relationship between the spectator, or the “cinematic subject,” and the signifying 
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system, or the language of cinema.17 Oudart credits Robert Bresson with the “discovery” of a 
“cinematic articulation irreducible to any other” which he calls “suture.”18 In significant contrast 
to Miller’s understanding of suture as that which is lacking between the chain of signifiers and the 
subject, in Oudart’s formulation, suture becomes “the closure of the cinematic énoncé in line with 
its relationship with its subject (the filmic subject or rather the cinematic subject), which is 
recognized, and then put in its place as the spectator.”19 Here, Oudart makes a distinction between 
the “filmed subject” and the “filmic subject”: while the former is the “actor in a representation 
whose symbolic dimension is revealed in the process of reading and viewing,” the latter is the 
spectator, “by and for whom the operation of suture works” (Oudart 1977-78). Thus, for Oudart, 
the filmed subject is the “signifying object,” whose field—i.e. the cinematic field—is “echoed by 
an absent field, the place of a character who is put there by the viewer's imaginary, and which we 
shall call the Absent One” (Oudart 1977-78). It is in the process of reading and viewing by the 
spectator that suture can be said to occur, claims Oudart. The “Absent One” of the cinematic field 
is replaced by someone—i.e. a character in the film—in the process of viewing, and through the 
process of shot-reverse shot. In this way, the pure field of absence comes to be represented in the 
signifier of the present one in the cinematic field, in which the two fields are sutured together. 
Thus, Oudart defines suture as “the abolition of the Absent One and its resurrection in someone” 
(Oudart 1977-78). This process, however, takes place in and by the spectator, who, as a result, is 
doubly decentered in the cinema. First what is enunciated, initially, is not the viewer's 
own discourse, nor anyone else's: it is thus that he comes to posit the signifying object as 
the signifier of the absence of anyone. Secondly the unreal space of the enunciation leads 
to the necessary quasi-disappearance of the subject as it enters its own field and thus 
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submerges, in a sort of hypnotic continuum in which all possibility of discourse is 
abolished, the relation of alternating eclipse which the subject has to its own discourse; 
and this relation then demands to be represented within the process of reading the film, 
which it duplicates. (Oudart 1977-78) 
Covering up, or mystifying this double decentering of the spectator—i.e. that the spectator is 
neither the “Absent One” nor someone in the film—is the effect of suture, which allows the 
spectator to view, read or understand cinematic representation as a fictional or symbolic system. 
In this way, Oudart’s theory of suture seeks to understand the nature of cinematic representation 
in linguistic or semiotic terms, following the psychoanalytic framework set up by Miller. 
 Oudart’s conception of the function of suture in cinema was further expanded by Stephen 
Heath in his essays “Narrative Space” and “Notes on Suture.” In the latter essay, Heath explicates 
Oudart’s argument in the following way: 
Cinema as discourse is the production of a subject and the subject is the point of 
that production, constantly missing in and moving along the flow of images, the 
very assurance of the flow, with suture, as it were, the culmination of that 
assurance. The awareness of absence breaks the immediate delight in the image; 
that absence is posed by the spectator as an absence of, the absent field of an 
absent one; that absent field is reappropriated into the film, the place of the 
absent one is filled by a character in the film; thus the pure field of absence 
becomes the imaginary field of the film, given as absent from the film, and the 
field of its imaginary, given in terms of the film’s fiction; thus the break in the 
initial relation with the image is sutured, sutured across the spectator constituted 
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as cinematic or filmic subject, essential to the realisation of image as signifier 
and to the articulation of shots together.20 
Heath correctly points out that in Oudart’s conception, cinematic suture points to the connection 
between the Imaginary and the Symbolic orders—in the sense of Lacanian psychoanalysis—and 
upholds the function of the Imaginary in the founding of the cinematic subject, or the spectator. 
Thus, in Heath’s estimation, the concept of suture proposed by Oudart implicates the discourse of 
cinema in a sense of loss—i.e. “the loss of the extreme pleasure of absorption in the image as the 
spectator is set as the subject of the film.”21 However, Heath further points out that Oudart had 
characterized suture not only as a device in cinema, but also as the singular ideological operation 
that produces the subject in the discourse of cinema: it is this view of suture as ideology that is 
taken up by Daniel Dayan in his essay “The Tutor-Code of Classical Cinema.”22 Referring to 
Dayan’s essay which explicates Oudart’s “Travail, Lecture, Jouissance,” Heath argues that 
although suture can serve well to name the process by which the specificity of the subject is 
inscribed in the cinematic space, Oudart’s formulation collapses the continuity of this process into 
the singular figure of the “Absent One” (Heath 1977-78, 64). Heath critiques Oudart’s use of the 
“Absent One” as a poor substitute for Miller’s explication of the role of the Other in the process 
of suturing the subject to its discourse. Thus, Heath supplements the monolithic nature that the 
idea of suture came to assume with the conception of “central projection” in his essay “Narrative 
Space.” In this essay, Heath suggests that cinematic space—in which the discourse of cinema 
could be said to “take place”—is organized around the “central projection,” which is defined as 
“the art of depicting three dimensional objects upon a plane surface in such a manner that the 
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picture may affect the eye of an observer in the same way as the natural objects themselves.”23 
The subject is sustained by the illusion of the “central projection,” which is constructed 
heterogeneously through social, psychological and aesthetic means.  
 Similar engagements with the role of cinema in constructing a subject of cinema were 
also evident in the works of Jean-Louis Baudry, Christian Metz and Laura Mulvey. According to 
Joan Copjec, the works of this group of theorist initiated a shift or a break in the ways in which 
Lacanian psychoanalysis was used in film theory, whereby the cinematic space, or the screen, 
came to be regarded as a kind of “mirror” that constructed the “reality” in which the spectator-
subject is founded.24 Copjec further points out that this view of cinema as an “apparatus”—a kind 
of machine or institution—which produces the spectator as completely subjected or subjugated to 
the function of the signifier through an imaginary identification, stems from Louis Althusser’s 
reconceptualization of the Lacanian category of the “Imaginary” as the historical and ideological 
construction of the subject. Copjec writes:  
Althusser rethought the category of the imaginary, making it a part of the process 
of the historical construction of the subject. The imaginary came to name a 
process necessary for—rather than an impediment to—the ideological founding 
of the subject: the imaginary provided the form of the subject's lived relation to 
society. Through this relation, the subject was brought to accept as its own, to 
recognize itself in, the representations of the social order.25 
Thus, it is through Althusser that film theorists, such as Metz and Baudry, came to accept the role 
of the cinematic screen as the so-called Lacanian “mirror” upon which the subject sees and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 . Heath, “Narrative Space,” Screen 17, no. 3 (1976):75-6. 
24 . Joan Copjec, “The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of Lacan,” 
October 49 (1989): 57. 
 
 25 . Ibid., 58. 
16	  
	  
identifies with its specular image, or likeness. This process of identification—which is essentially 
a false identification, according to Althusser, and by extension, according to Metz and Baudry—
produces the subject as fully controlled or determined by its social order. The project of a theory 
of cinema, therefore, is to dispel this false identification by revealing the ways in which cinema 
actively produces subjugation through the function of ideology.  
 Indeed, this goal of film theory is evident in Baudry’s seminal essay “Ideological Effects 
of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus.” In this essay, Baudry sets out to question the supposed 
ideological neutrality of the cinematic apparatus, in order to reveal that the ideology operative in 
the cinematic apparatus produces the conception of the subject as the “active center and origin of 
meaning.” Baudry writes: 
Cinematographic specificity (what distinguishes cinema from other systems of 
signification) thus refers to a work, that is, to a process of transformation. The 
question becomes, is the work made evident, does consumption of the product 
bring about a “knowledge effect” [Althusser], or is the work concealed? If the 
latter, consumption of the product will obviously be accompanied by ideological 
surplus value. On the practical level, this poses the question of by what 
procedures the work can in fact be made “readable” in its inscription. These 
procedures must of necessity call cinematographic technique into play. But, on 
the other hand, going back to the first question, one may ask, do the instruments 
(the technical base) produce specific ideological effects, and are these effects 
themselves determined by the dominant ideology? In which case, concealment of 
the technical base will also bring about a specific ideological effect. Its 
inscription, its manifestation as such, on the other hand, would produce a 
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knowledge effect, as actualization of the work process, as denunciation of 
ideology, and as critique of idealism.26 
Since the cinematic apparatus is invested in the production of ideological surplus value, leading 
to an increased mystification of the process by which it is produced, Baudry argues, that the goal 
of film theory ought to be de-mystification, by way of revealing the ideology that is the ground of 
the cinema apparatus. Thus, Baudry offers a thorough analysis of the ways in which the cinema 
apparatus—the camera as the “eye of the subject,” and projection as the creation of the illusion of 
continuity and persistence of vision—ultimately produces a “transcendental subject” bound to the 
“screen-mirror” via “double identification.”27 Specifically, for Baudry, the camera functions to 
establish a model of perspective that—like its predecessor, Renaissance painting—puts the 
subject at the center around which the image becomes meaningful and totalized. Thus, as the 
center of this false fullness of the visual field, the subject discovers its being as homogenous. 
Baudry further argues that the camera’s occasional deviations from the standard perspective work 
to reinforce the idea of perspective as “normal” vision. Another way in which the subject is duped 
into a sense of fullness and mastery of the visual or experiential field is through projection, 
Baudry argues. This is because the projector restores the false sense of continuity—represented 
by the moving images—by effacing the inherent differences, heterogeneity and discontinuity of 
the individuals shots that constitute a film. Moreover, Baudry argues, because the projection of 
cinema takes place in a “darkened room” and on a screen-mirror that is “bordered” or “framed,” 
the spectator can sustain its false belief in the transcendental mastery of the subject who is 
supposedly at the center of this operation. However, the screen-mirror does not reflect reality; it 
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reflects images that have no real correspondence.28 It is for this reason that Baudry concludes that 
the goal of a theory of cinema is to disturb or disrupt the elements of the cinematic apparatus, so 
that the instrumentality of the apparatus in producing the effect of ideology is properly revealed 
(Baudry 1974-75, 46). 
 Christian Metz’ influential essay “The Imaginary Signifier” retained the aspect of the 
spectator’s identification with the specular image, but introduced the concept of the gaze as the 
principal factor in this process of identification.29 Metz, like Baudry, theorizes the cinema screen 
as a mirror, and argues that the ways in which the spectator identifies with the specular image on 
the screen-mirror is comparable to the Lacanian conception of the “mirror stage.” Thus, the goal 
of film theory is very clear in Metz’ writing: 
Reduced to its most fundamental approach, any psychoanalytic reflection might 
be defined in Lacanian terms as an attempt to disengage the cinema-object from 
the imaginary and to win it for the symbolic, in the hope of extending the latter 
by a new province: an enterprise of displacement, a territorial enterprise, a 
symbolising advance; that is to say, in the field of films as in other fields, the 
psychoanalytic itinerary is from the outset a semiological one, even (above all) if 
in comparison with the discourse of a more classical semiology it shifts from 
attention to the énoncé to concern for the énonciation.30 
The concern for the énonciation, or speech-act, that Metz identifies in Lacanian psychoanalysis in 
its application to the study of cinema, refers to the insistence on the ideological analysis of 
symbolic construction of reality in cinema, referred to in the previous paragraph. Thus, Metz is in 
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agreement with Baudry’s proposition regarding the goal of film theory: to rescue the subject from 
the grip of the imaginary identification of ideology. However, Metz’ project is more openly 
political: he sees the effect and function of ideology as specifically the product of capitalism and 
industrial civilization.31 In this way, Metz is closer to Althusser’s attempt to bring together 
Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Metz is clearly invested in the liberatory potential of the 
symbolic register of cinema, as opposed to the oppressive nature of the imaginary: 
[In the symbolic] we can find hope for a little more knowledge, it is one of its 
avatars that introduces ‘understanding’, whereas the imaginary is the site of an 
insurpassable opacity, almost by definition. Thus as a beginning it is absolutely 
essential to tear the symbolic from its own imaginary and to return it to it as a 
look. (16) 
Thus, Metz’ project is certainly to liberate the spectator from the imaginary identification with the 
screen-mirror, but he casts the spectatorial identification in terms of voyeurism. If cinema is 
constructed symbolically, Metz argues, the spectator engages with it at a safe distance: “What I 
have said about identification so far amounts to the statement that the spectator is absent from the 
screen as perceived, but he is also (the two things inevitably go together) present there and even 
‘all-present’ as perceiver. At every moment I am in the film by my look’s caress” (56). Being 
absent as perceived and present as perceiver allows the spectator to escape the sense of real 
absence that characterizes life outside the cinema. For Metz, the cinematic apparatus allows the 
spectators to overcome temporarily the sense of lack that they otherwise endure. This experience 
provides a wholly imaginary pleasure, echoing that of the mirror stage. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 The point at which the spectator finds itself “in the film,” is the point of the gaze, Copjec 
argues in her analysis of Metz’ work.32 Copjec writes that the gaze, in this formulation, is the 
“ideal point,” which “can be nothing but the signified of the image, the point from which the 
image makes sense to the subject. In taking up its position at this point, the subject sees itself as 
supplying the image with sense.”33 In the case of Metz—as in the case of Baudry’s conception of 
the camera-eye, Heath’s conception of the “central projection,” or Oudart’s conception of the 
“Absent One”—Copjec argues: 
the gaze is always the point from which identification is conceived by film theory 
to take place. And because the gaze is always conceptualized as an analogue of 
that geometral point of Renaissance perspective at which the picture becomes 
fully, undistortedly visible, the gaze always retains within film theory the sense 
of being that point at which sense and being coincide. The subject comes into 
being by identifying with the image’s signified. Sense founds the subject—that is 
the ultimate point of the film theoretical concept of the gaze.34 
Of course, it is Copjec’s contention that this conception of the gaze is erroneous, and she argues 
that it is due to this false interpretation of the gaze in film theory that Lacanian psychoanalysis 
has come under attack in the field. This conception of the gaze, which associates it with the total 
visibility of the panopticon model, is a ““Foucauldization” of Lacanian theory,” Copjec argues 
(Copjec 1989, 56). The problem of this model, Copjec points out, is that in the relation between 
the gaze and the apparatus, the subject is rendered “completely upright, completely correct”: i.e. 
that the subject is fundamentally split, and that therefore engages with the symbolic order in an 
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oblique way—and not in the direct way as the proponents of imaginary identification would have 
it—is entirely missing from these formulations (62-3). Copjec goes on to point out that while 
Lacanian film theorists have followed Lacan’s “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the ‘I’ 
Function” essay in theorizing the relationship between the subject and its imaginary identification 
with the specular image, Lacan himself revised his theory considerably in “Of the Gaze as Objet 
Petit a” (66). In the latter seminar, Lacan recounts a personal story—in which he is made aware 
of the anxiety-producing effect of the gaze on the “I”—to argue that the gaze is “that which 
“determines” the I in the visible; it is “the instrument through which … [the] I [is] photo-
graphed”” (67). This, however, does not mean that the subject, or the “I,” is fully determined or 
controlled by the gaze, Copjec writes, because “the hyphen that splits the term photo-graph into 
photo—“light”—and graph—among other things, a fragment of the Lacanian phrase “graph of 
desire”—as it splits the subject that it describes” (67). It is for this reason that—contrary to the 
claims of apparatus theory or gaze theory in cinema—Copjec claims that “the speaking subject 
cannot ever be totally trapped in the imaginary” (67). 
 On the grounds similar to Copjec’s, Todd McGowan has also objected to the conception 
of the gaze in the standard Lacanian film theory. McGowan’s intervention in the field of Lacanian 
film theory—especially in the kind of Lacanian film theory that had dominated the field in the 
1970s—offers a reconceptualization of the gaze, set against primarily Laura Mulvey and 
Baudry’s theorization of the same. McGowan points out that while the early Lacanian film 
theorists contended that the ideological danger of cinema lies in the fact that it compels the 
spectator to identify with the gaze, a more proper Lacanian conception of the gaze posits it on the 
side of the objective rather than the subjective. McGowan writes referring to Baudry and Mulvey: 
Baudry contends that identification with this gaze has the effect of controlling the 
spectator. [A]ccepting this identification, the spectator fails to notice that the 
perspective of the gaze is symbolically situated. Although the cinematic 
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experience provides a sense of imaginary mastery, identification with the 
camera's gaze also hides the functioning of the symbolic order. […] For Mulvey, 
identification with the male protagonist supplements identification with the 
camera. The filmic spectator is thus provided with a sense of mastery over the 
gaze's female object. Identification with the male protagonist-like identification 
with the camera-provides a sense of complete mastery. Spectators accept and 
even pursue identification with this cinematic and male gaze because they are 
looking for mastery; for traditional Lacanian film theorists, this desire for 
mastery is the desire governing human behavior.35 
For McGowan—unlike Copjec—this juxtaposition of mastery or power and desire, undertaken by 
early Lacanian film theorist, demonstrates a Nietzschean interpretation of desire as desire for 
mastery over that which one desires. McGowan argues that when critics accuse Lacanian film 
theory—and his example is Gaylyn Studlar’s “Masochism and the Perverse Pleasure of 
Cinema”—of conflating desire with (male) power, such criticism is misdirected: Lacan himself 
never proposed that in the experience of cinema, the spectator desire mastery—quite the opposite. 
This is why McGowan recalls Lacan’s formulation of the gaze as “the objet a in the field of the 
visible,” and explains that the gaze is precisely that point in the visual domain which, because it 
distorts the subject’s orientation with the field, draws the spectator into the picture. That is, the 
gaze, according to McGowan, “involves the spectator in the image, disrupting her/his ability to 
remain all-perceiving and unperceived in the cinema.”36 In other words, McGowan contests the 
claim of early Lacanian film theorists that what the spectator derives from cinema is mastery and 
voyeurism through identification with the gaze. Instead, McGowan explains that the gaze as objet 
petit a “indicates that this object is not a positive entity but a lacuna in the visual field. It is not 
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the look of the subject at the object, but the gap within the subject’s seemingly omnipotent 
look.”37 McGowan contends that early Lacanian film theory missed the proper dimension of the 
gaze because it “conceived of the cinematic experience predominantly in terms of the imaginary 
and the symbolic order, not in terms of the real.”38  
 The missing dimension of the real in the early Lacanian film theory is what made it too 
narrow, and therefore open to the accusations brought up against it by the proponents of Post-
Theory, McGowan and Sheila Kunkle write in their introduction to Lacan and Contemporary 
Film. The authors/editors set out to correct this shortcoming of Lacanian film theory in the 
aforementioned volume. They argue that, as result of this elision, early Lacanian film theory 
could not account for “any sense of the power of film to disrupt ideology and to challenge—or 
even expose—the process of interpellation.”39 Because early Lacanian film theory depended too 
much on the functions of the Imaginary and Symbolic orders, the authors argue, the signifier’s 
perceived “authority” and flawlessness was never challenged. Moreover, such interpretation of 
Lacan elided the crucial role Lacan assigns to failure, interruption or disturbance in the 
production of signification. The authors very clearly point out the connection between such 
constitutive failure and the Real:  
Failure is necessary because the signifier must open up a space through which the 
subject can enter: a perfectly functioning system allows for no new entrants, no 
new subjects. As a consequence, if the symbolic order is determinative in the 
path that it lays down for the subject, it doesn't lay down this path smoothly but 
in a way that is fraught with peril. That is to say, the symbolic order continually 
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comes up against a barrier that disrupts its smooth functioning—a barrier that 
Lacan calls the Real.40 
Accordingly, the authors clarify that the Real is not external to the Symbolic order—that is, the 
Real is not a material object that lies beyond the Symbolic. Instead, they conceive of the Real as 
the “gap” within the Symbolic. In other words, the Real is that which is missing in the Symbolic. 
Thought of in this way, it is easy to see the connection between the McGowan’s 
reconceptualization of the gaze and the Lacanian Real. Expectedly, the authors go on to define 
objet petit a—of which the gaze is an instance—in terms of the Real: 
Lacan himself turned toward the Real as the central category of experience. He 
sketched the different forms of the objet a as little bits of the Real, as those 
partial objects—the gaze, the voice, the breast, the feces, and the phallus—that 
cause desire and are circled by the drives. The Real is not simply what “resists 
symbolization absolutely,” but also the pivotal category in the process of 
subjectivization.41 
Thus, by associating the subject with objet petit a and the Real—rather than with the Imaginary 
and the Symbolic—the authors cast the subject as the “stumbling block of sense,” in a direct 
rejoinder to Copjec’s estimation of the early Lacanian film theory’s conception of the gaze. 
 However, what is significantly missing from McGowan and Kunkle’s repositioning of the 
subject in relation to the Real is any reference to Miller’s conceptualization of suture, even 
though the declared purpose of their book is to rectify the mistakes of previous Lacanian film 
theory. Now, I am certainly not claiming that in order to fulfill their purpose the authors ought to 
address every variation of Lacanian theory related to representation. However, the way in which 
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McGowan and Kunkle want to rethink the relationship between the Real and the Symbolic—a 
relationship in which the subject can be located—is prominently topological, precisely in the way 
that Miller’s conception of suture is topological. Consider the following passage from Miller’s 
essay on suture, where he justifies—in a highly ironic way—his presence, as a non-clinician, in 
the psychoanalytic field: 
I will not keep you waiting. The justification lies in this, which will come as no 
surprise after the developments which have so enchanted your hearing at this 
seminar since the start of the academic year, that the Freudian field is not 
representable as a closed surface. The opening up of psychoanalysis is not the 
effect of the liberalism, the whim, the blindness even of he who has set himself 
as its guardian. For, if not being situated on the inside does not relegate you to 
the outside, it is because at a certain point, excluded from a two-dimensional 
topology, the two surfaces join up and the periphery or outer edge crosses over 
the circumscription.42 
Obviously, Miller is addressing several issues here: first, as a young scholar who is not formally 
trained in clinical psychoanalysis, Miller is commenting on the fact that his presence at the 
seminar challenges the supposed signifying consistency of the psychoanalytic field. 
Topologically, Miller is outside the field because he is not an analyst; yet he is clearly present in 
the field by virtue of his attending the seminar as an interlocutor. Moreover, the fact that Miller 
has to account for his presence suggests that he is not fully integrated in the system/field/school 
of psychoanalysis, and therefore, his vocal presence inside the field serves to upset the closed-
ness of the field. Second, Miller makes a clear reference to Lacan’s “excommunication” from the 
IPA, and suggests that in the figure of Lacan one could also identify this topological problem: 
Lacan is excluded from the greater field of psychoanalysis; yet, his absence-presence continues to 
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re-orient the field. Third,—and this is where he invokes topology as such—Miller points out that 
figures like Lacan and himself serve to demonstrate the ways in which it is possible to think of a 
topology beyond the two-dimensional geometry, where that which is seemingly excluded from 
the coordinates of a fixed geometral plane is also included in it as the absence that orients said 
plane. Following this nuanced preamble, Miller goes on to define the term that is his intervention 
in the psychoanalytic field: namely, suture. Miller defines the term in the following way: 
Suture names the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse; we shall see 
that it figures there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a stand-in. For, 
while there lacking, it is not purely and simply absent. Suture, by extension—the 
general relation of lack to the structure—of which it is an element, inasmuch as it 
implies the position of a taking-the-place-of.43 
Perhaps now it is not difficult to see Miller’s preamble as a performance of the topological 
concept of suture: suture is that which is lacking in the domain of signifiers; yet its lacking-ness, 
in itself, signifies it in relation to other signifiers. 
 Consider, now, McGowan and Kunkle’s description of the relationship between the Real 
and the Symbolic: 
This barrier is not external to the symbolic structure: the Lacanian Real is not a 
thing in itself existing beyond the realm of the signifier. Instead, the Real marks 
the point at which the symbolic order derails itself, the point where a gap occurs 
within that order.44 
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Is this description of the Real as a gap within the order not exactly similar to Miller’s conception 
of suture? In McGowan and Kunkle’s formulation, what is the Real but that which appears as 
lacking within the Symbolic order and thereby derails it? It would serve us well to linger on this 
verb—derail. Obviously, “derail” invokes the image of a train that has gone off the two parallel 
tracks on which it runs. However, does this also not suggest that, once this metaphorical train is 
derailed, it occupies a geometral position that connects the two parallel planes/rails by, precisely, 
crossing over them? Thought in this way, the Real can no longer be either a “category of 
experience,” nor can it be a “category in the process of subjectivization,” as the authors would 
have it.45 This is so because, topologically, the Real is neither a category, nor is it conducive to 
experience or subjectivization; rather, following Miller’s topology of suture, one could argue that 
the Real is precisely the opposite of these. If we follow Miller’s analysis, we will see that the Real 
is that which complicates and reorients categories; we will also see that the Real cannot be 
experienced; it can only be represented by a signifier (placeholder) to other signifiers in a system 
of signification. Thus, even though McGowan and Kunkle emphasize that the Symbolic order is 
not an always smoothly functioning monolith—i.e. an ideological apparatus—in order to open up 
the possibility of using Lacanian psychoanalysis to discover in cinema a challenge—rather than a 
mute obedience—to ideology, they do so by entirely rejecting early Lacanian film theory. A 
productive opportunity to test, modify and employ the analytical power of suture theory is lost in 
the process. 
 Slavoj Žižek’s defense of Lacanian film theory against the critique of Post-Theory, 
however, takes up the question of suture theory. In The Fright of Real Tears, Žižek points out that 
the rejection of Theory as the so-called “Theory of Everything” (TOE) stems from an improper or 
insufficient understanding of the “paradoxical relationship between universality and its 
constitutive exception,” and that this paradoxical relationship is best understood through the 
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concept of suture.46 However, in order to appreciate the position that Žižek takes with regard to 
suture, one must first explicate his analysis of the relationship between universality and its 
exception. In Žižek’s view, it is this paradoxical relationship that animates the nature of Post-
Theory’s critique: 
Post-Theorists basically reproach Theory with two opposite, mutually exclusive 
deficiencies: on the one hand, Theory is a new version of the global TOE (against 
which one should assert theories (in the plural): modest, mid-level, empirically 
verifiable research programmes); on the other hand, Theory involves a cognitive 
suspension characteristic of historicist relativism: Theorists no longer ask the 
basic questions like ‘What is the nature of cinematic perception?’, they simply 
tend to reduce such questions to the historicist reflection upon the conditions in 
which certain notions emerged as the result of historically specific power 
relations.47 
In Žižek’s view, what Post-Theory finds problematic is the way in which Theory arrives at the 
dimension of the universal without passing through the particulars. While the first approach wants 
to avoid universal claims and proposes that one arrives at a concept through the means of 
inductive logic involving empirically verifiable data, the second approach embraces a more 
deductive mode by considering how notions emerge out of specific historical conditions. In other 
words, both methods consider the universal dimension of a concept or notion as analogous to the 
metaphysical Theory of Everything, and therefore they reject it. Žižek, however, suggests that “a 
proper dialectical approach offers a way out of the predicament. The key feature of this approach 
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concerns the paradoxical relationship between universality and its constitutive exception.”48 This 
“proper dialectical approach,” according to Žižek, is a procedure in which the universal 
dimension of a concept or notion is reached via “a direct jump from the singular to the universal, 
by-passing the mid-level of particularity” (25). Žižek’s example of this “direct jump” is the way 
in which Freud arrives at universal assertions or concepts regarding certain psychic operations 
through the close dissection of some singular experience. Žižek points out that the obvious 
challenge to such universal assertion would take the form of skepticism regarding the verifiability 
of the universal in the absence of particular examples—i.e. how would one know for sure that the 
chosen experience is truly representative of universality? According to Žižek, the dialectical 
answer to this objection is that each particular example displaces universality in a specific way, 
and therefore it is impossible to arrive at a true universality in this manner.49 According to Žižek, 
the “singular” example—which is also an exceptional example—on the other hand allows the 
formation of universality and the necessary rules thereof. The singular example does so by 
providing an exception that establishes this domain of rules. However, Žižek also asks: how is it 
structurally possible for the universal, or the domain of rules, to contain its exception? The 
answer to this, Žižek suggests, is to be found in the analysis of suture. 
 Suture, according to Žižek, is that which “concerns the gap between the Universal and the 
Particular: it is this gap that is ultimately ‘sutured’” (31). In introducing suture, Žižek refers to its 
long history—and its loss of specificity—from Miller through Oudart to film theory. Žižek 
writes: 
The concept of ‘suture’ has a long history. It was elevated from a casual word 
that occurs once in Lacan into a concept by Jacques-Alain Miller, in his first and 
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seminal short article, an intervention at Jacques Lacan's seminar of 24 February 
1965. Here, it designates the relationship between the signifying structure and the 
subject of the signifier. Then, in the late 60s, it was taken over by Jean-Pierre 
Oudart. It was only later, when it was again taken over and elaborated by the 
English Screen theorists, that it became a major concept in cinema theory and 
opened up to wider discussion. Finally, years later, it again lost its specific 
mooring in cinema studies and turned into a part of the deconstructionist jargon, 
functioning as a vague notion rather than a strict concept, as synonymous with 
‘closure’: ‘suture’ signaled that the gap, the opening, of a structure was 
obliterated, enabling the structure to (mis)perceive itself as a self-enclosed 
totality of representation. (31) 
Two key points about the notion of suture become evident in this passage: 1) in Miller’s 
formulation, suture indicated the specific way in which the subject comes into being in relation to 
the system of signification; and 2) in Žižek’s interpretation, suture involves a misperception 
through which the system of signification appears to be universal. The system appears to be 
universal because the inherent failures—i.e. the gaps, the openings or the exceptions—are 
inscribed or stitched on as constituent elements of the system. In other words, Žižek argues that 
the process of suturing allows exceptions to be signified as exceptions within the system of 
signification, and it in this way that the system takes on the appearance of universality. Thus, for 
Žižek, suture perform an “ideological operation” in cinema, through which “the gap that separates 
two totally different levels—that of the enunciated content (the narrative fiction) and that of the 
decentred process of its enunciation—is flattened” (33). However, Žižek also points out that the 
process of suturing is never fully completed—i.e. gaps or distortions always appear within the 
system of signification. Thus, in Žižek’s view, the role of film theory is to analyze the ideological 
functions through which the system of signification takes on the appearance of universality. He 
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argues that the best way dispel the misperception of universality of the system of signification is 
to foreground the points at which the system “can no longer sustain the appearance of seamless 
continuity” (33). This point of rupture, for Žižek, is the Lacanian order of the Real. Thus, Žižek 
proposes that the point or site at which suturing becomes necessary is also the point at which the 
system of signification breaks down due to the appearance of the Real. Thus, Real becomes the 
key concept through which Žižek challenges the notion held by early Lacanian film theorists 
regarding the symbolic order’s complete domination of the subject. 
Section III: Argument and Chapter Overview 
 The goal of this dissertation is to join with the contemporary Lacanian film theorists’ 
claim that Lacanian psychoanalysis can significantly enrich film theory and steer one’s 
engagement with film in the direction of philosophy—away from the “middle-level research” of 
Post-Theory. Thus, my intervention in Lacanian film theory is indebted to the works of theorists 
such as Todd McGowan, Hugh Manon, Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Žižek . At the same time, 
however, I offer detailed and original readings of some of Lacan’s own writings, which are 
crucial in the development of film theory. In so doing, I not only explicate Lacan’s writing that 
has not been taken up by Lacanian film theory, but also, I touch upon a significant part of the 
clinical side of Lacanian psychoanalysis—namely, the aspect of “topology” in the Lacanian 
oeuvre. The basic argument of this dissertation is this: in theorizing about cinema, there is way to 
rethink the question of subjectivity without taking recourse in the ideas of spectatorship and 
identification—championed by early Lacanian film theory—and this path runs through the 
subject’s fundamentally skewed relation to what the subject—under the sway of objet petit a—
sees as its Other.  
In contrast to early Lacanian film theory that sees the relationship between the subject 
and its Other as overdetermined and as a result, does not see any possibility of the subject’s 
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autonomy within the totally flawless symbolic order, or the domain of the Other, I argue that the 
subject comes into being in relation to failures or disturbances that are inherent in the functioning 
of the symbolic order. As a result, the subject comes into being not as a mere puppet of the Other; 
rather, the subject comes into being by manipulating the inconsistencies in the field of the Other. 
Of course, the subject manipulates the Other because it desires to come into being—albeit 
retroactively—as a subject; or, more properly speaking, the subject manipulates the Other 
because it desires. Thus, in this process, the subject is also manipulated or lured by something 
that it sees as lacking, missing or inconsistent in the Other: essentially, a gap in the Other that 
only the subject can fill, and thereby can come into being. Thus, the subject in my formulation is 
a skewed subject: one that undoubtedly exists in relation to an Other, but one whose relation to 
this Other is off-kilter. To be sure, it is impossible for a subject—insofar as it is a subject—to 
conceive of an Other that has no inconsistencies, precisely because there would be no space for 
subjectivity in such a totality. These failures or disturbances in the functioning of the Other—that 
is, the symbolic order—that are necessary for the arrival of the subject is understood in 
contemporary Lacanian film theory as the Real. Following Lacan, contemporary film theorist 
suggest that the Real appears as part-objects, or as objet petit a, and thereby precipitates 
subjectivization. Thus, contemporary Lacanian film theory sees the Real as “the central category 
of experience” that, when transposed onto the study of cinema, can unleash the radical power of 
cinema to disrupt the hegemony of the symbolic order (McGowan and Kunkle 2004, xvii). 
 It is at this point—i.e. the point of the Real—that my analysis departs from contemporary 
Lacanian film theory. Instead of understanding the Real as a category of experience—which 
would necessitate an entity that experiences the Real—I see the Real as much more closely 
aligned with the structure of objet petit a, which can be understood as an object that appears to 
the subject as empty or missing. Just as the subject never really experiences objet petit a as a 
concrete object—whether part or whole—similarly, the Real is that which is missing from the 
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subject’s experiential domain. In other words, I propose a reversal of the claim that there is no 
subject without the Real and argue that there is no Real without the subject, and that there is no 
subject without objet petit a. Thus, in my view—and this is what I show in this dissertation—the 
best way to understand the radical power of the Real is through a thorough analysis of the 
subject’s relation to objet petit a. Rather than seeing objet petit a as a little piece of the Real—
which suggests a hierarchical relationship—I see them as two co-existent elements of a triadic 
structure. The third element in this triad is the false fullness of its image with which the subject 
identifies in the order of the Imaginary, or the Mirror stage, taken up enthusiastically by early 
Lacanian film theorists in their analysis of spectatorship. My contention is that by understanding 
the relationship between these three co-existent elements and what appears as the subject, one can 
arrive at a proper theory of film that can account for one’s experience with cinema in a more 
comprehensive manner. 
 I propose this re-thinking of the relationship between the specular image, the Real and 
objet petit a through the close reading of seven Bollywood films. This choice is guided by two 
primary concerns: first, much of my conception of culture is mediated by my experience with 
Bollywood films; that is, these are the film that I grew up watching, and therefore I relate to these 
films beyond the conscious, analytical level; and second, in my experience, Bollywood films 
seem to solicit the kind of spectatorial identification with which early Lacanian film theorists 
extensively engaged, whereby the rupturing of narrative and stylistic signification—such as, the 
prolific use of song-and-dance numbers that break up the narrative—is included in the process of 
signification as a routine. Hence, I chose Bollywood films because they allow me to push 
Lacanian concepts to their limit. Moreover, the seven films that I study in this dissertation are 
also specifically exceptional: in one way or another, each of these films reconfigures standard 
modes or practices of cinematic representation in the context of Bollywood. In other words, these 
films are avowedly at odds with the specific historico-cultural milieu within which they appear, 
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and as a result, clear the ground for a radical re-thinking of cinema. For this reason, these films 
also challenge the contemporary Lacanian film theory’s claim regarding the power of cinema to 
disrupt—and not found—signifying consistency.  
Section IV: Chapter Overview 
 I discuss the nature of the subject’s skewed relationship with process or system of 
signification in four chapters: Chapter I discusses how the subject’s relation to the system of 
signification is determined by temporal distortions. This chapter argues that the subject’s relation 
to temporality is punctuated by retroaction and anticipation, rather than a linear, chronological 
movement. This temporal uncertainty turns the pacing of the subject’s partial arrival into a 
hesitant one, and thereby allows for openness, freedom and difference in the subject’s relation to 
the structure of desire. The skewed temporality of the subject and the hesitancy inherent in its 
arrival are prominently consequential when communal subjectivities—such as national identity—
are taken into consideration. This chapter substantiates its claim through the analysis of Rang De 
Basanti (2006). Chapter II discusses the subject’s appearance in the system of signification or 
the domain of symbolic language in terms of spatiality. Through the analysis of Dil Se (1998), 
this chapter argues that the precipitation of subjectivity is a factor of the endless deferral of 
signification in symbolic language: just as the signifier tends to but never fully conjugates with 
the signified to precipitate stable meaning, the subject tends to a fixed locus but never fully comes 
into being within the space of language. In this chapter, I contend that the subject’s relation to the 
space in which it purports to occupy a locus is fundamentally skewed, even when the film 
depicting this relationship is neither overtly topophilic nor deliberately gaze-oriented. Rather, as 
Dil Se demonstrates through the interaction and intersection of multiple trajectories or vectors of 
subjective desire, the split or skewed subject appears where the process of signification fails to 
achieve closure. Chapter III discusses the psychoanalytic notion of the gaze. Contemporary 
Lacanian film theorists define the gaze as the point at which the consistency of the Symbolic 
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order breaks down, and in so doing, they depart from the path of early Lacanian film theorists, 
who considered the Symbolic order to be infallible and monolithic. However, contemporary 
Lacanians argue that the subject’s appearance is entirely dependent upon the gaze as objet petit a, 
which holds the subject in the sway of the domain of the Other. In contrast, in this chapter, I 
argue that although subjectivity is indeed precipitated in the domain of the Other or the field of 
symbolic language in relation to the gaze as objet petit a, it is not that the subject has no agency 
in this matter. On the contrary, this chapter proposes that it is possible to conceive of a kind of 
subjectivity that comes into being via an oblique relationship with the space of signification, by 
recognizing the gaze qua objet petit a as that which is lacking in the Other, and then by 
manipulating the Other to reveal its lack. This chapter substantiates its claims through the 
analysis of Tere Bin Laden (2010). Chapter IV discusses the notion of object voice as another 
manifestation of the objet petit a. Through the analyses of the audio-visual dys-synchrony of 
Alam Ara (1931), Abhimaan (1973), and Sholay (1975), this chapter argues that a prominent 
factor in the subject’s arrival is aurality—i.e. the domain of sound, which is constituted of audible 
and inaudible elements alike. This chapter further argues that the subject’s appearance is 
predicated upon distortions or disturbances in this domain, whereby the signification of sound 






THE SUBJECT’S TEMPORALITY 
RETROACTION AND ANTICIPATION IN THE DESIRE FOR HISTORY 
The relationship between cinema and temporality has been an intimate and privileged one since 
the inception of cinema. One could even argue that the essence of cinema lies with the 
phenomenon of movement—that is to say, the displacement of and in space in relation to time—
that cinema makes available to its spectator. Indeed, to study cinema is to study the moving 
images, wherein each static or still frame is replaced with the next in accordance with the passage 
of time, creating—as its effect—the illusion of movement. The spectator’s vision—to be more 
precise, the limitedness of vision—plays a central role in upholding the illusion of cinema as the 
moving images. Because the human eye can perceive only a limited number of images within a 
given duration, the continuous replacement of still images or frames coupled with the sense that 
some time has passed creates an illusion of movement for the human eye. To clarify then, one 
could delineate three basic elements that constitute cinema as moving images: first, serial 
replacement of still images; second, passage of time; and third, human spectator who experiences 
the first two elements. If and when these individual elements or the relationship between them are 
subjected to modification, the result is a noticeable and often radical reconfiguration of cinema. 
For instance, hypothetically, if we conceive of a film that contains only one still image or frame, 
the resulting product will be disorienting, to say the least. A somewhat different version of the 
hypothetical scenario occurs in Andy Warhol’s Sleep (1963) and Empire (1964): in the former 
film, the spectator sees a long take footage of John Giorno sleeping for five hours and twenty  
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minutes, and in the latter, the spectator sees—for eight hours and five minutes—the exterior of the 
Empire State Building, with its lights flickering periodically. As such, both films contain the evidence 
of some movement; however, the passage of time becomes almost unbearable in each case due to the 
relative stillness of the images. Noticeably, the radical nature of both films depends on the 
considerable amount of time that passes between the first frame and the last frame. In other words, the 
very awareness that a long time has passed in which very little image-replacement has occurred re-
orients one’s relationship to the films. At the same time, it could be argued that none of the above-
mentioned points are really relevant if no human spectator is watching these films: if these films are 
unbearable, they are so for the human eye. For the non-human eye—i.e. the camera that records John 
Giorno or the Empire State Building—the passage of time and the relative stillness of the images are 
irrelevant. To put this in slightly different terms, then: the temporal-spatial nature of the moving 
images must pass through a consciousness that can differentiate between time A and time B, as well 
as between image A and image B. It is in and through this consciousness—one that can 
differentiate—and its relation to the passage of time that the experience of cinema is best understood. 
 Thus, the goal of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between subjectivity and 
temporality. Specifically, this chapter argues that the subject’s relation to temporality is not linear-
chronological; rather, the subject’s relation to temporality is punctuated by retroaction and 
anticipation. This temporal uncertainty turns the pacing of the subject’s partial arrival into a hesitant 
one, and thereby allows for openness, freedom and difference in the subject’s relation to the structure 
of desire. The skewed temporality of the subject and the hesitancy inherent in its arrival are 
prominently consequential when communal subjectivities—such as national identity—are taken into 
consideration. A desire-based notion of communal subjectivity demands the presence of difference, 
dissention or exception as its necessary constitutive element. The emergence of this difference or 
exception that founds its corresponding system—which is not a totality, but precisely a 
contingency—can be accounted for only when one recognizes that the subject relation to temporality 
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is fundamentally skewed. I substantiate my argument through the analysis of a Rang De Basanti 
(2006), a Bollywood film, which demonstrates how temporal retroaction and anticipation punctuates 
the subject’s relation to its national identity and history, and thereby demonstrates that the purported 
subject of desire is differentiated and free. 
 That cinema has always been responsive to the question of time is one of the central points 
made by Todd McGowan in Out of Time: Desire in Atemporal Cinema. McGowan points out in the 
introduction the crucial role that temporality plays not only in the construction of cinema, but also in 
its dissemination: 
From its inception, cinema has privileged time. The essence and the appeal of the 
cinematic art are inextricable from the experience of temporality that it offers 
spectators. Whatever else films explore, they inherently take temporality as their 
subject due to the nature of the medium. Whatever occurs in the filmic image—or 
between filmic images—occurs within the temporality of the film’s projection. Every 
film orders time in some fashion or other, and the privileged role that time plays in 
cinematic art distinguishes film from all other arts. That is, the way that a film orders 
time shapes its status as a work of art.50 
Three crucial points or claims should be isolated from this passage: first, the essence of cinema is that 
it allows the spectator to experience temporality; second, cinema is inherently bound to explore 
temporality as its content and in its form; and third, cinema’s relation to temporality is a medium-
specific one. The first point allows McGowan to properly lay out the relationship between the 
psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious—specifically with regard to the Freudian “death drive” that 
dominates the unconscious through repetition—and the experience of cinema. In other words, 
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McGowan’s first point contributes to the consideration of temporality in the theorization of cinema in 
the context of Lacanian film theory. However, the last two points—because they are more closely 
aligned with the Modernist notion of medium-specificity—diverge away from Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory. Indeed, McGowan merely touches upon the medium-specificity argument, and 
offers a series of assertions regarding it, all the while accepting the notion of medium specificity as an 
a priori. The first part of McGowan’s argument—one that seeks to isolate the role of death drive in 
the question of temporality in cinema—is far more interesting. 
 Referring to Freud’s introduction of the death drive in the work of psychoanalysis, McGowan 
writes 
If the death drive structures the psyche, then the dream is not simply the fulfillment 
of a wish but the repetition of a trauma. […] Adapting [the theory of the death drive] 
to the cinema, cinematic images would not simply fulfill an unconscious desire but 
would also be a site for the repetition of loss. This conception of the cinema runs up 
against the imaginary plenitude of the cinematic experience, which seems to preclude 
loss instead of foregrounding it. It also collides with the basic temporality of the 
cinema, which tends to move forward in time from an experience of absence toward 
the realization of the spectator’s desire through the presentation of a fantasy object, 
such as romantic union. But what the theory of the death drive can explain is the role 
that absence plays in the cinema. Films do not directly reproduce the unbroken time 
of everyday experience so much as reassemble time through the editing process and 
even through the projection of images itself. There is a gap in cinematic time in 
which an absence repeats itself, and this repetition corresponds to that of the death 
drive. Though most films hide repetition under the cloak of the fantasized realization 
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of desire, some accentuate this repetition and thereby suggest a different form of 
temporality.51 
McGowan goes on to suggest that while the kind of cinema that hides the repetition of loss inherent in 
the temporality of the cinematic medium promotes a desire-based subjectivity whereby the causal-
linear progression of time leads to teleological point of resolution, a cinema based on the 
repetitiveness of the death drive yields a form of subjectivity that is atemporal: 
The subject of the death drive becomes atemporal in the sense that time can provide 
no hope for an alteration of the fundamental problem animating it. Rather than 
looking forward to a future in which desire might be realized, the subject of the death 
drive views past, present, and future on the same plane.52 
To be clear, McGowan does not mean that the subject of the death drive—i.e. the subject that 
atemporal cinema promotes—has no relation to time; contrarily, McGowan’s point is that, in its 
centralization of the death drive, atemporal cinema challenges the extraneousness of temporality to 
the subject. In desire—and by extension, in the desire-based cinema—the subject experiences time as 
chronological and linear, leading from absence or lack of the object of desire to the telos of presence 
or plentitude of the object of desire. In this operation of desire, McGowan suggests, time remains 
extraneous to the basis of subjectivity itself, because under the sway of desire, the subject believes 
that even though it is presently alienated from the fulfillment of desire (i.e. one does not have 
everything that one wants at any given point of time), in future it will have fully realized its desire. 
The subject remains alienated from its desired fullness, and this alienation propels the subject in the 
path of desire in the first place. However, this realization remains foreclosed for the subject of desire. 
To put this in different terms: the basis of subjectivity is that the subject cannot surpass the exigencies 
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of time and fulfill all its desires. This realization is foreclosed in desire-based or temporal cinema, 
which therefore needs to organize time in chronological and/or causal order so as to promise future 
fulfillment of desire. Whereas in atemporal or drive-based cinema, the spectator experiences the 
inevitable temporality of the persistence or repetition of loss as the very basis of its subjectivity. 
Therefore, McGowan argues that the notion of atemporal cinema yields an “ethics of temporality,” 
along the lines of Heidegger, Bergson and Deleuze. 
 McGowan points out that the thinking of temporality through the death drive leads to an 
ethical position because it accedes to the fundamental incompleteness of subjectivity, and in so doing, 
opens up the subject to otherness. Referring to Heidegger, McGowan writes: 
The great failure of the history of Western philosophy, according to Heidegger, lies 
in its inability to think temporality as the basis of being itself. This failure produces 
the idea of stable essences, including that of the subject, that fall into time rather than 
emerging out of it. As long as we continue to think of time as added to being, we will 
view ourselves and others as completed objects. In Heidegger’s conception, a proper 
sense of temporality allows us to grasp ourselves as constantly self-transcending. 
Unlike the traditional subject, Heidegger’s Dasein finds its being only through its 
temporality, which opens it to the otherness of its own future and of other beings. 
Grasping our temporality permits us to recognize otherness in a way that Western 
philosophy has been systematically unable to do. (McGowan 2011, 3) 
In McGowan’s view, then, atemporal cinema and the subject of the death drive are analogous to 
Heidegger’s conception of Dasein. Just as Dasein is out-of-joint with its temporality—i.e. its own 
future is “other” to it—the subject of the death drive is unable to instrumentalize time in the service of 
its own isolated future satisfaction, McGowan argues (4). In this way, atemporal cinema, and its 
drive-based subjectivity, can open up the possibility of a politics of non-isolation—i.e. an ethical 
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politics based on the community of others, rather than the desire-based politics that isolate subjects in 
its lure of fullness. However, the ethics and the politics of the atemporal cinema of the drive, 
McGowan argues, are truly against the notions of futurity and causality, McGowan points out: 
The fact of the drive—and psychoanalytic thought in general—demands an 
atemporal attitude. In this sense, psychoanalysis represents a countercurrent to the 
major movements of twentieth century thought. Rather than affirming the primacy of 
time, it insists on the subject’s resistance to temporal change. The repetition of the 
drive provides the foundational horizon for the subject, and no amount of time will 
allow the subject to transcend this horizon. The only possibility that the future offers 
is that of a new form of repetition. (12) 
In other words, it is not that by rejecting the desire-based production of chronological temporality, 
atemporal cinema promises another future where the subject can recover from its foundational loss, 
perhaps in the formation of a community. On the contrary, the subject of atemporal cinema accepts—
and enjoys—the inevitability that it can never reach a state of plentitude, and a result of this sustained 
incompleteness, keeps open its interaction with others while disregarding the dominance of the causal 
structure of chronological time. Thus, when this subject of the drive acts—i.e. does something in 
relation to others—it does not do so with the purported view that its action will cause the dissipation 
of its loss; rather, this subject acts outside of the dominance of the cause-effect logic that a 
chronological notion of time demands. 
 In McGowan’s view, the way in which the subject of the drive resists the dominance of 
causality and chronology is by asserting its own form of subjectivity, which is other than the desire-
based subjectivity. This, McGowan argues, is the “freedom” that atemporal cinema offers: 
The point [of atemporality] is not that time is just an illusion (as it is for Parmenides 
and the Eleatic philosophers) or that it is just a form of appearance (as it is for Plato) 
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but that time does not hold within it the promise of openness and difference. The 
rejection of the idea of an open future that occurs with the logic of the drive seems to 
imply a rejection of human freedom. [However,] the atemporality of the drive resists 
the causality of time by rupturing it with the assertion of subjectivity. The drive’s 
repetition is at once the subject’s insistence on its own path and its refusal to submit 
to the reign of causality that governs time. Without the drive, without this repetition 
of loss that marks our entrance into society, we would have no means for resisting the 
determining power of causality. (12-13) 
Two clarifications are necessary to properly grasp the argument that McGowan offers in this passage. 
First, when McGowan refers to the subject of the drive, it is not to be confused with the subject that 
desire produces—while the subject of desire maintains the causality of chronological time, the subject 
of the drive ruptures the unity implied in these notions. Second, when McGowan refers to the path in 
which the subject of the drive insists, it is to be understood that the path of the drive is circular 
(repetitive), as opposed to the linear (causal) path of desire. In this way, for McGowan, atemporality 
frees the subject from the structure of desire, which always compels the subject of desire to follow the 
logic of causality, promising direct access to particular objects of desire. In other words, it is the 
nature of desire to de-emphasize or minimize the time that it takes for the subject’s action qua cause 
to yield the effect of having access to the particular object of desire. The satisfaction of the drive, on 
the other hand, subsists in the continuation—rather than the prompt resolution—of the search. It is 
McGowan’s claim—and this is why he promotes the atemporal cinema, the cinema of the death 
drive—that while the former isolates the subject from its community of others and renders irrelevant 
the object of desire, the latter allows for an ethics of non-alienation to emerge by allowing the subject 
to experience the inevitable horizon of temporality in a more proper way. McGowan elaborates this 
point by providing a personal example: while attempting to recall certain intertextual reference about 
a film, McGowan sought the help of a colleague, who promptly produced the necessary information 
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via a quick internet search. This process, McGowan argues, demonstrates the way in which desire 
ultimately renders the object of desire “empty”: 
Rather than spending days thinking about the possibilities and asking other friends, 
the Internet provided an instant resolution and thereby diminished the importance of 
the object. I knew the answer, but I lost the object. I experienced the fleeting pleasure 
of finding the correct answer instead of the prolonged satisfaction of desiring it, and 
the fleeting pleasure revealed the emptiness of the object. This resolution and others 
like it make immediately evident the gap between the satisfaction that one expects 
from desire’s realization and that which one receives. (27) 
One could derive from this passage that the promptness with which the object of desire—i.e. the 
information, the intertextual trivia—became available leaves the desiring subject ultimately 
dissatisfied. In other words, the libidinal force that the object of desire acquired when the subject did 
not have access to it rapidly dissipates once the object becomes available, leaving the subject to an 
anti-climactic53 resolution. This, for McGowan, is the structure of desire. The reverse of this 
process—i.e. the atemporality of the drive—is presumably the one that McGowan wants to promote. 
In other words, the subject of the drive would not have performed the internet search (the cause) to 
find the correct information (the effect) which would resolve quickly and chronologically the process 
of searching. Instead, the subject of the drive would spend time in the search itself, and in so doing, 
would open itself to the possibility of other experiences: i.e. the possibility of sharing one’s desire 
with others, the possibility of finding information only tangentially related to the purported object of 
the search, etc. This mode of being, which foregrounds the drive, would liberate the subject from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 53 . The pun in the reference to “climax” is an intended one, in this case. As I see it, the “gap 
between the satisfaction that one expects from desire’s realization and that which one receives,” 
contains an unavoidable reference to the expected aura of coitus which rapidly—and rather 
bathetically—loses its turgidity post-coitus. 
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ultimately dissatisfying reign of desire and bring to focus the fact that the subject is never coherent or 
complete—something must always remain lacking in the subject. 
 While McGowan’s analysis of the difference between the drive and desire in the passage 
above is undoubtedly insightful, one cannot help but question McGowan’s central premise: i.e. the 
promptness of the result of the internet search resolved the trajectory of desire. At the very material 
level of the example, one could argue that the function of the prompt internet search is not to deliver 
the result to the subject on a permanent basis. That is to say, when one performs an internet search for 
a prompt result or answer, one will not retain this information forever. Rather, the structure of the 
internet search—as a presumed infinite repository of information—is such that it allows the subject to 
immediately forget the answer, since the subject derives satisfaction from the anticipated certainty of 
retrieving the same information at a moment’s notice. To be more precise, in the internet search, the 
subject seeks after something; but, rather than hoarding this object for itself, the subject releases it so 
that it can continue to perform internet searches. To assume that any internet search carries with it a 
sense of certainty, finality or resolution is naïve, to say the least. If it were so, one would search for 
something on the internet once and only once, which is obviously not the case.  
On a more abstract level, however, the problem of desire indicated by McGowan—i.e. that 
desire tends towards quick resolution, and thereby robs the subject of its freedom from causality and 
chronology—is far more consequential. This notion—that of the subject’s non-autonomy and fixity 
with regard to desire—presents desire as a determinative and monolithic structure which wields 
absolute control over the subject fails to account for the fact that there is, in fact, no sense of finality 
in desire. The purpose of desire is to maintain the subject qua desiring, and as such, it does not lead 
the subject to any resolution. Hence—and McGowan correctly points this out—the object of desire is 
ultimately an empty object. It is the emptiness of the object of desire that turns it into the object/cause 
of desire—in other words, the Lacanian objet petit a. Thus, the causal logic that McGowan sees the 
subject of desire following is premised upon the non-substantiality of the object, which, by extension, 
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cannot lend fixity, coherence or certainty to the subject in a linear-chronological manner. On the 
contrary, the subject that McGowan sees coming into existence in the structure of desire never fully 
arrives, precisely because the process or structure of desire never closes upon itself in completion. In 
desire, the subject’s arrival is always a factor of temporal retroaction and anticipation: that is, the 
subject of desire always will have arrived. The anticipated-retroacted arrival of the subject is 
prominently recognizable when the subjectivity in question is a communal one—for instance, the 
notion of a national subjectivity. McGowan argues that a drive-based subjectivity is open to the 
community of other as a determinative factor of its being, while a desire-based subjectivity is 
fundamentally alienated, isolated in its pursuit of the object of desire. It is on this ethical-political 
ground that McGowan ultimately rejects the subject of desire and favors the subject of the death 
drive, which he finds in atemporal cinema. However, given that the point of desire is not closure but a 
repetition of itself, one fails to see why the desire-based subject would not be open to the community 
of others. More crucially, in desire, the community in which the subject finds itself never reaches a 
state of completion or finality, either. In other words, the community that desire engenders is based 
upon difference, unlike the temporality of the drive, which “does not hold within it the promise of 
openness and difference” (McGowan 2011, 12). Thus, a desire-based notion of national subjectivity 
would allow for the emergence of differences within its system, wherein each purported national 
subject relates to its community in a contingent or provisional way, thereby transforming the notion 
of national subjectivity itself. Whereas, in a drive-based notion of national subjectivity, there would 
be no space for difference or distanciation—each purported national subject would experience the 
entire structure of national identity at all times. A drive-based notion of national identity cannot allow 
for dissention. Thus, McGowan’s rejection of the subject of desire and the promotion of the subject of 
the drive is far more problematic than it appears on the first glance. 
It is my purpose in this chapter to argue that in desire the subject’s relation to temporality is 
not linear-chronological; rather, the subject’s relation to temporality is punctuated by retroaction and 
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anticipation. As a result, the subject of desire never fully arrives into existence. This temporal 
uncertainty turns the pacing of the subject’s partial arrival into a hesitant one, and thereby allows for 
openness, freedom and difference in the subject’s relation to the structure of desire. The skewed 
temporality of the subject and the hesitancy inherent in its arrival are prominently consequential when 
communal subjectivities—such as national identity—are taken into consideration. A desire-based 
notion of communal subjectivity demands the presence of difference, dissention or exception as its 
necessary constitutive element. My discussion of the formation of communal identity follows Ernesto 
Laclau’s analysis of populism, especially with regard to Laclau’s formulation of the empty signifier 
as the exception which contingently establishes a system. In Laclau’s writing, the temporal aspect of 
the formation of populism through the function of the empty signifier remains implied, in the 
background. However, I extend Laclau’s argument to claim that the emergence of this difference or 
exception that founds its corresponding system—which is not a totality, but precisely a 
contingency—can be accounted for only when one recognizes that the subject relation to temporality 
is fundamentally skewed. I substantiate my argument through the analysis of Rang De Basanti 
(2006), a Bollywood film which does not follow the characteristics of atemporal cinema, as proposed 
by McGowan. McGowan lays out the characteristics of atemporal cinema in the following way: 
The atemporal cinematic mode does not distort forward-moving time simply because 
of the demands of story, as is the case with science fiction. Its distortions are instead 
formal ones. The distortion of time takes place in the filmic discourse (what Russian 
Formalism calls the syuzhet); that is, it occurs in the way that the story (or fabula) is 
told, not in the story itself. (8) 
In contrast, Rang De Basanti distorts the forward-movement of time precisely because the story 
demands it, and this distortion takes place at the level of form or style as well as at the level of the 
narrative itself. However, in spite of its difference from McGowan’s prescription, Rang De Basanti 
allows us to see the ways in which temporal retroaction and anticipation punctuates the subject’s 
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relation to its national identity and history, and thereby demonstrates that the purported (national) 
subject of desire is differentiated and free. Thus, in my analysis, I engage with the film’s narrative 
elements as well as with the stylistic elements. Specifically, in terms of style, this film foregrounds 
the ways in which one’s temporal access to historical events is always mediated through aesthetics, 
and by doing so calls attention to the inalienability of stylization from representation. The visual 
aesthetic of Rang De Basanti, therefore, functions on three interrelated registers: on the side of self-
reflexive mise-en-abyme; with a certain opacity of style that draws on symbolic or double deception; 
and by interrupting the possibility of consistent style through stylistic hybridity. Insofar as narrative is 
concerned, the film engages with history specifically as an open question, whereby the truth-status of 
historical events in relation to the present is staged against the linear or teleological conception of 
temporality; one’s relation to history is staged through retroaction and anticipation. In this way, Rang 
De Basanti presents the question of national history as a contingent—rather than completed—myth-
construct which is punctuated through moments of interruption posed by the act of its restaging in 
popular culture. 
Section I: Three Temporal Lines  
 Rang De Basanti (Paint it Saffron), directed by Rakeysh Omprakash Mehra, was released in 
2006, closely following a group of films that represent a resurgent interest in Indian national history 
and politics. Even though I risk oversimplifying the complex socio-political scenario of India, allow 
me to offer this brief context: as India moved toward ‘future,’ i.e. the culture of globalized economy, 
the question of national self-definition posed itself with deep urgency. It is in this context of temporal 
tension that Rang De Basanti looks back wistfully to the Indian freedom movement as the inaugural 
moment of Indian national selfhood. Rang De Basanti foregrounds the ‘untimeliness’—that is, being 
out of sync with the moment when one can utter “I am”—of the question of national identity in its 
plot, which I will briefly describe. 
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Struggling British filmmaker Sue McKinley comes across the diary of her grandfather, Mr. 
McKinley, who served as a jailer in the British Army during the Indian independence movement. 
Through the diary, she is compelled by the story of five freedom fighters to make a re-enacted 
documentary film about them. When her pitch is rejected, Sue travels to India, and with the help of 
her friend, Sonia, Sue casts five young men, Daljit "DJ", Karan, Aslam, Laxman and Sukhi, to portray 
as the revolutionaries, inspite of their feeling that a film about the independence movement has no 
bearing upon the present. In the process of making the film, they gradually begin to realize that their 
own socio-political context is eerily similar to that of the characters they portray in Sue's film. 
Meanwhile, Sonia's fiancé Ajay, a Flight Lieutenant in the Indian Air, is killed when his flight 
crashes. While the government blames the pilot, Sonia and her friends claim that he sacrificed his life 
to save hundreds of others that would have been lost had he ejected from the aircraft and left the 
aircraft to crash into the populous city. They learn that the defense minister is responsible for this 
incident because he had been bribed to accept faulty aircraft parts. To their surprise, they also learn 
that it was Karan's father who had bribed the minister. The group and their supporters decide to stage 
a peaceful protest, which the Police forcefully break up. Ajay's mother is severely hurt and slips into a 
coma. The friends decide to react following methods of the early freedom fighters from Sue’s film, 
and they murder the defense minister and Karan’s father to uphold “justice.” The minister is reported 
to have been killed by terrorists, and therefore is hailed as a martyr by the media. To bring forth their 
intentions behind the killings, just as the five freedom fighters did, the five of them attempt to reach 
the public. They forcibly take over the All India Radio station, where Karan goes on air and reveals 
the truth about their actions. While still on the air, they are all killed in an ambush by the police and 
military commandos. 
It should become immediately apparent that the plot has three distinct yet interdependent 
temporal lines that intersect, and thereby hold the plot together, only when a subjective identity (that 
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is, being able to say “I am this”) is precipitated through a misrecognized identification. To wit, one 
should see the following temporal lines in the plot:  
1. The time of Mr. McKinley’s observation of and writing about the five 
revolutionaries (T1) 
2. The time of Sue’s film that seeks to bring T1 to signification through re-
enactment (T2) 
3. The time of the five young men that runs askew from the times of both Sue’s film 
and McKinley’s narrative (T3)   
As the plot reveals, the only way T1, T2 and T3 can intersect—that is, become identical—to produce 
a coherent, meaningful narrative is if the five young men (mis)recognize themselves as the five 
revolutionaries. However, this misrecognition has to pass through an act in good faith: namely, the 
five young men must act in the place of the five revolutionaries, and not as if they were the five 
revolutionaries. In other words, even though the men’s identification with the revolutionaries is a 
fundamental misrecognition, the men must not perceive this as such. On the contrary, for the men, the 
three temporal lines must collapse, creating a temporal exigency that not only spurs them into 
decision, but also lends them subjective consistency, whereby they can proclaim: “I am the 
revolutionary.”  
 In fact, this is precisely what happens in the plot of Rang De Basanti: the five young men 
become the revolutionaries, making Sue’s cinematic representation of McKinley’s narrative possible, 
and thereby making the narrative of Rang De Basanti one that is coherent and meaningful. How are 
we to read the temporal exigency of the collapse of three temporal lines that precipitate the five young 
men as subjetivized signifiers of a national, historical past? In other words, what conception of time is 
operative in the narrative of Rang De Basanti? The answer—one that will show us that, in this film, 
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one’s relation to history is staged through retroaction and anticipation—is to be sought in Jacques 
Lacan’s essay “Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism.” 
Section II: The Error that Binds 
 In this essay—written in 1946, revised in 1966, one of Lacan’s earlier works—Lacan 
illustrates the ways in which the subject (read, the cogito) comes into being as such—not via its full 
identification with the signifier, but as a result of the gap between two signifiers. Anyone who is 
familiar with Lacan’s oeuvre would recognize this formulation from his more widely circulated essay, 
“The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious” (1966), where Lacan repurposes the structure of the 
Sassurean sign to argue that the subject, as the subject of knowledge, comes into being through what 
Lacan calls a “quilting point” that binds the synchronic sliding of the signifier. What then is unique 
about “Logical Time”—that is to say, what element of signification does this essay offer that “The 
Insistence” does not? I propose that while Lacan’s analysis of the subject in “The Insistence” is 
primarily spatial—one can clearly see this in the metaphor of verticality of the quilting point—in 
“Logical Time” the analysis of the subject takes into account the temporal aspect of the sliding of the 
signifier and the moment of penetration enacted by the quilting point to precipitate the subject. In 
other words, “Logical Time” stands against the commonly held charge that, in Lacan’s formulation, 
the subject is a-temporal or a-historical, by insisting on the time it takes for the quilting point to stop 
the sliding of the signifier as a necessary coefficient of the subject’s arrival. “Logical Time” performs 
this analysis by offering a logical problem that I summarize in the following way: Three prisoners are 
invited by the warden to play a logical game, the winner of which will be set free. In this game, the 
warden shows the prisoners three white discs and two black disks, and unbeknownst to all of them, 
pins a white disk to the back of each prisoner. Each prisoner, who can only see the disks on the other 
two, but cannot communicate with his fellows, must logically deduce the color of his disk. Following 
52	  
	  
this, the prisoners contemplate each other for some time and exit simultaneously with the exact same 
rationale for his identity.54 
 In Lacan’s analysis, the temporal span—from the moment of the prisoners’ perception of 
each other to the moment of decision preceding the act of their simultaneous exit—is of tremendous 
importance. Lacan argues that there are three stages or steps to this process: namely, the instant of the 
glance, the time for comprehending, and the moment of concluding. In other words, there are three 
temporal lines running through this operation, which must somehow collide or intersect to spur the 
act of exiting, whereby the subject can proclaim: “I am white.” Although the structural similarity of 
the temporal lines of this formulation to that which we find in the plot of Rang De Basanti is striking, 
let us continue to pursue Lacan’s analysis, so as to better understand the temporal complexity of the 
plot.  
 Of the three steps of the prisoners’ logical problem, Lacan proposes the following: 
One can isolate [in the sophism] three evidential moments whose logical values 
prove to be different and of increasing order. To lay out the chronological succession 
of the three moments would amount once again to spatializing them through a 
formalism which tends to reduce discourse to an alignment of signs. To show that the 
instance of time presents itself in a different mode in each of these moments would 
be to preserve their hierarchy, revealing therein a tonal discontinuity essential to their 
value. But to discern in the temporal modulation the very function by which each of 
these moments, in its passage to the sequential one, is reabsorbed therein, the last 
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moment which absorbs them alone remaining, would be to restore their real 
succession and truly understand their genesis in the logical movement.55 
What Lacan is rejecting here is precisely the teleological notion of temporal movement, which will 
organize the three instances in a line of progression whereby the inaugural moment of the glance 
necessarily and chronologically leads to moment of conclusion or decision. However, such an 
analysis does not account for the temporal modulation of these moments—that is, the ways in which 
temporal exigency (haste) and temporal delay (hesitation) animate the relation between the three 
moments. This analysis of the temporal modulation takes into account the contemplative, hesitant 
inaction of the prisoners—embodied in the time for comprehending—that sequentially aligns the 
moment of decision to the moment of glance. It is in this way that the moment of decision anticipates 
its certainty by retroacting to the moment of glance through the time of comprehension. In other 
words, each moment has to absorb, as its antecedent, the previous moment while anticipating the 
certainty of the following moment: only this can spur the subject into concluding the duration of 
contemplation or hesitation through a decisive action. Without this process of retroactive absorption 
of anticipated certainty, one is caught up in a signifying quagmire of infinite doubt, and the cogito-
subject cannot come into being as such. The inter-absorption—in other words, becoming-identical—
of the three moments is what precipitates the subject. However, such identification that engenders the 
subject—as Lacanian scholar Bruce Fink points out in his analysis of “Logical Time”— “is entirely 
based on an error [that] reminds us of the error involved in the mirror stage.”56 He further explains 
that “the error in reasoning is needed to bring the time for comprehending to a close…Indeed, the 
error is responsible for the advent of the subject here, for the all-important precipitation of 
subjectivity.”57 What is this “error” if not what Lacan calls the “fundamental misrecognition,” 
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and II: Lacan’s Return to Freud (NY: SUNY Press, 1996), 363. 
 
 57 . Ibid.  
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whereby the subject comes into being by identifying with and assuming the fullness of its image on 
the mirror, even though in reality the subject is far from fullness? 
Section III: Uneasy Collapse--“The Time for Unrest is Here” 
 If one starts with this erroneous identification with one’s representation, one should be able to 
see the ways in which in the plot of Rang De Basanti is brought to a signifiable closure by the five 
young men’s identification with their specular image—that is, with the revolutionaries of Sue’s film, 
and by inclusion, with the revolutionaries in McKinley’s narrative. That this identification is 
erroneous should be quite evident: the five young men are, in fact, not the five revolutionaries; yet in 
the course of the plot of the film, they assume not only the signifying position of their purported 
specular image, but also enact, in good faith, the actions of the revolutionaries. It is evident that it is 
at the precise moment when the five young men re-perform the revolutionaries’ violence by 
murdering the corrupt minister and his partner-in-crime that the three temporal lines of the plot come 
to a resolution. From this moment onwards, Rang De Basanti will no longer invoke the 
revolutionaries—that is, a common past; a national history—through Sue’s film, since the act of 
murder has subjectivized the five young men as the revolutionaries. Indeed, Sue’s presence in the plot 
becomes increasingly tertiary following the murder, as she is relegated to the position of a mere 
observer of the actions in which the five men engage. The exclusion of Sue and her film from the plot 
of Rang De Basanti following the murder clearly indicates the ways in which the five young men 
have assumed, as retroactive certainty, the figure of the five revolutionaries as their common, inter-
subjective history. Similarly, the young men’s initial doubt about the timeliness of Sue’s project, and 
their subsequent participation in it, anticipates their relationship to national history as the inaugural—
precisely because they mark it as incommensurate—moment of the time in which they currently live. 
 Nowhere is this temporal complexity more prominent in Rang De Basanti than the song-and-
dance sequence placed between two significant events: the successful completion of a large part of 
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Sue’s project that brings the five young men closer to their specular image; and the crash-death of 
Ajay, the fighter pilot, that will propel the five young men in path of subjectivization through the re-
enactment of violence. Understandably, this is a turning point in the film’s narrative, where the 
temporal processes of retroaction and anticipation are embodied through visual style.  
 The song-and-dance sequence, aptly titled “Khalbali,” or “agitation and confusion,” begins 
with a deep-focus shot of what is clearly signified as remnants of pre-colonial Indian civilization. In 
the foreground of this shot is one of the five young men, nonchalantly smoking a cigarette, looking 
away from the ruins. This shot orients the viewer in two ways: spatially, it locates the main characters 
in seclusion from the political turmoil of the metropolis; and temporally, it juxtaposes the 
contemporaneous with the ancient, by situating the decidedly apolitical and post-ideological (at least 
up to this point in the narrative) characters in their ancient sanctuary. The camera cuts to reveal all of 
the main characters engaged in frolicking dance movements that draw more from western club or 
music video dance-choreography than from typical Indian dance moves, while the song proclaims—
“the time for unrest is here.” Although the signifier “unrest” gestures towards the literal political 
unrest in which the characters will participate, at this point in the song-and-dance sequence, unrest 
seems to suggest more of a youthful exuberance and restlessness. Yet, anticipated even in early part 
of the song-and-dance sequence is a message of revolution that invokes a phrase commonly used in 
the Indian Freedom Movement: Inquilab Zindabad, Long live revolution. In fact, intercut with the 
dance in which the characters engage, the viewer sees one of the main characters spray-painting this 
phrase—among other graffiti-works that he has purportedly done in the past—on the wall of the 
ruins. In keeping with the motif of youthful unrest, the graffiti-works on the wall are brightly colorful 
in their combination of mundane catch-phrases and images. A deep sense of irony—perhaps even that 
of pastiche—prevails in the graffiti: the catchphrases (such as, “My India is Great,” “Go Slow” etc.) 
on the wall are something one might expect to see on the backs of commercial trucks in contemporary 
India; the images replicate the practice of mass-produced yearly calendar art of various divine or 
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mythological figures. Yet, these commonalities are slightly transformed in the graffiti: for instance, 
the truck-bumper catchphrase, usually written as “Mera Bharat-OK-Mahan” (My India-OK-is Great), 
is transformed into “Mera Bharat OK” by crossing out “Mahan.” Prominent in this tongue-in-cheek 
re-purposing of nationalistic pop-art is the young men’s engagement, in a decidedly oblique fashion, 
with the politics of Indian nationhood.58 The moment of the song-and-dance sequence, however, 
captures one of the five young men spray-painting “Inquilab Zindabad” in bold, red monochrome 
letters across and over the other graffiti. Crucially, this is the only slogan in the graffiti that does not 
go through an ironic transformation. It is as if this slogan invokes the past moments of anti-colonial 
struggle in an unadulterated form, posits them in an ironic, contemporary context, only to anticipate 
the merging of these two temporal lines in the forthcoming revolutionary actions of the five young 
men. 
 
Fig. 1. Screenshot from Rang De Basanti59 
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 59 . Rang De Basanti, directed by Rakeysh Omprakash Mehra (2006, Mumbai, India: UTV 
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 The spatio-temporal line of the song-and-dance number is further complicated through 
retroaction and anticipation, when the bright and colorful representation of the main characters is 
intercut with the sepia-toned reproduction and re-enactment of Indian freedom fighters in a British 
jail. This re-enactment and reproduction of the past moments of anti-colonial struggle—ones that 
eventually precipitated the independent Indian nation—belongs to Sue’s documentary camera, and 
not to the omniscient narrative camera of Rang De Basanti. Indeed, the camera becomes less mobile, 
and less panoramic in the sepia-toned intercuts, compared to the highly mobile and deep-focus 
camera style of the song-and-dance sequence. One could perhaps argue that the relative immobility of 
the camera, and the sepia tone of the re-enacted sequences signify the past in its insularity, in that the 
past is clearly marked as “different” from the present in terms of cinematic style. One could also 
argue that Sue’s motive in making a film about the Indian freedom movement, based on the diary of 
her grandfather, who was a jailer in British India, is to memorialize the past qua past—without any 
regard to the context of post-independent, postcolonial politics of Indian nationhood. Yet, the song-
and-dance sequence reveals the temporal impossibility of such teleological memorializing of the past: 
the main characters of Rang De Basanti have not only become actors impersonating Indian 
revolutionaries in Sue’s film, they have also imbibed the gesture of revolution, which anticipates their 
actions in the later part of Rang De Basanti. The temporal line that runs through the sepia moments 
within the song-and-dance sequence, then, anticipates the future retroaction of the revolutionary 
spirit on the part of the main characters of Rang De Basanti. This double movement of time through 
retroaction-anticipation is brought in clear relief by jump cuts, through which the song-and-dance is 




Fig. 2. Screenshot 
 A third temporal line is also available in the song-and-dance sequence: namely, the pure 
present moment of song-and-dance, as captured by Sue’s video camera. These sequences—also 
juxtaposed with the narrative camera of Rang De Basanti, and the documentary camera of Sue’s 
purported film—are remarkably different in visual style from the other two temporal lines. In sharp 
contrast, these moments are represented by a shaky, handheld camera aesthetics; where one is made 
aware of the ongoing process of video recording by blue-tinted, two-tone images that are visibly 
framed by the rectangular video recording space, as well as the continuously blinking, red 
“recording” light typical of video cameras. The camera angles are decidedly unprofessional, in that 
the images are often distorted when the camera is brought too close to objects. However, home-movie 
aesthetics of these moments complicates the temporal identification of the narrative camera of Rang 
De Basanti, which is evidently recording the same dance movements as the ones recorded by the 
handheld camera. The temporal complication is brought to the foreground when one asks: if the 
panoramic, colorful capture of the song-and-dance symbolically identifies the present, and if the sepia 
tone signifies the retroacted-anticipated past, then what is time of the handheld camera capture? 
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Since the handheld camera neither retroacts, nor anticipates, I claim that these sequences are caught 
up in the pure—hence distorted—presence of the Lacanian moment of glance. Hence, the double 
temporal movement of retroaction and anticipation becomes necessary to transform the distorted or a-
contextualized captures into signifiable temporality. 
 
Fig. 3. Screenshot 
 The pertinent analytical question presented to us by the temporal complexities of the three 
distinct cinematic styles is the following: where and how the temporal lines intercut, and what effect 
does it precipitate? The answer, I propose, is to be found in the concluding shot of the song-and-dance 
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sequence, where we find the main characters reclined among the ruins. 
 
Fig. 4. Screenshot 
Noticeably, the colorful narrative camera of Rang De Basanti frames this shot, and both the 
documentary camera of Sue’s film, and the handheld camera captures have receded. The characters 
seem to be lost in a reverie—physically located in the present among the ruins, yet not-quite-there, as 
represented by their body language. As the narrative of Rang De Basanti will later reveal, this is the 
proverbial calm before the storm of revolutionary actions leading to the violent death of the main 
characters. The deep-focus camera captures the background—the graffiti-laden wall—prominently, 
which now bears the fully-formed slogan “Inquilab Zindabad,” as well as “Well, the rebel has 
arrived,” in bold, colorful letters. The announcement of the rebel’s arrival—evidently, an already 
accomplished event—cannot be understood without the context of the revolutionary slogan that 
visibly emerges through the song-and-dance sequence. In other words, the rebel can only arrive when 
the three temporal lines collapse, and anticipate the future moments that echo the revolutionary 
moments of the past. 
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Clearly, what begins as a somewhat unexpected—dare I say, untimely—dance sequence, 
presented as such through the stabilizing and panoramic lens of Rang De Basanti, unravels to reveal, 
respectively, the presence of Sue’s documentary camera through grainy, black-and-white images, and 
the presence of McKinley’s description of the revolutionaries as represented in Sue’s film, through 
the use of sepia tone and a somewhat theatrical performance of the actors. The gaiety of the five 
friends, the performed seriousness of the enacted past, and the candid nature of Sue’s documentary 
camera repeatedly intercut each other in this sequence. Clearly, the juxtaposition of the three distinct 
visual styles in one sequence—where we also have to grapple with the fullness of the upbeat music-
track against the brutal violence perpetrated on the revolutionaries—does not necessarily produce a 
seamless, fully identified signification. Rather, the formally insistent hybridity of this sequence—that 
seems to jump between three temporal lines—causes the emergence of a particular kind of 
subjectivity: one that is thoroughly contingent in its structure, yet misrecognizes its contingency as 
identity. In other words, Rang De Basanti, is actively engaged in thinking about the ways in which 
the subject of misrecognition relates to its supposed moment of inauguration, by revealing the 
temporal modulations that go into the construction of a national history.  
Section IV: Untimely History of the Popular; Or, A Gramscian Syllogism 
 Even though it is evident that the song-and-dance sequence, “Khalbali,” stages an uneasy 
collapse of the three temporal lines operative in the narrative of Rang De Basanti, one is compelled to 
interrogate the nature of the proposed historicity that such a collapse might precipitate. In other 
words, one needs to ask: What constitutes history in Rang De Basanti? Understandably, this question 
is central to the plethora of responses that Rang De Basanti has generated in the academic 
community, as well as in popular-culture communities, such as blogs. Neelam Srivastava’s essay, 
“Bollywood as National (ist) Cinema: Violence, Patriotism and the National-Popular in Rang De 
Basanti,” is singularly crucial in its thoughtful engagement with the question of historicity in this 
film. Srivastava’s essay compares, at the level of the narrative and aesthetic form, Rang De Basanti 
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with The Battle of Algiers (1966) to argue that while the latter proposes a revolutionary view of the 
post-colonial nation-as-collective, the former restages national history in a conservative or bourgeois 
fashion. Srivastava’s engagement is echoed in Aarti Wani’s essay, “Uses of History: A Case of Two 
Films,” which positions Rang De Basanti in a somewhat similar category of bourgeois or neo-liberal 
recuperation of national history that empties the Indian freedom struggle of its revolutionary or 
popular content. One could argue that Srivastava’s and Wani’s critique of Rang De Basanti hinges 
upon the following three-fold syllogistic structure:  
1) Premise: The forging of a post-colonial nation takes on the form of national-
popular as the convergence-point of diverse class interests, bringing about a working-
class hegemony through struggle; 
2) Premise: The post-colonial national-popular, if restaged to empty out its essential 
content of class-consciousness, precipitates a false or revisionist, bourgeois view of 
history; 
3) Conclusion: Rang De Basanti performs a bourgeois recuperation of anti-colonial 
struggle, because it does not produce class-convergence in its representation of 
national history. 
One cannot help but notice the equation of the category of the post-colonial nation with the category 
of the popular in this formulation that proposes a very specific definition of both the categories. This 
is particularly evident in Srivastava’s invocation of Antonio Gramsci, when she offers the following 
comparison between The Battle of Algiers and Rang De Basanti: 
Films that represent political violence as forging the nation contextualize it within a 
situation of ‘national-popular’ struggle. But these forms of the national-popular take 
on very different configurations in the two films, which have less to do with the 
historical and political differences between the Algeria of the 1960s and the India of 
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2006, and more to do with the sort of ‘imagined’ national audience that these films 
aim for. Commercial Hindi cinema actually reverses Gramsci’s aspirations for 
national-popular culture as a unifying force for different class interests, especially 
that between the intellectuals and the masses; in other words, it is instrumental in 
bringing about a bourgeois hegemony. 
In Rang de Basanti we see this regressive version of the national-popular in action. 
By focusing on the urban middle class as the sector of society that can ultimately 
solve the ills of the nation, it elides any possibility of alliance with the working-class 
or the rural poor which does not entail the dominance of the bourgeoisie over these 
other groups.60 
Clearly, what is at stake in Srivastava’s analysis is a contestation regarding the proper definition of 
the structure of the category of the popular. Noticeably, Srivastava’s interpretation of the national-
popular considers it as a point of convergence—a unifying force that precipitates nation as a coherent 
form of community in its ideal, Gramscian mode. It is precisely because Rang De Basanti fails to 
produce such a community that Srivastava criticizes the film as regressive. In order to examine the 
import of this charge against Rang De Basanti, it is therefore necessary to interrogate the concept of 
the popular itself. 
Section V: The Popular 
 The word popular, when used as an analytical category in the study of politico-cultural forms, 
gestures to a connotative paradox: in its positive dimension, popular is admired by many people—
hence democratic—but in its negative dimension, popular is also vulgar, coarse, and ill-bred. 
Raymond Williams points to this paradox of the popular in his Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture 
and Society in the following way: 
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Popular estate and popular government, from C16, referred to a political system 
constituted or carried on by the whole people, but there was also the sense (cf. 
COMMON) of ‘low’ or ‘base.’ The transition to the predominant modern meaning of 
‘widely favored’ or ‘well-liked’ is interesting in that it contains a strong element of 
setting out to gain favor, with a sense of calculation that has not quite disappeared but 
that is evident in a reinforced phrase like deliberately popular.61 
What interests me particularly in Williams’ analysis is the conflation of a systemic wholeness with a 
high degree of intentional calculation in the formation of the politico-cultural category of the popular. 
This conflation gestures to a fundamental question vis-à-vis the ontology of the popular that 
Williams’ analysis cannot resolve—namely, if the popular is constituted by the whole people, then 
from whom does such a formation solicit favor? In other words, what is the nature of that entity 
which evidently supersedes the whole that constitutes the popular—for whose eyes the popular is 
staged? The question seems more insidious and inscrutable where cultural productions that identify 
themselves as popular are concerned. It seems that such self-identification is directed toward an 
unseen audience that exists beyond the perceived wholeness. Yet, it is this entity—this unseen 
observer—that allows the popular to constitute itself as a whole; as such, this entity appears to be the 
condition of possibility of the popular. A subsequent analytical problem arises from this conception 
of the popular: since the category of the popular as a systemic wholeness is constitutively dependent 
on that which exists beyond this whole, then how is the wholeness constituted as such? In other 
words, if there exists beyond the whole—validating the whole as such—an entity, then the perceived 
wholeness of the popular involves an ontological fallacy. Insofar as the formative core of the popular 
seems to contain a fallacy—an impossibility—the anatomy of the popular itself demands sustained 
critical inquiry. Hence, the second question that I pose to the concept of the popular is the following: 
structurally, how does the popular represent itself to its condition of possibility?  
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Ernesto Laclau, in his essay “Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics,” theorizes the 
formation of the category of the popular as a hegemonic operation. Laclau’s definition of hegemony 
will be particualr interest to our present discussion of the ontology of the popular. Laclau Writes, 
referring to Rosa Luxemburg’s analysis of hegemony: 
In a climate of extreme repression any mobilization for a partial objective will be 
perceived not only as related to the concrete demands and objectives of that struggle, 
but also as an act of opposition against the system. It is not, consequently, something 
positive that all of them share which establishes their unity, but something negative: 
their opposition to a common enemy. If the function of the differential signifiers is to 
renounce their differential identity in order to represent the purely equvalential 
identity of a communitarian space as such, they cannot construct this equivalential 
identity as something belonging to a differential order. This pure equivalential 
function representing an absent fullness cannot have a signifier of its own—for in 
that case the ‘beyond of all differences’ would be one more difference and not the 
result of the equivalential collapse of all differential identities.62 
In this definition of hegemony, Laclau argues that a popular movement against repression—a 
movement that brings people disparate socio-economic interest together as a people—functions as a 
hegemonic system whereby the constitutive particularities within the group are subsumed under the 
common goal of opposition against the enemy. Hence, the common goal cannot have a positive 
content, since opposition, in its very nature, is predicated upon the negation of that which exists. It is 
this negative content of their relation to the enemy that the group recognizes as their commonality, 
and therefore is constituted as a group of identical entities. However, such a consensus among 
disparate entities is enforced precisely because that which signifies—stands for—their unity is never 
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fully available to them. The fullness of such a signifier—insofar as the signifier fully represents the 
group as a popular entity—is always already absent. This signifier-sans-positive-content that makes 
the formation of the popular possible as such, is the empty signifier in Laclau’s formulation. 
However, in his definition of the empty signifier, Laclau points out that such a signifier can never be 
represented in positive terms within the system of signification. Laclau writes: 
An empty signifier can, consequently, only emerge if there is a structural 
impossibility in signification as such, and only if this impossibility can signify itself 
as an interruption (subversion, distortion, etcetera) of the structure of the sign, that is, 
the limits of signification can only announce themselves as the impossibility of 
realizing what is within those limits—if the limits could be signified in a direct way, 
they would be internal to signification and, ergo, would not be limits at all.63 
Hence, it is precisely at the point where the structure of signification fails—when the system of 
signification is interrupted by a structural disjunction—that the empty signifier can be said to exist as 
such. It is only because the empty signifier always remains beyond direct—hence positive—
signification that it can enforce the consensus that holds the “differential” entities constitutive of the 
signifying system in an equvalential chain. It is the fundamental structural impossibility of the empty 
signifier that holds the system of signification together as wholeness. In terms of cinematic 
representation then, it is precisely at that point where dys-synchrony appears—precisely where a part 
of the film remains in disjunction to the system of representation of the filmic diegesis—that the 
empty signifier emerges. Functionally, however, it is the inverse of this operation that makes the 
representative wholeness of the film possible: it is precisely because disjunction and dys-synchrony 
exist that the film can represent itself as “popular.” Clearly, this formulation is particularly salient to 
our analysis of the “item number” as an instance of disjuncture and dys-synchrony in Bollywood 
cinema. One can now claim that the representation of Bollywood cinema as the bearer of the popular 
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is possible because of the structural failure that the song-and-dance sequence introduces in the 
structure of signification of the film itself. 
 If the item number constitutes the popular in Bollywood cinema, one needs to understand the 
ways in which such a structural operation becomes possible. Drawing upon our previous analysis of 
the item number as an instance of the Lacanian objet petit a, and as an instance of the empty signifier, 
we can argue that the formation of the popular in Bollywood cinema is politically significant because 
such a consensus-formation depends on a fundamental misrecognition of the negative content of the 
empty signifier or objet petit a as the possessor of a positive content.  
 The representation of the empty signifier—the objet petit a—in the case of the Bollywood 
song-and-dance sequences (such as “Khalbali” ) takes the form of what Mladen Dolar calls the object 
voice. In A Voice and Nothing More, Dolar formulates the object voice—which is an instance of the 
Lacanian objet petit a—in the following way: “an object which functions as a blind spot in the call 
and as a disturbance of aesthetic appreciation.”64 If we read the blind spot and the disturbance as 
instances of representational failure, we will see how the song-and-dance sequence is an instance of 
the object petit a, or an empty signifier. But what is its effect? In other words, what does the object 
voice produce as an outcome of its structural operation? Dolar’s analysis of the object voice attempts 
to answer this question in the following way: 
There is the signifying chain, reduced to its minimal features, which yields, as a 
result or as a leftover, the voice. It looks as though there is a reversal: the voice is not 
taken as a hypothetical or mythical origin that the analysis would have to break down 
into distinctive traits, not as a diffuse substance to be reduced to structure, a raw 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




material to be tamed into phonemes, but, rather, the opposite—it stands at the 
outcome of the structural operation.65 
Here, Dolar refers to Lacan’s formulation of the graph of desire in “The Subversion of the Subject 
and the Dialectics of Desire.” Significantly, the structural operation—of which the voice is a 
leftover—also has, as one of its terms, the subject in the act of knowing: and this is precisely what 
Dolar chooses not to address. Herein lies the political significance of the empty signifier and the 
production of the popular as such: this operation also produces the subject as one who knows. Lacan, 
however, points out necessary misrecognition that engenders the subject in the act of knowing itself. 
In Ecrits, Lacan writes:  
Here arises the ambiguity of a misrecognizing that is essential to knowing myself. 
For, in this “rear view,” all the subject can be sure of is the anticipated image—which 
he had caught of himself in his mirror—coming to meet him.66 
In this passage, Lacan refers to that vector in the graph of desire, which Dolar chooses not to address; 
i.e. the line that represents the movement that produces the subject qua subject of self-knowledge. 
This vector takes the subject through that line in the graph of desire “which yields, as a result or as a 
leftover, the voice.”67 Therefore, voice—or more specifically, object voice—as a leftover, produces 
the subject in the act of knowing itself: although the act of knowing is fundamentally a 
misrecognition. In order to explain why misrecognition is essential to the subject’s self-knowledge, 
Lacan posits the schema of the subject’s anticipated image captured in the rear view. The subject’s 
image in the mirror refers to Lacan’s formulation of the mirror stage as a formative juncture of the 
subject’s unconscious—but that is not our point of inquiry at this moment. Consider instead, the 
specific locus of the image vis-à-vis the subject: the self-image is something that the subject is never 
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fully cognizant of. Although the subject’s encounter with the image is always in the past—denoted by 
Lacan’s rear view metaphor—in the sense that the image has already appeared in the subject’s 
experiential domain, something is always left over in that encounter. The subject’s cognition of the 
image, in this sense, is never complete: the subject’s encounter with the image is always irrevocably 
in the past that gestures to the future, and never in the present. In other words, the subject never 
possesses the image fully: while the subject’s encounter with the image has already taken place, the 
subject continues to expect that it will be able to fully possess the image in future. The self-image, for 
the subject, is that which is always to-be-had. This recognition, on the part of the subject, that there 
exists—albeit in future—a locus where the self-image will be fully available is therefore a 
fundamental misrecognition: the subject’s encounter with the self-image is always a missed 
encounter.  
 We can now see the political dimension of the popular—insofar as it is represented as such—
as the empty signifier: it produces, as a necessary outcome, the subject of misrecognition. However, 
this misrecognition is not equal to the Marxian view of ideology—they do not know it, but they are 
doing it—rather, this misrecognition uses cynicism as a form of ideology. The formula of cynical 
ideology can be expressed in the following way: they know very well what they are doing, but still, 
they are doing it. The popular, then, insofar as it is represented as popular—without addressing what 
it means to be popular—produces the subject as a subject of hegemony. I claim that the possibility of 
transgressing hegemonic politics—and as result, the possibility of opening up a site of ethical, 
emancipatory resistance—can come out of an ontological inquiry into the popular. The solution, if 
there is any, is not in knowing what the popular means; rather, we should constantly interrogate what 
it means to be popular.  
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Section VI: The Impossible History  
 What I am suggesting with regard to Rang De Basanti is that here the idea of a nation is never 
fully precipitated: what this film presents, as Srivastava points out, is the concept of a nation in its 
fragments. Srivastava’s charge against Rang De Basanti, as I point out in the previous sections, is that 
this film upholds a bourgeois hegemonic view of the nation precisely because one—i.e. the bourgeois 
middle class—fragment among the many insidiously occupies, while precluding the working class, 
the signifying position with regard to the postcolonial Indian nationhood. In other words, Srivastava 
argues that Rang De Basanti offers a partial or incomplete representation of the national-popular 
history of the Indian freedom struggle. However, if we follow Laclau’s analysis of the category of the 
popular as an instance of the Lacanian objet petit a (i.e. part-object), it should become apparent that 
the unifying force of the nation must always-already draw upon the exclusion and elevation of at least 
one signifier that precipitates the coherence of all the other (disparate) signifiers in the form of the 
national-popular. Hence, it could be easily argued that the form of Gramscian national-popular—
which, according to Srivastava, Rang De Basanti is not—can present a unified narrative of history 
only through a fundamental misrecognition: i.e. a signifying chain in which a part is taken for the 
whole. This kind of signifying operation will necessarily smooth out or obliterate the presence of 
hesitancies in terms of its form and content. 
 Yet, the presence of a deep temporal hesitancy is undeniable in Rang De Basanti. My 
analysis of the song-and-dance sequence, “Khalbali,” reveals the ways in which the audio-visual dys-
synchrony and the narrative inconsistency repeatedly point up to the failure of coherent signification. 
I claim that in its formal register, “Khalbali” embraces formal hybridity precisely because Rang De 
Basanti refuses to engage in the production of the fundamental misrecognition that the inauguration 
of the national-popular necessitates. The hesitant, almost schizophrenic movement of the song-and-
dance sequence between the three temporal lines, as represented by three very different, and often 
incongruous stylistic modes of the camera, does not allow the formation of a singular temporal point 
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where the three lines of time intersect in a signifying wholeness. Rather, it appears from the analysis 
of the song-and-dance sequence that it is precisely this hesitation and interruption that Rang De 
Basanti turns into a moment of celebratory enjoyment by stretching out its formal hybridity on a 
formal register. If “Khalbali” plays out a gesture of foreshadowing with regard to the narrative arc of 
Rang De Basanti—in that it seems to declare the arrival of the rebel—then the moment of purported 
inauguration is repeatedly interrupted: it does not cohere around a causal nucleus. The possibility of 
coherent signification—whereby the five young men might come to fully signify the freedom 
fighters, and thereby create an unbroken temporal line through past, present and future—always 
remains tentative and fragile. Moreover, even this fragile possibility of a coherent national history 
which will come into being when the five young men fully assume such a temporal continuity can 
only exist in the domain of representation: i.e. in the form of historicity that Sue’s film project tries to 
enact. The only moment in Rang De Basanti where this possibility comes closest to fruition is during 
the narrative turning point of “Khalbali;” yet, even in this sequence, we are only left with contesting 
aesthetic modes through which Rang De Basanti continuously attempts, and fails to access history.  
 Keeping in mind the drawing-out of this moment of failure or hesitation, if we turn our 
attention to Lacan’s “three prisoner” problem, we will be able to see that Rang De Basanti dwells on 
the “moment of hesitation,” and thereby endlessly defers the arrival of the temporal quilting point that 
will mark the inauguration of a coherent subjectivity. The subject—that never fully arrives in Rang 






THE SUBJECT’S SPACE 
FIELD OF SPEECH AND THE ARTICULATION OF DESIRE 
The previous chapter of this dissertation discussed the role of temporality in the precipitation of 
subjectivity. Continuing with the examination of subjectivity in relation to the experience of 
cinema, the present chapter takes up the question of space as a prominent factor in the 
precipitation of subjectivity. In other terms, if the previous chapter asks “when does the subject 
arrive?” then this chapter asks “where does the subject arrive?.” To be clear, my interest does not 
lie with the material analysis of the actual or physical space in which a subject could arrive or 
come into being: although interesting and valuable, such study would necessarily be an 
incomplete one, since one cannot take into account every instance of space. Just as the 
consideration of temporality is not directly related to the material manifestation of the passage of 
time as indicated by, say, the forward movement of a clock-hand, in the same way, the 
consideration of spatiality in this chapter has very limited relation to the physical manifestation of 
space as indicated by, say, an apartment, a neighborhood or a continent.  
In contrast, this chapter argues that the subject arrives by announcing its position in the field of 
language; that is to say, the subject comes into being retroactively by assuming or taking upon 
itself a locus in relation to the two axial coordinates of symbolic language—namely, the 
synchronic and the diachronic axes. Through the analysis of Dil Se (1998), this chapter argues  
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that the precipitation of subjectivity is a factor of the endless deferral of signification in symbolic 
language: just as the signifier tends to but never fully conjugates with the signified to precipitate 
stable meaning, the subject tends to a fixed locus but never fully comes into being within the 
space of language. In this chapter, I contend that the subject’s relation to the space in which it 
purports to occupy a locus is fundamentally skewed, even when the film depicting this 
relationship is neither overtly topophilic nor deliberately gaze-oriented. Rather, as Dil Se 
demonstrates through the interaction and intersection of multiple trajectories or vectors of 
subjective desire, the split or skewed subject appears where the process of signification fails to 
achieve closure.  
 Consider the following illustration of the two axial coordinates of symbolic language—
namely, the synchronic and the diachronic axes—in relation to which the subject comes into 
being: 
 
Fig. 5. Synchronic and diachronic axes 
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It should be noted that the space designated as the locus of the subject in this graph is neither an 
actual or physical space, nor a determinative or fixed position in which the subject can be found. 
Rather, this figure graphically renders the concept of spatial relationality, which consists of three 
variable elements: namely, the synchronic axis, the diachronic axis, and the space marked off by 
the two axes. The subject, when it arrives in this relational space, comes into being in the form of 
will have arrived; that is, the subject never fully arrives. Since the subject’s hesitant arrival is 
spatially relational, it should also be noted that the subject cannot appear all by itself: when it 
appears, it must appear in relation to other entities. Therefore, in the most basic form of this 
relationality, the subject’s appearance requires the assumed presence of at least two vectored 
points of reference: i.e., the two axes in the figure. However, even though its arrival is in relation 
to the two vectors, the locus of the subject’s arrival is not relativistic or arbitrary. Rather, this 
arrival is the result of a specific set of operations and causes. To be more specific: a) the subject 
will have appeared in the field of language by articulating or naming its desire when the 
synchronic and the diachronic axes intersect or interfere; and b) this intersection or interference is 
retroactively anticipated as the object-cause of the subject’s arrival. In other terms, the subject 
comes into being where interference or disturbance occurs in the field of symbolic language: i.e. 
the locus of the subject is coterminous with a certain failure in the process of signification. To be 
sure, the failure of signification does not refer to an absolute lack of synchrony between the 
signifier and the signified; rather, failure is to be understood as serialized deferral—a process by 
which the signifier and the signified temporally postpone and spatially displace their assumed 
conjugation. Now, since the disturbance or failure in the field of symbolic language does not 
occupy a fixed locus, the subject that will have arrived in relation to this disturbance cannot 
occupy a fixed locus, either. To be clear, the failure of signification is a vector: i.e. a geometric 
point set in motion in relation to other geometric points. Therefore, the subject—which must 
assume upon itself this failure of signification in order to come into being—can only tend toward 
the failure of signification. Thus, the subject is a vector, rather than a fixed point. However, the 
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question that becomes immediately apparent is this: if the subject is a vector, then what causes its 
setting-in-motion? In other words, what is the spatial relation between the field of symbolic 
language—which consists of the serialized deferral of signification—and that which appears as 
the subject? 
 The question of the subject’s spatiality or location has been a crucial one in 
psychoanalysis—represented, prominently but somewhat inaccurately, in numerous films by the 
so-called spatial arrangement in an analytic session where the analyst remains half-hidden, seated 
behind the analysand, who remains supine on a couch. This popular imagination aside, for Lacan, 
the subject’s location has been a crucial factor in understanding the subject’s structure or 
constitution. Lacan remained interested in the subject’s spatiality throughout his career: while 
early in his career Lacan used various graphs to provide a map of the subject’s itinerary, later 
Lacan’s interest shifted to relational and three-dimensional geometry as a way to explicate the 
subject through Venn diagrams and topological paradoxes. The culmination of Lacan’s 
investment in this avenue of inquiry is, of course, the infamous turn to “knot theory” towards the 
very end of his career: one can clearly see the evidence of this radical investment in his seminar 
entitled “Le Sinthome,” where Lacan spends considerable amount of time on the Borromean knot.  
 Given that cinema—in a very prominent way—is about spatial organization, one would 
think that Lacanian film theorist would take up Lacan’s exploration of the subject’s spatiality 
through and in cinema. This, however, has not been the case: Lacanian film theorist, by and large, 
avoid the graphs, the topological figures, the Venn diagrams and certainly the knots. In so doing, 
Lacanian film theorists quite unnecessarily miss a promising opportunity of revitalizing 
psychoanalysis on the one hand and film studies on the other hand, while establishing a dialogue 
between the two with regard to spatiality should not be difficult at all. Consider, for example, the 
question of mise-en-scene, a crucially important aspect of any film: what is it if not relational 
organization of space? That is, if mise-en-scene is the careful positioning of that which appears in 
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front of the camera, it is so because central to its concern is the establishment—and 
transmission—of a certain sense. To put it in other terms, in creating mise-en-scene, one 
composes the orientation of a given space, where the position of each object has significant 
relational bearing upon the position of other objects, so that something is thereby placed in the 
scene: what ultimately emerges from the scene is meaning, which makes possible the spectators’ 
experience of cinema. Thus, one could easily envision the application of Lacan’s conception of 
spatiality—say, the Venn diagrams—in generating a complex analysis of mise-en-scene as that 
from which the meaning or sensibility of a film emerges. Even an elementary graph, such as Fig. 
1 in this chapter, can demonstrate the way in which framing works in the creation of mise-en-
scene: just as the subject’s locus emerges in relation to the two axes that frames it, similarly a 
figure (human or otherwise) appears comprehensible only when it is framed in relation to other 
objects occupying the same space.  
 Hugh Manon is one of the few Lacanian film theorists to employ the notion of the 
spatiality in explicating the relationship between subjectivity and space in cinema.68 In his essay, 
“Living Dead Spaces: The Desire for the Local in the films of George Romero,” Manon argues 
that when a film offers an abundance of specific or localized information about the space in 
which the narrative of the film purportedly unfolds, the result is an “anamorphic blot in the field 
of vision, a desire-inspiring blockage,” that foregrounds the Spaltung of the subject—what 
Manon calls, “split viewership.”69 Manon suggests that films approach the notion of topophilia—
i.e. the love of places—in one of two ways: 1) by presenting isolated traces of the local that 
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generates a sense of familiarity and realistic context, and 2) by offering an abundance of specific 
information about the narrative space. The first approach is more common in narrative cinema, 
because such presentation of place or space upholds the perceived realism of cinema. However, 
the second approach—of which, according to Manon, the films of George Romero are prime 
examples—resists such identification of realism, and instead makes localness uncanny. This 
uncanny manifestation of localness, Manon argues, is akin to Lacan’s discussion of anamorphosis 
in Seminar VII. Manon writes:  
In anamorphosis, each of two coherent, yet oppositional perspectives (one local, 
one non-local) destabilizes the other, rendering it lacking, partial—and this 
lackingness and partiality is what sustains the viewer’s engagement with the 
overall representation. No matter from where one gazes at an anamorphotic 
representation, one of its two fields necessarily distorts, becomes alien. In 
anamorphosis, the viewer can’t have it both ways, but equally important is the 
fact that neither the readable image nor the indecipherable stain ever reaches its 
final destination, since each is always/already in the process of morphing, of 
becoming something else. Anamorphosis functions similarly in the films of 
George Romero, although they do not of course involve a literal optical 
transposition; audiences do not physically reorient themselves to view the screen 
at an angle. Instead, Romero repeatedly allows the region of America in which 
his films are produced to overflow his narratives, usurping the spotlight and 
daring us not to notice. The result is a nagging awareness of the gravity of local 
space, a disquieting sense of mundanity and inertia that decodes either as 
uncomfortably naturalistic or uncannily familiar.70 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Here, Manon makes a crucial point regarding anamorphosis and spatial orientation: anamorphosis 
is that point in the subject’s visual field in which at least two orders of spatial orientation interfere 
with each other. In other words, when an image—static or mobile—contains an anamorphic 
element, the spectator is presented with a dilemma—she cannot experience as comprehensible 
both spatial orientations; legibility must lie with one or the other. This is clearly understandable in 
the case of anamorphic paintings, where the spectator must physically reorient herself each time 
she wants to view one of the spatial orientations present in the painting. However, this is not the 
case with cinema—as Manon points out, the spectator does not move. What constitutes 
anamorphosis in cinema, then? In other words, if anamorphosis is operative in George Romero’s 
films, where is such disturbance of the visual field to be located? Manon does not provide an 
explicit answer to this question; although he goes on to suggest, towards the end of the essay, that 
the figure of the zombie in Romero’s films “rise up as a metaphor for the problem of localness 
itself.”71 In other words, for Manon, Romero’s zombie is a stand-in for the notion of anamorphic 
distortion. 
 In order to properly understand Manon’s equation, anamorphosic blot↔zombie as 
metaphor, one needs to study his essay on the nature of the gaze, entitled ““Comment ça, rien?”: 
Screening the Gaze in Caché.” In this essay, Manon argues that the Lacanian notion of the gaze is 
best understood as “masked-off-ness” in the field of the Other, which is also the space or domain 
of symbolic language.72 In explicating the notion of the gaze as that which is masked-off, 
unavailable to vision, or unoccupied, Manon writes: 
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As you read this essay, you presumably have no sense that you are being 
watched; nor are you aware of any gap or blind spot in your field of vision. Now 
imagine how the room you occupy might look from a nondescript spot in the 
corner, any one of the millions of points in space with a clear view of your body. 
Where in this arrangement does the gaze reside? Inasmuch as your body forms a 
seeable part of the room, the gaze cannot belong to you because it also includes a 
multitude of perspectives of you. Likewise, the gaze cannot belong to any other 
(small “o”) that you can see peering back at you from the corner—betrayed 
perhaps by a pair of eyes or a camera lens—since this look cannot include itself 
as a part of what it sees. Instead, the gaze must be understood as encompassing 
both of these looks simultaneously, along with every other available line of sight 
in the room.73 
The crucial point about the structural antagonism between the spatial orientation of vision and the 
gaze that Manon clarifies for us is this: the gaze appears where two or more visual planes 
interfere with each other. Each of these visual planes have their spatial coordinates that make 
each plane comprehensible to vision—i.e. renders each plane visible. However, a spectator—the 
subject for whom the visual plane is comprehensible—cannot occupy all possible spatial 
coordinates. When the subject moves from one visual plane to the next, the coordinates of the 
previously occupied space is lost to the subject. It is in this way that vision and gaze are mutually 
exclusive. To put it in different terms, gaze is the failure of vision, or the failure of the 
comprehensibility of the visual plane. Consequently, the gaze is that structurally or geometrically 
impossible point where all planes of vision intersect each other. As such, then, the gaze is that 
locus where all spatial orientations of all visual fields are manifested. In other words, the gaze 
supplies the spectator with an unbearable abundance of information regarding visibility or 
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spatiality. It is for this abundance of specificity that the gaze disturbs or resists the smooth 
functioning of visual comprehension. Since comprehension—visual or otherwise—takes place in 
the order of symbolic language, the gaze appears as and in the failures of the space of symbolic 
language. Moreover, as I have previously discussed, the space of language is not a static field; 
rather, it is marked by the synchronic and diachronic vectors of the signifier. Consequently, any 
failure in this field cannot be a static point, either. Hence, the gaze—the failure in the visual 
field—must also be a vector. Consider the following graph, which presents, in the most 
rudimentary form, the vector of the gaze: 
 
Fig. 6. Two intersecting planes 
To be sure, MN and QP are the two available fields of vision, marked by their individual spatial 
orientation. We can easily imagine numerous spectatorial positions or points within either MN or 
QP. However, the two planes intersect along the AB vector, and all imaginable points on the AB 
vector fully belong to neither MN nor QP. Therefore, either no spectatorial position can be 
imagined along this vector; or, if so imagined, the spectatorial position will not have visual 
comprehension vis-à-vis either MN or QP. This rudimentary graph—and this graph could be 
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made far more complex by adding n number of planes that intersect with each other variously—
elaborates one point: the gaze—when it appears—has more to do with comprehension than it has 
to do with the physics of vision. In other words, if the gaze is that which appears as masked-off in 
the field of vision, it is not that some material visual element suddenly becomes invisible or that 
something else covers it like a mask. Rather, the gaze is that which appears incomprehensible or 
unimaginable in terms of vision, and therefore it is that which refuses to fall under any signifier: 
the gaze is that which resists and defers signification. To put it in simpler terms, the gaze is not 
something we do not or cannot see; rather, it is something that we cannot quite understand or 
name precisely when we see it. 
 The two essays by Manon are crucial in pointing out the relationship between subjectivity 
and spatiality in cinema: the former essay brings to focus the ways in which an excess of spatial 
specificity precipitates a kind of subjective engagement that vacillates between comprehension 
and incomprehension, and the latter essay describes the gaze as ultra-saturated visual locus that 
remain inaccessible to vision precisely because of its plentitude. However, in both essays, 
visuality and its failure is predominantly understood in terms of physical or material elements: the 
former essay focused on the regional accent of the zombies as a prime example of localness, and 
the latter essay understands the gaze through the physics of vision. The question of 
comprehensibility or understandability is hinted at in both essays, but neither dwell on this matter. 
In contrast, my goal in this chapter is to extend Manon’s insightful argument about spatiality and 
subjectivity to its proper domain: i.e. the domain of symbolic language, in and through which the 
subject comes into being by naming its desire. In this chapter I argue that the precipitation of 
subjectivity is a factor of the endless deferral of signification in symbolic language: just as the 
signifier tends to but never fully conjugates with the signified to precipitate stable meaning, the 
subject tends to a fixed locus but never fully comes into being within the space of language. This 
form of deferred subjectivity—which is akin to Manon’s “split viewership”—can certainly be 
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found in films that are overtly topophilic or gaze-oriented, as Manon shows through the films of 
George Romero and Michael Haneke. However, through my analysis of Dil Se (1998)—a 
Bollywood film by Mani Ratnam—I contend that the subject’s relation to the space in which it 
purports to occupy a locus is fundamentally skewed, even when the film depicting this 
relationship is neither overtly topophilic nor deliberately gaze-oriented. Rather, as Dil Se 
demonstrates through the interaction and intersection of multiple trajectories or vectors of 
subjective desire, the split or skewed subject appears where the process of signification fails to 
achieve closure. 
Section I: Terror in the Space of Desire 
 Dil Se (From the Heart), directed by Mani Ratnam, was released in 1998, closely 
following a decade of steadily escalating border tension in the Kashmir region between India and 
Pakistan. Dil Se was not the only Bollywood film of its decade to dramatize the historic tension 
between India and Pakistan and the resulting specter of terrorism: Sarfarosh (1999), Mission 
Kashmir (2000) and Fiza (2000) are some of the many films that represent the Indo-Pak 
relationship through the lens of domestic and foreign terrorism. It is also possible to see in Mani 
Ratnam’s oeuvre a continued meditation on the subject of contested spaces—especially in his 
earlier works Roja (1992) and Bombay (1995). While many of the aforementioned films 
apparently seek to establish the Indian nation-state as just, good and valiant by focusing on the 
representation of military action in a proto-realist mode of film-making, Dil Se engages with the 
dichotomy of citizen subject and terrorist non-subject in completely oblique manner. Dil Se 
responds to the conflicts between India and Pakistan—specifically in the Kashmir region—by 
foregrounding two interrelated registers of tension: namely, a spatial tension regarding the liminal 
status of the Kashmir region between the two nation-states; and a tension of signification with 
regard to the individuals with an articulated position about the spatial tension. The structural 
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impossibility of signifying a contested space and the liminal subjects therein is at the core of the 
plot of Dil Se, which I shall briefly describe. 
 As India celebrates fifty years of independence, All India Radio news reporter and radio 
jockey Amar (Shahrukh Khan) is sent to the Northeast province of India to cover common folk’s 
response to this historic event. As the Northeast province is a hotbed for anti-state separatist 
activities, Amar also plans to interview a so-called terrorist leader for his radio program. 
However, while Amar waits to board the train that will take him to the region, he comes across a 
mysterious woman (Manisha Koirala) for whom he develops an immediate fascination. He 
attempts –without success—to cajole personal information from the woman in the hopes of 
forming a liaison with her. The woman disappears, leaving Amar in throes of fantasy. From this 
point forward, the search for this woman becomes the primary motivating factor for Amar’s 
actions, and his duties as a reporter takes the second place. Once in the Northeast, Amar’s 
interviews with the so-called common people and terrorist leaders reveal the brewing discontent 
with the political and power structures of the Indian nation-state, yet Amar remains blissfully 
unaware, singularly fixated as he is in his desire for the mysterious woman. Through two chance 
encounters, Amar eventually gets to know the whereabouts and the name of the woman, Meghna. 
Upon his insistent advances, Meghna informs Amar that she is a married woman, and asks him to 
leave her alone. Amar, now remorseful, arranges to meet with her one more time so that he can 
apologize to her. However, Meghna arrives with two men—ostensibly including her husband—
who severely beat up Amar, but let it slip that Meghna is, in fact, not a married woman. 
Invigorated, Amar resumes his search, and—again, by chance—discovers that Meghna has left 
for Ladakh, in the Kashmir region. Amar immediately finds a reporting gig in Ladakh, where—
amidst the police shooting of a suspected terrorist—he finds Meghna, with whom he boards a 
bus. Amar proceeds to tease and torment Meghna about her supposed husband, and he is 
intercepted by security guards whom Meghna fends off by saying that Amar is her husband. The 
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bus breaks down, forcing the duo—along with the passengers—to hike through the Ladakh valley 
for two days. Amar tries to force himself on Meghna, who suffers a debilitating anxiety attack as 
a result. Despite this, the duo fall for each other on this trip, but Meghna disappears once again, 
leaving Amar no choice but to return home to Delhi. Once home, Amar attempts to forget 
Meghna, and agrees to get married to another girl that his family chooses for him. As the wedding 
arrangements are underway, Meghna shows up unannounced in Amar’s house in Delhi, and asks 
for a place to stay. Amar obliges, and finds her a job in All India Radio. However, Amar is soon 
interrogated by the Police as his name turns up among the belongings of a terrorist—one of the 
two men who had assaulted Amar—who, along with Meghna, were being investigated in 
connection with a suspected plot to assassinate the President at the Republic Day parade. Amar 
continues to pursue Meghna after learning this truth about her identity, and finally confronts 
her—bombs strapped to her body—at the parade. He tries to dissuade her from carrying out the 
act, but eventually tells her “If you won’t be with me, then take me with you.” They embrace, and 
the bomb goes off, killing both Amar and Meghna. 
 Clearly, the coherence of the plot of Dil Se depends upon the parallel development—and 
eventual intersection—of two distinct lines of desire: 1) Amar’s desire for Meghna, and 2) 
Meghna’s desire to claim some sort of answer from the nation-state with regard to politically 
contested spaces, such as Kashmir and the Northeast. It should also become obvious from the 
above summary of the plot that both the lines of desire are not destined to realize. In other words, 
Amar will not really get to know or have a romantic relationship with Meghna, and Meghna will 
not really elicit an answer or a response from the nation-state regarding the contested spaces. 
Both of them will, as we know, simply die at the conclusion of the film. One could also argue that 
both characters, on some level, are aware of the impossibility of their desires. Yet, they continue 
to pursue the object(s) of their desire—as if their lives depended on it—at the cost of their 
purported goals. However, it is also crucial to note that in the plot, the two lines of desire cannot 
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endlessly continue parallel to each other; they must, at some point, intersect. In other words, the 
plot must find a common ground between Meghna’s desire and Amar’s desire. It is at the site of 
this common ground that the film can be said to have a message with regard to the issues of 
terrorism and national politics. As we know, this common ground only appears at the end of the 
film, when Meghna and Amar die in each other’s arms, obliterated by the exploding bomb. In 
other words, the common ground is one where the two lines of desire cross out each other, and 
the desiring subjects (Meghna and Amar) disappear. How are we to read the message of Dil Se 
with regard to a kind of subjectivity specific to the terrorism films? More specifically, we need to 
ask, perhaps in a Freudian manner—in showing that the contesting desires of the terrorist and the 
citizen can only converge either in fantasy, or in mutual obliteration, what does the film actually 
want us to see? The answer, I propose, is to be sought in Jacques Lacan’s exploration of the 
articulation of desire vis-à-vis the object/cause of desire, specifically in his 1966 essay, “The 
Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious.” 
Section II: The Truth of Desire 
Lacan’s attempt, in “The Insistence,” is to point out that the ways in which the subject 
tentatively comes into being as subject-of-articulation by signifying—i.e. naming—its desire. In 
other words, Lacan argues that one is not a subject unless one is able gives a name to that which 
one desires. However, Lacan also points out—against the common understanding of the function 
of language—that this act of naming is far from a stable, accomplished fact. The subject—insofar 
as it retroactively comes into being through and after this act—while naming its desire, must 
arrest the synchronic sliding of the signifier through what Lacan calls a quilting point. In Lacan’s 
view, however, it would be a mistake to consider either the subject an active agent responsible for 
the function of the quilting point, or to consider the act of quilting final. The subject, in Lacan’s 
oeuvre, is far from an agent; rather, the subject is, quite literally, held under the sway of the 
Unconscious. Thus, it is the subject’s assumed position in the field of the Unconscious—which is 
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also the domain of Language and the Other—that allows the subject to retroactively arrive in 
relation to the object/cause of desire. In other words, the Unconscious is responsible for the 
subject’s arrival—the subject itself is rather powerless in this regard. Moreover, the Unconscious 
brings the subject’s desire to articulation—thereby giving birth to the subject, as it were—through 
the manifestation of the Other as the object/cause of desire (also known as L’objet petit a) around 
which the subject’s desire turns. Notably, in contrast with the foregrounding of temporality in the 
construction of the subject in “Logical Time,” Lacan’s analysis of subjectivity, in “The 
Insistence,” demands a spatial understanding, not only of the relationship between the signifier 
and the signified (in a sign), but also of the position where the subject comes into being in the 
process of signification. Lacan unfolds his analysis in three steps: first, he introduces the revised 
or inverted Saussurean schema of the sign; then, through the revision of Saussure, Lacan presents 
the idea of the signifying chain to reformulate the role of the signifier in precipitating meaning; 
finally, Lacan points out, following Freud, the ways in which the signifying chain brings about 
the subject. 
In the first step, Lacan addresses the problematic of signification by calling into question 
the structuration of the Saussurean sign. In order to do so, Lacan invokes the famous Saussurean 





Fig. 7. Lacan’s diagram of the tree74 
To be sure, in the Saussurean schema, the word “TREE” is the signifier, and the physical tree (or 
its image) is the signified—the signifier represents the signified, through what Lacan calls “the 
bi-univocal correspondence between the word and the thing, even in the mere act of naming.”75 
Moreover, Lacan points out that the line or the bar between the signifier and the signified puts the 
former over and away from the latter—this suggestion of spatiality or distance is crucial in 
understanding the function of the quilting point in the precipitation of meaning. However, Lacan 
objects to this “bi-univocal correspondence” because, in his analysis, such an assertion, when 
taken to its extreme would mean that “there is no language in existence for which there is any 
question of its inability to cover the whole field of the signified, it being an effect of its existence 
as a language that it necessarily answer all needs.”76 Of course, considering such a language—
which would need to be a meta-language—would amount to logical positivism, and meta-
language, Lacan argues, does not exist. Against the S/s schema, Lacan suggests the following: 
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 75 . Ibid., 116. 
 76 . Ibid., 116. 
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one will fail even to keep the question in view as long as one has not got rid of 
the illusion that the signifier answers to the function of representing the signified, 
or better, that the signifier has to answer for its existence in the name of any 
signification whatever. [Because in the] formula S/s: if we could infer nothing 
from it beyond the notion of the parallelism of its upper and lower terms, each 
one taken in its globality, it would remain only the enigmatic sign of a total 
mystery. (Lacan 2006, 117) 
 Here, Lacan’s argument regarding the relationship between the signifier and the signified 
in the precipitation of signification has significant bearing upon the way in which we want to 
understand the parallel development, and eventual convergence of the trajectories of Amar’s and 
Meghna’s desire. What Lacan is trying to point out here is this: if we were to maintain that there 
always remains a strict boundary or bar between the signifier and the signified, then the two 
would never converge to precipitate signification or meaning. Both the elements of a sign would 
remain inexplicable in their parallel separation, if we are to follow the Saussurean schema. Thus, 
the problem that Lacan identifies here is eerily similar to the complication that we run up against 
when trying to decipher the relationship between Amar and Meghna’s articulation of desire in the 
plot of Dil Se. To be sure, it would be impossible to understand the plot if there remains a bar 
between the trajectories of the two characters, much like the enigma that Lacan points to in his 
analysis of the Saussurean sign. Hence, it follows that if we pursue Lacan’s re-formulation of the 
sign—one that will tell us how and where the reciprocal infringement of the two elements 
precipitate meaning—we will be able to better understand the way in which Dil Se concludes 
with the mutual obliteration of Amar and Meghna. 
 After pointing out the structural problem of the Saussurean sign—i.e. that, in this schema, 
the signified incessantly slides under the signifier—Lacan proposes a revised form of the schema 
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that addresses the topography of the reciprocal infringement of the signifier and the signified. The 
following is what Lacan proposes: 
We are forced, then, to accept the notion of an incessant sliding of the signified 
under the signifier - which F. de Saussure illustrates with an image resembling 
the wavy lines of the upper and lower Waters in miniatures from manuscripts of 
Genesis […]. All our experience runs counter to this linearity, which made me 
speak once, in one of my seminars on psychosis, of something more like spaced 
upholstery buttons as a schema for taking into account the dominance of the 
letter in the dramatic transformation which the dialogue can bring about in a 
subject. (121) 
 In making this seemingly off-hand reference to his seminar on psychosis, Lacan is 
alerting us regarding two very crucial elements of his theory of the subject: namely, the 
upholstery button, and the dominance of the letter in transforming the subject. The upholstery 
button has a lengthy genealogy and several manifestations in Lacan’s thought. However, the 
manifestation with which we familiarized ourselves in reading Lacan’s “Logical Time” is called 
the quilting point. Allow me to present three observations regarding the quilting point: it is an 
element of symbolic language; it occurs at the level of the signifier; it does not totalize 
signification. The first two observations call attention to the fact that the quilting poin is a 
linguistic function that arrests the incessant sliding of the signifier, and brings together the 
signifier and the signified to precipitate signification. The third observation, however, is more 
crucial: the quilting point does not petrify the signifier and the signified in a singular, stable 
signification. If the quilting point were to have a stabilizing effect, then each signifier would be 
permanently tied to its assigned signified, and there would be no such thing as connotation. In 
fact, it is precisely where the quilting point performs its tethering function that the possibility of 
connotation becomes evident. In other words, the quilting point calls attention to the necessity of 
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quilting by its very presence, and alerts us to the fact that the signification is not constitutively 
stable. Thus, the quilting point leaves a residue—a gap or hole in the process of signification—in 
its wake. This is what Lacan means when he characterizes the quilting point as a spaced 
upholstery button. 
 It is in this space that the dominance of the letter gives birth to the subject by supplying it 
with the object/cause of desire. The letter that so dominates the subject is none other than what 
the letter a designates in Lacanian algebra—namely, L’object petit a. Consider the following 
diagram—of the appearance of the subject—from The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis: 
 
Fig. 8. The graph of the quilting point77 
To be sure, this diagram—in addition to representing the circuit of the drive and the locus of objet 
petit a—shows us the structure of the quilting point, as represented by the upward-and-backward 
trajectory of the sign delta (Δ)78. The three tiers of this graph—i.e. goal, rim and aim—correspond 
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 78 . The “delta” (Δ) at the right end of the vector, in Lacanian matheme, is the pre-
linguistic, undivided, biological entity, or the mythical “real.” In another manifestation of this 
91	  
	  
to the three tiers of Saussurean sign, namely, signified, bar and signifier. However, the 
fundamental difference between the Saussurean and the Lacanian schema is that while in the 
former the upper and the lower tiers remain inviolate along the middle tier, in the latter schema 
the trajectory of the delta passes through the middle tier and binds the upper and the lower tiers. 
What is crucial in the movement of the delta-vector—from its point-of-origin to its goal, via its 
aim—is the way in which object petit a compels the vector to turn upward and backward. This 
itinerary of the vector—caused by objet petit a—posits the subject qua subject-of-signification in 
a retroactive manner. 
 Now, if we apply this understanding of the retroactive-anticipated arrival of the subject 
through the process of signification, as precipitated by the quilting function of objet petit a, we 
will be able to better comprehend the trajectories of the articulation of Amar’s and Meghna’s 
desire. As noted in the plot summary of Dil Se in the previous section of this chapter, it is evident 
that the characters anticipate the imminent failure of their desire for each other; yet, they persist 
in their aim, so that they can retroactively attain the goal of their desires. However, the itinerary 
that is their aim must turn around the object/cause of their desire. Evidently, in Dil Se, Amar and 
Meghna function as each other’s objet petit a. Thus, when they arrive—come into being as 
subjects—at their goal, they mutually realize that the object/cause of desire which initiated their 
journey is nothing but a hole in signification. Hence, as subjects who recognize their inaugural 
misrecognition, they embrace this hole: i.e. they obliterate each other. However, this recognition-
of-misrecognition can take place only after the (anticipated) subject completes the trajectory of 
desire at the level of the signifier. The domain of the signifier—here we must recall our reading 
of the problems of the Saussurean sign—is fraught with slipperiness, where signifiers 
synchronically refer to other signifiers, creating a chain of metonymic substitutions. This 
metonymic chain—through which Amar’s Meghna’s desires unfold—is also vertically 
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“barred subject” (S) at the left end of the delta-vector.  
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punctuated by the articulation of relevant contexts that allows us to understand the particular 
nature of the itinerary undertaken by the characters in Dil Se. Nowhere is this trajectory more 
prominent than in the song-and-dance numbers in which Amar and Meghna articulate their desire 
for each other. The following reworking of Lacan’s graph represents this economy: 
 
Fig. 9. Reworked graph 
 
Section III: Substitution One—“Walk in the Shadow of Love” 
The expository sequence of Dil Se is, at once, incredibly reticent and exceedingly 
forthright: it presents us with Amar and Meghna, the two main characters, within the first three 
minutes of the film; yet, the plot does not reveal anything about the background of the characters. 
This move, by itself, should tell us that Dil Se engages obliquely with the genre conventions of 
Bollywood cinema, where the establishing sequence is expected to—on the one hand—provide a 
thorough socio-cultural context of the main character(s), while on the other hand it is also 
conventional to introduce major character(s) halfway through the film. Clearly, the opening 
sequence of the film is intended to whet the viewer’s appetite for signification, in that the film 
compels the viewer to ask: Who are these characters? What is their history? In fact, this desire to 
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know is voiced by Amar immediately after his chance encounter with Meghna on a forlorn 
railway station where both are waiting for a train. Amar demands that Meghna respond to his 
interest in her: “Tell me something about you, anything at all,” he tells her. Just when he is about 
to give up hope, Meghna tells him that she would appreciate a cup of tea. This request bears a 
certain promise for Amar: by letting on what she wants, Meghna has also opened up the 
possibility of a liaison. Clearly, Dil Se wastes no time in establishing that Amar desires Meghna. 
However, Meghna’s status changes from immediate object of desire to object/cause of desire 
rather rapidly when she boards a train with two unknown men, giving Amar the slip. Amar, tea in 
hand, watches Meghna leave, and with a wistful expression utters to no one in particular: “This 
has to be tiniest love story in the whole world.”  
But of course, Amar’s expression tells us that the story that is to come will be anything 
but short. If anything, Meghna’s teasing departure has lured Amar into pursuing this matter 
further. This wistful tone is also writ large on Meghna’s face as she looks at Amar from the 






Fig. 10. Amar’s POV79 
We should not fail to note what this shot so clearly reveals: Amar and Meghna recognize each 
other’s desire, as substantiated by not only Amar’s point of view of this shot, but also Meghna’s 
reciprocation of this look. We should also note that a bar splits the shot in two distinct sections. 
While the left of the screen is occupied by Meghna looking at Amar (read, at the camera), the 
right of the screen is populated by men who look at Meghna in somewhat threatening and 
possessive manner. A significant portion of the shot is also saturated with dark colors, while the 
brightness of Meghna’s face and the separating bar stand out in clear relief. If there was any 
doubt that Meghna becomes Amar’s object/cause of desire from this point forward, these visual 
elements of the shot should allay such reservations.  
I propose that we read this shot in the following way: Meghna, who clearly wants Amar, 
is beyond his immediate access—behind the bar as she is—while others’ clearly have greater 
access to her. Hence, it should not be surprising that this shot launches Amar in the trajectory of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 79 . Screenshot from Dil Se, directed by Mani Ratnam (1998; Mumbai, India: Eros 




desire, precisely in the way that objet petit a compels the subject in the circuit of desire. The 
visual structure of this shot substantiates Lacan’s formulation that “Desire is the desire of the 
Other.”80 Naturally, Amar’s response to this moment, in which he is captured by his objet petit a, 
is to create a dream-scenario, where, through a series of synchronic substitutions, he can engage 
in the process of desire. 
 This is precisely what allows Dil Se to present its first song-and-dance number; one that I 
shall categorize as an “item number,” since the lead female dancer, who is a pure substitutive 
signifier for Meghna, never again appears in the film. This inaugural song-and-dance number is 
aptly called “Chaiyya Chaiyya,” “Walk in the Shadow of Love.” The sequence begins with a tight 
close-up of Amar’s face, as he is lost in a reverie with his eyes closed and head tilted slightly up, 
as if to match the angle of Meghna’s last look. 
 
Fig. 11. Amar’s face 
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Even though in this shot the camera is still tethered to physical reality of the railway station, the 
space of the film has been transformed via the upbeat song that has already started in the audio 
track. Matching the mood of the song, Amar is far from crestfallen at the loss of his object of 
desire. He appears to enjoy this initial moment of fantasizing. Noticeably, the colors of this shot 
reflect the doubleness of loss and desire: while the bright red color of Amar’s jacket foregrounds 
the element of desire, shadows are still present—albeit in the background. Naturally, the next we 
see Amar in the sequence, we find him emerging from the shadows, standing on the roof of a 
train, silhouetted against what clearly appears to be the opening of a tunnel. What is this but a 
metaphor for Amar’s arrival into the bright light of desire? What is this if not a metaphor for the 
birth of his subjectivity, through the womb-like tunnel through which the train passes?  
 
Fig. 12. Train through tunnel 
After this dramatic emergence, Amar engages in an energetic, upbeat, and physically impossible 
song-and-dance routine on top of the train with a woman (known simply as “Dancer on Train” in 
the credits) and group of people, whose overtly traditional costuming clearly marks them as 
common folks. As they go through the repetitive dance motions, Amar and the woman also sing 
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an intricately composed, fully aspirated, musical ensemble-accompanied song. In this dream-
space, the film allows itself not only to defy narrative continuity, but also allows itself to defy 
laws of physics. The gyrating bodies of the actors jump on the train as it moves, apparently at a 
high speed, through serpentine, undulating train tracks on a hilly region; yet, surprisingly, none of 
the actors find it difficult to perform the extremely acrobatic dance movements, let alone fall off 
the roof of the train. In fact, the film gleefully highlights this physical impossibility by capturing, 
in several long shots, the bodies of the dancing actors on the roof of the train. 
 
Fig. 13. Dancing on train 
We should not fail to notice that color-scheme of the shot has completely changed at this point—
there are no shadows to be found in this bright and soothing green setting. Even though Amar 
dances with the others—and one should note that the common-folk dancers look eerily similar to 
the men with whom Meghna left Amar—his attention is clearly on the “Dancer on Train.” The 
sexual charge of Amar’s desire for Meghna finds a substitution in the clearly sexualized 
representation of the body of the “Dancer.” The sequence foregrounds the sexual way in which 
Amar finds the “Dancer” alluring. In close-up, we see Amar joyful face against her bared midriff, 
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while her face is cut off in the framing of the shot. We see that Amar is looking up and away, at 
the “Dancer,” but we do not see her making eye contact with him. In fact, I would argue that the 
tease or lure of the “Dancer” is formally similar to the path that Amar’s desire takes with regard 
to the absent figure of Meghna. 
 
Fig. 14. “Dancer on train” 
 The deeply sexualized body of the “Dancer” that the camera takes obvious pleasure in 
showing never reveals all. Although copious amount of skin is shown on screen, although the 
dance movements are clearly suggestive of the act of copulation, the “item number” remains at 
the level of fantasy by steadfastly refusing to follow realism of any kind. Crucially, as any Indian 
viewer would not fail to recognize, the stylized garment worn by the “Dancer” is fictional: i.e. no 
village belle would actually wear such a non-functional dress. Apart from the clearly identifiable 
fakeries, the viewer would also be aware that the bodies, which defy the laws of gravity— by not 
falling down from the roof of a moving train while dancing—could not be real by any means. . I 
would further argue that, precisely because the “Dancer” is evidently not real that Amar, now a 
subject-of-desire, can use her as a substitute for Meghna in a sexually charged dream scenario. 
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Therefore, the “item number” promises a beyond, but refuses to deliver its promise, thereby 
allowing Amar to desire per se. However, what really allows us to comprehend this “item 
number” as Amar’s desire to assign signification to Meghna is the way in which this sequence is 
visually punctuated, or framed. Just as it began with the metaphoric birth of Amar through a dark 
tunnel, the dance sequence ends when the camera fades to black as the train enters another dark 
tunnel. It is within the frames of this double metaphor that one begins to comprehend the sexual-
Oedipal nature of Amar’s desire. If the disappearing face of Meghna can launch Amar into a 
dream that is framed by what Freud would call the desire for the Mother, then what else could 
Meghna be for Amar but the object/cause of his desire? In the following section, I shall 
substantiate this argument further by demonstrating the ways in which Amar’s eventual real 
encounter with Meghna precipitates catastrophic effects in his dreamscape.  
Section IV: “A Heart’s only a Heart”; or, Why the Letter Kills 
 Although the dream-sequence that is “Chaiyya Chaiyya” takes Amar from the forlorn 
railways station to the troubled Northeast region of India, where he is to interview common folks 
and terrorist leaders for All India Radio, his search for Meghna continues unabated. However, it 
is at this point that Dil Se begins the doubled narrative of terrorism, national politics and violence 
one the one hand, and Amar and Meghna’s desire on the other. To be more exact, it is at this 
point that the film begins to position the love story against the background of terrorism and the 
violence of the nation-state. This doubling at the level of the plot helps to bring out the theme of 
liminality. To be sure, the theme of liminality is reflected not only in the film’s thoughtful 
consideration of the political issue of terrorism, but also in the nature of Amar and Meghna’s 
relationship. The terrorists in this film are neither fully inside the nation-state, nor totally outside 
of it; similarly, Amar and Meghna can neither fully consummate their desire, nor can they move 
away from each other. As the two parallel trajectories of desire get closer to each other, Amar and 
Meghna are caught in a deadlock. Yet, anticipated in this deadlock is the retroactive certainty of 
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their mutual demise. Nowhere is this doubled, back-and-forth movement of Amar’s and 
Meghna’s desires more prominent than in the song-and-dance number entitled “Dil se re,” or 
“From the heart/ A heart’s only a heart.” 
 This sequence begins when, after a few chance encounters, Amar is finally able to locate 
where Meghna lives, and confronts her there. This is a remarkable incident as far as Amar’s 
desire is concerned: this is the first time that he gains access to his object/cause of desire. He has 
been singularly dedicated in his pursuit of this imagined moment, where he would profess his 
love for Meghna. The singular insistence of his desire has been undeterred by the other side of his 
experience in the Northeast; namely, his conversations with the common folks and terrorists who 
are equally disgruntled with the nation state. Amar seems unmoved when his interviewees tell 
him that fifty years’ of independence means nothing for them, as they have been systematically 
disenfranchised by the independent nation-state. He does not seem to recognize the threat of 
violence when his interview with the terrorist leader reveals an immense training camp for 
militant activists. Quite literally, for Amar, the crucial theme of terrorism against the nation-state 
fades in the background, compared to his obsessive search for Meghna. However, since Amar’s 
desire has to play out at the level of the signifier (i.e. in the domain of the Unconscious), the 
metonymic sliding of the articulation of his desire is haunted by images of violence. That which 
he tries to repress or foreclose as mere background—namely, the clear presence of violence in 
which he is caught up, along with Meghna—returns in the form of uncanny symptoms. It is in 
this context of uncanny haunting that Amar comes face-to-face with Meghna, declares his love 
for her. The camera immediately transports the duo to a day-dream sequence that is presented 
through a song-and-number, following the conventions of Bollywood cinema.This is crucial 
because this is the first time that Amar and Meghna appear—sans the substitutive “Dancer”—in 
each other’s fantasy. Naturally, one would expect this sequence to closely correspond to the 
joyous rhythms and bright colors of the previous dance sequence. However, the song-and-dance 
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sequence does exactly the opposite: the number opens with images of military violence, the initial 
shot dominated by the darkness of shadows and bright orange of fire. 
 
Fig. 15. Fire motif 
This shot, which frames the song-and-dance sequence, is ambiguous in many ways. First, the 
sequence does not reveal from whose point of view we are witnessing this bleak, almost 
apocalyptic mise-en-scene. Moreover, since this frame is captured in long shot, one cannot be 
sure if this is a point of view shot at all. In other words, the initial shot does not reveal whose 
dreamscape is being presented to the viewer. However, certain visual cues relate this shot to the 
moment in “Chaiyya Chaiyya” when Amar emerges—captured in a silhouette—from the dark 
tunnel. Similarly to the previous metaphor of emergence, the soldiers emerge—rather suddenly—
from a field of swirling mist. As the figures of the soldiers become more visible, the fog recedes 
somewhat, revealing the setting of this sequence—a city in the state of violence. In the 
background, one can see the hints of a large building and tall street lights, suggesting the urban 
nature of this devastated landscape. The silhouetted figures clearly reveal an essential feature of 
their identity: they are clearly not a civic force (i.e. the police); they are, indeed, members of the 
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military force, substantiated by their attire and guns. Also noteworthy is the way blocking is used 
in this sequence to reveal the purpose of these figures. They are organized in a phalanx, evidently 
following the military mode. Yet, we cannot forget that the military figures are quite similar to 
the image of Amar-in-emergence. The darkness of the figures only heightens the sense of threat 
that perhaps erupts in Amar’s unconscious as he gets dangerously close to his object/cause of 
desire. The doubleness of fear and desire is figured in the color scheme of this shot. The bright 
orange flame in the left foreground is in stark contrast with the predominant dark tones of the rest 
of the shot. The reddish-orange color of the fire not only invokes Amar’s jacket of a similar color-
scheme from the previous dance number, but this colorful fire also continues to (re)appear as a 
motif of the conjugated presence of desire and death from this point forward. 
 The indeterminate nature of this shot’s point of view is further complicated by the 
appearance of both Amar’s Meghna’s faces, captured in tight close-up shots, intercut with images 
of violence. These close-up intercuts are always followed by either the threatening soldier-figures 
who rush toward the camera, or by the reappearing motif of bright fire. Thus, it is rather 
ambiguous whether the nightmarish signifiers belong to Amar or Meghna, especially because 
both have experienced manifestations of violence to some degree. However, the violent mise-en-
scene is not completely detached from the articulation of their desire for each other. A shot-
reverse shot sequence captures the potentially violent aspect of the erotic charge between the two. 




Fig 16. Through the balistraria 
In this shot, what captures Amar’s point of view is Meghna’s steady look at the camera (hence, at 
him). Clearly, the shot emphasizes the element of the look by blocking most of Meghna’s face, to 
the point where we are left with a condensed moment of glance. The glance, however, is charged 
with signification. Although one can read Meghna’s look in many ways, an immediate reading of 
her expression cannot miss the sense of accusation and betrayal. Hiding behind what looks like 
the wall of an old fort, Meghna looks at Amar and the violent world in which they are caught 
through a balistraria. This image is revelatory in many ways: the balistraria invokes the genealogy 
of violence in a very specific historiographic way; the crouching posture of Meghna (since she is 
clearly lit from above) hints at a primal sense of fear; moreover, the balistraria, which also looks 
like a cross, invokes the militant aspect of Christianity in a pointedly postcolonial way81. 
Remarkably, what remains indeterminate is Meghna’s intention—one simply cannot say whether 
she is hiding, or crouching in a predatory position. The motif of fire—representing death, desire 
and violence at the same time—is clearly on Meghna’s side in this shot, as her face is lit up with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




the orange hue of the flames. The fire-motif also appears in the reverse shot, where Amar’s face 
is captured in close up, presumably from Meghna’s point of view. 
 
Fig. 17. Fire motif 2 
 The eye line match of this shot shows that Amar, much like Meghna, is in a crouching 
position. Further, half of Amar’s face is blocked by the raging flames—in contrast with the dark 
wall that blocks Meghna’s face. However, this blocking achieves a similar effect by making it 
difficult to read Amar’s expression. However, noticeably, Amar’s attire is very different now. 
Instead of the bright red jacket, he wears what appears to be military jacket, with the tell-tale 
shoulder strap clearly visible. If this shot is indeed from Meghna’s point of view, her desire has 
metaphorically equated Amar with the military power of the nation-state. In other words, if 
Meghna’s desire addresses someone or something, it is certainly not Amar-the-subject; rather, the 
substitutive sliding of the signifier has assigned to Amar the role of representing state power. The 
foregrounding of the fire—in keeping with its motif-status—invokes passion, desire and death. 
However, the significant difference in this shot is that Amar touches the fire, yet remains 
unaffected by it, at least for the time being. What is this if not the visualization of the phrase 
“playing with fire” in all its connotations? Indeed, Amar is playing with fire, in the sense that he 
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has come too close to his object/cause of desire. In so doing, he has also subjected himself to 
Meghna’s desire—one that seeks response from the state power—that has transformed him.  
 This sequence of shots in the song number also anticipates, through a retroactive move, 
the coming-together of Amar and Meghna. They had indeed come face-to-face once before, in the 
initial moments of the film. However, if that encounter revealed anything about the possibility of 
Amar and Meghna’s conjugation, it is that their desire for each other is centered on a constitutive 
impossibility—a lack or hole in signification. The present song-sequence metaphorically reveals 
this inaugural lack: Amar’s point of view unveils the lurking danger in Meghna; and Meghna’s 
point of view reveals the ways in which Amar is associated with state power. Hence, the only 
way the parallel trajectories of their desire could intersect is by cancelling out each other. I would 
argue that the ending of the film—where Amar and Meghna explode together—is already 
inscribed in this sequence. Indeed, the eventual death-in-explosion of the duo is prominently 
featured at the end of this song sequence. However, this foreshadowing has one significant 
caveat—while in their final moments Amar and Meghna remain fixed within the ring of fire, in 
this sequence they run away from a bright orange fireball that rushes toward them. I would argue 
that this move—away from the all-consuming fire—demonstrates that the trajectory Amar’s and 





Fig. 18. Explosion 
Of course, we will see the same conflagration re-appear at the end of the film, where Amar and 
Meghna will recede—almost invisible—in the background, while the blindingly bright explosion 
will occupy the foreground. However, if we want to follow the trajectory of their desires to their 
goal, where they will be effective annihilated as individuated subjects and come together sensu 
stricto, we have to look no further than the song-and-dance sequence that celebrates the moment 
when Meghna and Amar consummate their desire for each other. In the next section, we will 
follow the final leg of their itinerary by reading “Satrangi Re” (O one of many colors) 
Section V: Unmoored Subjects 
 The pacing of Dil Se changes significantly following the “Dil Se Re” song- sequence. The 
editing leaves behind the unrestricted, slow and associative pattern, and embraces a faster-paced, 
linear and cause-effect pattern. It is as if once the end of Amar and Meghna’s love story is in 
sight, the film cannot wait long enough to reach this point. Hence, the song-and-dance number 
that effectively declares the eventual mutual obliteration of Meghna and Amar—namely, 
“Satrangi Re”—feverishly takes the duo from one impossible mise-en-scene to another. The 
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cursory attempt at realism of the previous song sequences no longer limits the film, as it launches 
into the creation of a dreamscape that is completely surreal. The signifying terrain of this 
sequence is filled with metaphors and metonyms, as if to instantiate the synchronic sliding of the 
signifier. If we apply Lacan’s diagram of the quilting point to the scenario of this song number, 
we could argue that the delta-trajectory of Amar and Meghna’s desire is passing through the rim 
at this point. In the Saussurean schema, they are passing through the bar that separates the 
signifier and the signified. In other words, they are passing through the strata where meaning is at 
its most unstable form. 
 Indeed, the opening shot of the sequence disorients the viewer. The subjects we have 
come to know as Amar and Meghna seem alien—removed from any known reference frames, set 
amidst rapidly changing mise-en-scene. The inaugural scene of this sequence—one that will 
chronicle the eventual un-anchoring of the subjects—captures Amar and Meghna singing and 
dancing in a landscape that has no real correlative in the diegesis.  
 
Fig. 19. Unreal landscape 
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Diegetically, Amar and Meghna should be somewhere in Kashmir, in the Ladakh region. 
However, the terrain in this shot does not correspond to the way in which Ladakh has been 
previously established in the film. Instead of attempted realism, this shot steadfastly refuses to 
reveal anything regarding the location. Moreover, in contrast to the insistent eye line match and 
shot-reverse shot structure previously followed, in this shot Amar and Meghna’s look can only be 
described as being awry. They are neither looking at each other, nor are they prominently looking 
away from each other; they seem to be caught up in completely different (focal) planes. The 
layering of the shot is decidedly more complex than the usual background-foreground separation, 
where the two planes are commonly tethered by axially exchanged looks. Here, one finds no 
visual evidence that the plane occupied by Amar and the plane occupied by Meghna are causally 
connected. The only visual similarity between the two planes is the color-matching of the attires. 
While both wear black outfits that make them stand out against the beige tone of the rocks and the 
light blue of the sky, Meghna’s clothes are emphatically orientalized. The eroticism latent in 
orientalism is brought out prominently by Meghna’s bared midriff and ever-so-slightly 
translucent bustier. In contrast, Amar’s costuming covers him up almost totally, and does not 
anchor him in any standard visual code. However, the camera does not reveal any preference with 
regard to their subjectivity: in deep focus, the camera captures both characters with equal lack of 
grounding. 
 The initial shot quickly gives way to an entirely different locale in a subsequent shot. 
Here, we find that Amar and Meghna have exchanged planes—Amar is in the foreground now. 
Moreover, they have left the dry landscape of the previous shot, and now appear next to a lake in 




Fig. 20. Snowy field 
Amar retains his black outfit, but Meghna has changed into a white dress. She is almost invisible, 
placed against the blinding whiteness of the snow. Yet, her image is doubled: the camera captures 
Meghna’s reflection on the surface of the still lake. It is this reflected image that seems to intrude 
into the plane that Amar occupies, while Meghna’s body seems distant—almost inaccessible—
and indistinguishable from the natural elements. The rapid shift of the location of the shot, as well 
as the reversed positions of Amar and Meghna underscores the radical substitutability of the 
signifiers in this sequence. It is as if Amar and Meghna are entirely expendable as individual 
subjects; their only function is to carry out their assigned roles in the signifying chain. 
 The evident surrealism of this sequence is taken to its extreme when, in a subsequent 
shot, Amar and Meghna symbolically consummate their desire. To be sure, this is the infamously 
reticent rendering of the so-called sex scene following the Bollywood convention in this regard. 
In this shot, we find Amar and Meghna wrapped in a bright orange sack-like object. They occupy 
the same plane in the shot; yet, it is the rendering of the background that completely negates any 
possibility of subjective consistency. The background in this shot is strikingly similar to a painted 
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backdrop that renders, with obvious fakeness, a lake and snowy mountains. The obvious visual 
reference is the lake from the previous shot, where Amar and Meghna were clearly separated. 
Evidently, the only way the duo can physically come together is by exchanging the real lake with 
a painted lake. This honest fakery compels the viewer to ask the fundamentally crucial question: 
namely, is there a “there” there, where these two subjects can have what they desire? This shot 
seems to suggest that the only way in which Amar and Meghna can intersect as subjects is when 
the very basis, anchoring and grounding of their subjectivity is radically unmoored. 
 
Fig. 21. Fire motif 3 
We should not fail to notice the re-appearance of the fire motif in another manifestation in this 
shot. The sack-like object in which the characters are wrapped bears close resemblance—with 
regard to color and shape—to the orange flames in the previous song number. Noticeably, Amar 
and Meghna are no longer running away from the metaphoric flame; in fact, they seem contently 
absorbed in each other while being enveloped in it.  
 This shot clearly foreshadows the ending of the film, when Meghna and Amar would be 
similarly enveloped by the flames of an exploding bomb. In other words, this moment in the 
111	  
	  
song-sequence is also an anticipated moment of completion-in-death, albeit at the level of the 
signifier. But how are we to read this ending-before-the-end? Are we to read the mutual 
obliteration of the two characters as “narrative irresolution” leading to a “subversion of 
heteronormativity?”82 Or, are we to read this representation of terror (state-sponsored or 
otherwise) as “phantasmic spectacles” that enable the “circulation of an endless political 
cliché?”83 While I partially agree with these observations, in that Dil Se indeed subverts 
“heteronormativity,” and that the films creates a “phantasmic” ground, I argue that the claim that 
Dil Se is either irresolute or spectacular entirely misses the point of the film. 
I propose that one should read Dil Se—especially the scene(s) of Amar and Meghna’s 
death—in the following way: Dil Se presents the possibility of a radical politics which recognizes 
that faith bestowed upon the supposed coherence of the subject inevitably leads to a kind of ontic 
and ontological violence where the desires of each individuated subject run contrary to each 
other. Hence, Dil Se seems to suggest, a properly radical politics would embrace the desires as 
what they really are: namely, the trajectory of a subject that retroactively comes into being by 
misrecognizing the vacuity of the object/cause of desire as concrete or quantifiable. By embracing 
the foundational lack of desire, Dil Se proposes a kind of subjectivity that is truly radical in its 
refusal of coherent anchoring. If Dil Se is gleefully produces of a phantasmic space, it does so 
precisely to underscore that it is through fantasy that the subject comes into being as the subject-
of-desire. Thus, when this fantasy is clearly and overtly marked as fantasy the cogito-subject has 
no other choice but to become unmoored. The subject, thus un-anchored, would then be able to 
embrace the truly terrifying lack or hole that had once constituted its subjectivity. This askew-
subject—a contemplative, lost subject, just as Meghna and Amar are finally absorbed in each 
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other’s foundational lack—would not only reject heteronormativity and/or hegemonic national 
identity, but also it would reject the very foundation of the cogito-subject: namely, subjectivity 
itself. Thus, Sujala Singh misses the point of Dil Se when she writes the following: 
These films, I contend, are caught up in the bind of guilt and responsibility. Even 
as they attempt to imagine a secular, all-embracing India, they also depict state 
violence and torture, Problematic though the erasure of specific histories, the 
infantilism of terrorist figures or the inclusion of token “good” minority 
characters may be (as I show later), these films attempt to humanize “othered” 
identities.84 
The “erasure of specific histories” in the case of Meghna and Amar is neither problematic nor 
does it humanize the characters. Contrary to this claim, when Amar and Meghna meet for the first 
time, they have no histories—specific or otherwise. The plot of Dil Se consists in creating a 
history that is very specific to these characters. Their histories are indeed specific to their desires; 
yet, the film reveals over and over that the characters have to traverse (i.e. leave behind, residue-
like) this history in order to achieve the goal of their desire. The history that Amar and Meghna 
write is a history of their itinerary (aim) to their goal. Their goal, however, is not to humanize 
each other; neither is it the goal of Dil Se. Their goal—that is, the goal of their desire—is to 
simply be totally absorbed in each other. This is clearly not a goal consistent with the cogito-
subject who must be able to think (as himself) in order to be (exist as individual). The goal of Dil 
Se is to compel the subject to trade its desire for knowledge for enjoyment. In this sense, Dil Se’s 
position is not the liberal-humanist one where the othered is humanized; Dil Se is radical 
precisely because it is avowedly anti-humanist. 
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 Similarly, when Ananya Kabir praises Dil Se for its “narrative irresolution” and 
consequent “revolutionary potential,” she misses the chance of deriving a thoughtful conclusion 
from what is otherwise an astute observation. Kabir writes, “The paradox of distance that beckons 
and keeps at bay is the complication needed to propel the narrative forward, but it also prevents 
narrative resolution.”85 She goes on to substantiate her claim through a quick reading of the song-
sequence “Dil Se Re,” where she aptly identifies that for Amar, Meghna always remains slightly 
out-of-reach. However, when she deduces from this observation that “such elusiveness stalls 
progress towards an integrative denouement,” she misses the crucial point that this elusiveness is 
nothing but the substitutive-synchronic movement of the signifier toward its goal. A resolute end, 
far from being absent in this song-dance-sequence, is anticipated in every step of the way. Much 
like Singh, Kabir’s inability to read Dil Se properly is caused by the faith that humanism (i.e. 
Cartesian subjectivity) is the ultimate good. Naturally, to these critics, Dil Se’s subversive 
commitment to foreground the un-anchoring of subjectivity appears to be the proof of either 
formal unsophistication, or clichéd politics. The problem is not that these critics—and I invoke 
them to exemplify a particular way of reading, and nothing more—are not good readers of audio-
visual texts; the problem is that while Dil Se unfolds in a register that is decidedly queer, askew 
or awry, the critics attempt to read it from a sincere or straight perspective. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






THE SUBJECT AND THE GAZE 
AN INTIMATE EXTERIOR 
The previous chapters of this dissertation discuss the ways in which the subject—or, that which 
assumes the position of subjectivity—comes into being hesitantly in relation to the field or space 
of language, which is also the domain of the Other. The subject appears only when a partial 
failure, disturbance or distortion occurs in the domain of the Other. Contemporary Lacanian film 
theorists have focused on this element of partial failure or disturbance of the Symbolic order in 
their analysis of subjectivity, and in so doing, they have departed from the path of early Lacanian 
film theorists, who considered the Symbolic order to be infallible and monolithic. Lacanian film 
theorists today approach the necessity of the failure of signification in two prominent ways: first, 
theorists consider the failure of signification as the rupturing of the Symbolic order by the 
appearance of the Lacanian Real qua part-objects or objet petit a; and second, theorists 
concentrate on the partialness of the failure of signification to argue that it is the promissory or 
the not-quite-completed nature of objet petit a that attracts or compels the subject to come into 
being as a split subject. The former approach is evident in the works of Todd McGowan, 
especially when he discusses atemporal cinema as a cinema of the death drive. The latter 
approach is less common; however, Hugh Manon’s works prominently demonstrate the 
importance of partialness in the precipitation of split-subjectivity. Both scholars investigate the 
element of failure or rupture by theorizing the notion of the gaze as the primary  
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manifestation of objet petit a in the experience of cinema. The common ground between these 
two ways of thinking about the failure of signification is this: the subject’s appearance is entirely 
dependent upon the gaze as objet petit a, which holds the subject in the sway of the domain of the 
Other. In other words, contemporary Lacanian film theory argues that the subject is powerless—
i.e. it lacks agency—where the gaze, and by extension, the Other is concerned.  
In contrast, I argue that although subjectivity is indeed precipitated in the domain of the 
Other or the field of symbolic language in relation to the gaze as objet petit a, it is not that the 
subject has no agency in this matter. On the contrary, this chapter proposes that it is possible to 
conceive of a kind of subjectivity that comes into being via an oblique relationship with the space 
of signification, by recognizing the gaze qua objet petit a as that which is lacking in the Other, 
and then by manipulating the Other to reveal its lack. This fundamentally skewed subject 
manipulates the Other by creating and inserting a cipher—a blank or fake object—at the level of 
the system of signification. This cipher, which is structurally akin to the gaze as objet petit a, 
serves to reveal the lack in the Other—which is to say, the cipher serves to reveal what the Other 
desires. The subject—by manipulating the Other in this way—comes into being by assuming the 
place of the cipher. To put it in different terms, I argue that the skewed subject is the agent of its 
own appearance in the domain of the Other, rather than being a non-agent, whose being is 
completely dictated by the gaze qua the object to which only the Other has access. However, it is 
crucial to clarify that my claim regarding the subject’s manipulation of the Other through the 
creation of a cipher or gaze-effect is not a turn to the early iterations of Lacanian film theory, 
which sought to locate the gaze on the side of the subject, rather than on the side of the object. In 
contrast, my argument about the skewed subject’s agency is an extension of contemporary 
Lacanian film theory, which has demonstrated that the gaze is objective, rather than subjective. 
The only difference between my approach and that of Lacanian film theorist today is that while I 
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argue that the skewed subject can manipulate the gaze qua object, the contemporary theorists 
argue that the subject has no such capacity. 
In this chapter, I substantiate my argument in three ways: 1) I propose a re-thinking of the 
structural relationship between the Other and the gaze through the topological analysis of the gaze 
as extimate to the Other: in this, I follow the discussion of the notion of extimacy by Jacques-
Alain Miller; 2) I offer original readings of Lacan’s theorization of the gaze and the Other, 
especially through the analysis of the L-Schema; and 3) I draw on Tere Bin Laden (2010), a 
Bollywood film directed by Abhishek Sharma, to provide examples of the ways in which the 
skewed subject establishes agency in relation to the Other. Tere Bin Laden shows that 
subjectivity—an awry or skewed one—is precipitated only when a cipher appears in the domain 
of the Other. The creation and insertion of this cipher, in whose name or place the subject will 
appear, is the form of agency that Tere Bin Laden entertains for the subject. In particular, this film 
shows that the gaze-like cipher that the skewed subject brings to bear upon the domain of the 
Other is extimate to it: that is, the cipher is positioned in the interior of the Other as an object or 
element that is fundamentally exterior to it. In other words, in this film, the cipher becomes an 
intimate constitutive element of the Other, but precisely as an element that turns outward the 
interiority of the Other’s space or surface. In this outwards turn of the Other’s space, it is revealed 
that the Other is not entirely consistent with or fully enclosed upon itself. This non-enclosure of 
the Other—i.e. the lack or the gap in the Other—that the cipher reveals demands a signifier. This 
signifier of the Other’s lack—in other words, the signifier of the distortion of the interior and the 
exterior—is objet petit a: the extimate object. Thus, in order to properly grasp this turning 
outward of the Other’s interior space, one needs to consider the topological analysis of the gaze 
as extimate to the Other. 
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Section I: Lack in the Other 
 Although Lacan has often discussed the distorted relationship between inside and outside, 
interior and exterior or container and contained, he used the neologism—extimacy86—to 
designate the condition of interiorized exteriority only once in his seminar The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis. However, even earlier than this neologism, Lacan’s conception of the Freudian 
unconscious was that it was outside—rather than interior to the subject—and therefore the subject 
was “ex-centric.”87 Most prominently, the question of interiorized exteriority is taken up by Lacan 
in his topological analysis of the three-dimensional form of a torus.88 Lacan never fully developed 
the notion of extimacy; it was Jacques-Alain Miller who brought out the significance of this 
notion in understanding the topological relationship between the Other and objet petit a in his 
essay entitled “Extimité.” 
 In this essay, Miller argues that the term extimacy is used by Lacan to “designate in a 
problematic manner the real in the symbolic.”89 Miller goes on to suggest that the consideration 
of extimacy is crucial because it allows one to move away from the distinction between the 
interior and the exterior through which the relationship between the Real and the Symbolic is 
commonly understood. Miller presents a simple diagram to represent the relation between the 
interior and the exterior: 
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Fig. 22. Interiorized exterior90 
To clarify, Miller argues that the grey circle is the exterior that is present in the interior of the 
larger white circle. Miller’s point here is easy to misunderstand: he is not demonstrating that 
some external object or element has been imported in the interior space of the white circle. 
Instead, Miller suggests that the grey circle marks the most interior or intimate part of the white 
circle. Precisely because the grey circle is intimate that it “has a quality of exteriority,” Miller 
argues.91 He writes that 
It should be observed that the term “interior” is a comparative which comes to us 
from Latin and of which intimus is the superlative. This word is like an effort on 
the part of language to reach the deepest point in the interior. Let us note as well 
that quotations from literary works given by dictionaries show that one says 
commonly, constantly that the most intimate is at the same time the most hidden. 
Therefore, paradoxically, the most intimate is not a point of transparency but 
rather a point of opacity. (Miller 1994, 76) 
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In other words, the space which is designated as interior—by virtue of there being a space that is 
designated as exterior—is not uniformly signifiable, because the innermost or intimate part of this 
interior is signified differently. Thus, the word intimate designates a locus—within the space 
known as interior—which is not as accessible to signification as the other parts of the interior 
space. It is this locus—this opaque, intimate interior—that Miller calls extimate. Although Miller 
does not refer to the three-dimensional form of a torus in his explication of extimacy, the torus 
figure perfectly illustrates his point. Consider the following rendering of a torus: 
 
Fig. 23. The Torus 
The hole at the center is spatially intimate to the surface of the torus, because without the hole, 
the torus will not retain is surface-shape. However, the hole—because it is empty—is not 
included in the surface space of the torus: it designates a space in the interior of the torus that is 
turned outward to that which is exterior to the torus. Moreover, the hole is not accessible to or 
from the surface of the torus; hence it is extimate to the torus.  
 With this understanding, one can properly appreciate the subsequent steps in Miller’s 
argument, in which he first demonstrates that the space of the Freudian unconscious—which, in 
Lacan’s theory, is the space of the Other—is extimate to the barred subject, or the subject of 
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desire. He goes on to argue that the space of the Other, likewise, has its extimacy: the extimacy of 
the Other, according to Miller, is objet petit a. Consider Miller’s illustrations in this regard: 
 
Fig. 24. Diagram of extimacy of the Subject, the Other and Objet petit a 
To be clear, the subject is written ∃ to designate that something is barred to it—i.e. the subject, 
insofar as it is a subject of desire, must lack access to something. Miller argues—following 
Lacan—that what the subject of desire is primarily barred from is access to its unconscious. In 
other terms, the subject’s unconscious must remain fundamentally unknown or alien to it, even 
though it is the unconscious that constitutes the subject as such. Similarly, Miller argues that the 
topological notion of extimacy can be applied to the space of the Other to reveal its extimacy—
namely, objet petit a. Miller presents his argument regarding the extimacy of the Other in this 
way: 
Up to this point in our argument, we have used the concept of the Other as 
something obvious. Now, the question of extimacy leads us to problematize this 
concept, to ask the question of the alterity of the Other, i.e., of why the Other is 
really other. “What is the Other of the Other?” is the very simple question asked 
by Lacan in order to ground the alterity of the Other. The first attempt made by 
Lacan was to posit that the Other of the Other of the signifier was the Other of 
the law. This would imply the existence of a metalanguage which would be the 
Law, for the Law as absolute is a metalanguage. Later Lacan, thinking against 
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Lacan, says on the contrary that “there is no Other of the Other,” that “there is no 
metalanguage.” [This] implies a problem in grounding the alterity of the Other. 
Jouissance is precisely what grounds the alterity of the Other when there is no 
Other of the Other. It is in its relation to jouissance that the Other is really Other. 
(78-9) 
What Miller points out in this passage is crucial: if the unconscious qua the Other constitutes the 
subject via the relation of extimacy, then this relationship is spatial. Hence, as an element of this 
spatial relationship, the Other must also fall under the topology of space or surface. Thus, Miller 
asks, if the Other is designated a space or surface, what is its extimate constitutive core? In other 
words, what is alien or inaccessible in the Other? Miller’s answer—at this point in his 
argument—is that jouissance is the Other’s extimacy. Jouissance is a complex term in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis; however, Miller is using this term is a very specific sense in this passage. By 
jouissance, Miller indicates to an excess of particularity or alterity that marks the Other as Other. 
In other terms, if the Other is that which is alien, inaccessible or foreign to the subject, then it is 
that quality of the Other that marks it as alien, inaccessible or foreign is its jouissance. 
Topologically speaking, then, the Other can function as the Other only insofar as there is 
something lacking in it: a hole in its space that turns outward its interiority and makes its intimate 
core alien to it. The objectal form of the Other’s jouissance, which is also its extimacy, therefore 
is a part or blank object. This part object is also known as objet petit a. 
 Miller goes on to elaborate the extimate relation between the Other and objet petit a 
through the following personal anecdote: Miller’s class was interrupted when a student, having 
heard the rumor about a bomb being placed in the classroom, shouted “Bomb!” Although the 
bomb did not really exist, the shouting produced the same effect that the existence of a real bomb 
would have produced: everyone evacuated the room in panic, etc. Miller argues that the signifier 
“Bomb!”—since it signified an empty or absent object—functioned as objet petit a to produce the 
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desired effect of signification, in that this announcement emptied the room. In other words, when 
the signifier “Bomb!” was introduced in the field of signification in this precise way, the 
symbolic consistency of the scenario was disrupted. Conversely, Miller argues that had the 
student who shouted handed him a note indicating that there might be a bomb in the classroom, 
he would have maintained the signifying consistency, and would have emptied the room in an 
orderly fashion. It is Miller’s claim that by shouting the word in this way, the student produced an 
excess of specificity—or jouissance—the objectal form of which was the non-presence of the 
bomb. In this way, the shouted word made it impossible for the subject(s) to occupy the same 
space as the empty object (Miller 1994, 81-2). It is from his analysis of this experience that Miller 
concludes his essay by arguing that objet petit a, as the extimate core of the Other, is 
incompatible with subjectivity (82). In other words, Miller claims that because the Other founds 
the subject through extimacy, and because objet petit a—as the Other’s extimacy—reveals too 
much about the Other, the appearance of objet petit a destabilizes subjectivity. 
 Although Miller’s topological analysis of extimacy provides us with valuable insight into 
the relationship between the subject, the Other and objet petit a, it cannot account for the 
functioning of a kind of subjectivity that is decidedly skewed. In other words, Miller’s analysis 
does not take into account the possibility that the student who shouted “Bomb!” might have done 
so with the ulterior motive of emptying the classroom, knowing full well that there was no real 
danger as such. My argument—and Tere Bin Laden amply demonstrates this point—is that it is 
entirely possible for the subject to produce the effect of distortion in the field of the Other by 
creating and introducing a blank or empty object—just like Miller’s “Bomb!”—which allows the 
subject to re-establish its locus in the field of symbolic language in an oblique way. 
Section II: Without You (I am Nothing) 
 Tere Bin Laden (Without You, Laden/Yours, Bin Laden), directed by Abhishek Sharma, 
was released in 2010, closely following a group of Bollywood films that dramatize the fraught 
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relationship between migratory aspirations and the tense (and increasingly xenophobic) world 
situation after September 11. These films, such as New York (2009), Kurbaan (2009) and My 
Name is Khan (2010) center around the figure of the Indian diaspora, who—after 9/11—has to 
reconfigure her/his position in a supposed globalized world that made migration possible. The 
diasporic figure(s) in these films is shown to be caught in a liminal or dispossessed zone between 
expulsion and containment by the state power. Foreclosed from their legal rights and barred from 
their initial social positions, the diasporic figures in these films lead a secretive life, in which their 
goal is to reclaim recognition—often at the cost of their lives. Even though the details of this 
dispossessed subject’s itinerary vary in each film, it is abundantly clear that the kind of 
subjectivity active in these films is far from a centered, coherent one. In fact, these films 
repeatedly highlight the ways in which subjectivity is split from within, and only becomes 
coherent temporarily in a domain that is beyond the purview of this putative subject.  
 Although Tere Bin Laden is similar to these films in many ways, its approach to the 
question of the dispossessed or unanchored subject is also significantly different. Engaging 
obliquely with the notion of a coherent subject, Tere Bin Laden underscores the ways in which 
such a demand for subjective consistency is fundamentally flawed. The film also shows that 
subjectivity (even an awry or skewed one) is precipitated only when a cipher appears in the 
domain of the Other. The creation and insertion of this cipher, in whose name or place the subject 
will appear, is the only form of intentionality that Tere Bin Laden entertains. This two-fold 
process is apparent in the plot of the film, which I shall briefly describe. 
 Ali Hassan, a young news reporter for a second-rate local TV channel in Karachi, 
Pakistan, has his heart set upon migrating to the US. Ali sees no future for dashing young talent 
like himself in Pakistan, and he is after the dream life in the US where he wants to become a news 
reporter for News America. He is the only Pakistani individual on board a flight to New York—
the first plane from Pakistan to the US after the 9/11 attacks. However, during the flight, Ali’s 
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enthusiasm for being an American newsman gets the best of him, and he rouses his co-
passengers’ suspicion while video recording himself saying words such as bomb, hijack and 
Muslim in an attempt to practice reading news for the camera. He is summarily deported upon his 
arrival. Not one to give up on his life-long dream of one day living in the US, Ali applies for a 
visa six times in seven years. Finally, his application is rejected for life because he assumed false 
identities and because of his prior deportation. Undeterred, Ali contacts a travel agent, who 
promises illegally to obtain his visa for a significant sum of money. While Ali attempts to gather 
money, he is sent to report on a local fair where he comes across a chicken farmer who looks very 
similar to Osama Bin Laden. Initially, Ali thinks that he has found the real Osama, and fantasizes 
that the reward from the US Government will solve his money issue. However, while spying on 
the Chicken farmer (Noor), Ali discovers that this is his true identity. Then he hatches a plan to 
dress up Noor to look like Osama and record a video message with the help of an Arabic-
speaking voice artist, which he would sell for a heavy price. Eventually, the fake Osama tape is 
released to an Indian TV channel, and creates a massive uproar throughout the world. The US 
responds by escalating its military offensive in Afghanistan. A crack team of intelligence 
operatives is also sent to Pakistan to investigate the tape. The American investigators and their 
Pakistani counterparts eventually unearth the link between Ali and the tape. Meanwhile, Ali—
who is no longer able to go to the US because of the high-level security alert caused by the tape 
he created—realizes the ramifications of his plan, and proceeds to rectify it by attempting to 
create another tape where Noor/Osama will declare peace with the US. Before this message is 
recorded, the intelligence agents find their studio, forcing Ali and his friends to hastily escape. 
Eventually they are caught, brought to a secret prison, where it is revealed that the tape was 
faked. However, the chief American intelligence officer—in order to save his face—colludes with 
Ali to record the Osama peace-offering tape, where Ali (as himself) plays the reporter. While his 
other accomplices go back to their own lives, the film ends with Ali—now a famous reporter 
because of his scoop—landing in New York, while a host of US reporters run after him. 
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 Clearly, what drives the plot in Tere Bin Laden is Ali’s thwarted desire, in the perusal of 
which he does not cede. However, his desire (to migrate to the US) alone is not enough to receive 
recognition as a subject-of-desire, as his multiple failed attempts to fool the authorities show. As 
long as Ali continues in his attempt to appease what he takes to be the demand of the US as his 
Other—one who directly determines the shape of his subjectivity—his efforts are in vain. 
However, the moment he discovers that this Other is, in fact, lacking—that is, there is something 
that the Other desires—he begins to succeed. One should not fail to notice, however, that the film 
does not allow Ali an iota of intentionality in creating this lack; rather, the lack predates the desire 
that it institutes. In other words, it is not that Ali made the US realize that they want Osama; 
Osama was always and already wanted by the US War on Terror. The intentionality that Tere Bin 
Laden allows Ali is in the creation of a cipher—a fake or blank object—that loosely resembles 
the object that the US desires. If Ali’s desire drives the plot, it is the cipher that is at the core of 
the plot. Noor/Osama is this cipher, and must remain as such for the proper unfolding of the plot. 
Thus, one must ask: why does Ali’s plan succeed even after the fakeness of Noor/Osama is 
revealed to the authorities? Ali, as a subject-of-desire, is not defined or shaped by the US in a bi-
univocal correspondence. Ali comes into being as a subject in relation to the US by aligning 
himself with the cipher, which, in its very structure, gestures toward the Other’s lack. In this way, 
Ali is not what the Other desires, but he is the one who holds the key to the Other’s desire.The 
kind of subjectivity particular to Ali is, therefore, decidedly an skewed or oblique one: Ali knows 
that the fulfillment of his desire to become a diasporic subject is inherently fake, and the US 
authorities know that the Noor/Osama tapes are spurious. The subject(s) come into being in spite 
of this knowing misrecognition, not at the level of intentional coherence or correspondence, but 
precisely in the domain of representation or signification. It is this domain of language—one that 
holds the subject in its sway—that Jacques Lacan calls the domain of the Other, and the blank 
object or cipher through which the Other manifests, he calls the gaze. 
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Section III: The Other’s Eyes (That I Do Not See) 
The interrelated concepts of the Other and the gaze are central to Lacan’s theory of the 
subject, and are developed over the entire course of his teaching. However, Lacan engages with 
the concept of the gaze as the principal functionary of the scopic drive, the consistency of which 
is held up by the Other, most extensively in his 1964 seminar on The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, specifically in the lectures entitled Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a. In 
these lectures, Lacan’s attempt is fourfold: first, he establishes that the subject comes into being 
in its attempt to cover over its inaugural split; second, he points out that the subject does so by 
soliciting recognition in the visual field; third, he elaborates that this demand for recognition 
articulates itself in the visual field through the gaze, which is a manifestation of objet petit a; and 
finally, he argues that in its assumption of the gaze, the subject comes into being in the domain of 
the Other—i.e. in the domain of language or representation. In other words, Lacan’s purpose in 
the lectures is to chart the itinerary of the subject from its real inauguration (birth) to its symbolic 
inauguration (birth as subject). This path, which precipitates what we know as the subject—i.e. 
the subject of desire—is not autonomous or intentional. Rather, it is constitutively dependent 
upon the process of signification in the network of signifiers; that is, in the domain of language. 
However, in order to arrive, the subject—driven by the inaugural, traumatic splitting that is 
birth—must misrecognize the domain of signifiers as another entity that controls it (the would-be 
subject), because it presumes that this entity is not haunted by a traumatic split. Hence, at this 
stage the (would-be) subject demands that this Other-who-has-it-all recognize its existence—i.e. 
validates the subject qua subject. However, the answer from the Other is always a blank message, 
in that it does not supply the (wanting-to-be) subject with recognition. This empty answer is the 
objet petit a, around which desire circulates to precipitate the subject. In its attempt to possess the 
objet petit a, the subject-proper comes into being by articulating its desire in the field of language. 
At this stage, the subject knows that it had misrecognized the Other as non-lacking, but it persists 
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in this misrecognition as that which founds its subjectivity. Primarily, Lacan argues that this 
journey undertaken by the subject takes place in the visual field; hence, gaze is a principal 
manifestation of objet petit a. 
 Lacan elaborates on the coordinates of the gaze by responding to Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological study of the split between the visible and the invisible in Le Visible et 
L’Invisible. In disagreement with Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, Lacan writes: 
But it is not between the invisible and the visible that we have to pass. The split 
that concerns us is not the distance that derives from the fact that there are forms 
imposed by the world towards which the intentionality of phenomenological 
experience directs us—hence the limits that we encounter in the experience of the 
visible. The gaze is presented to us only in the form of a strange contingency, 
symbolic of what we find on the horizon, as the thrust of our experience, namely, 
the lack that constitutes castration anxiety. The eye and the gaze—this is for us 
the split in which the drive is manifested at the level of the scopic field.92 
Here, Lacan objects to the intentionality with which phenomenology imbue the subject. In his 
estimation, there is no intentionality where the subject is concerned. The gaze is not to be located 
in the clear distinction between the visible and the invisible as phenomenology would have it. 
Rather, the nature of the gaze—insofar as it is a part-object—places it in the liminal limit of 
experience. The gaze, Lacan argues, is related to the experiential register only as a thrust—i.e. a 
movement in the direction that lies beyond concrete experience. In other words, what the subject 
experiences in the gaze is precisely the originary lack—embodies in the castration anxiety—that 
founds the subject. Lacan clarifies this elusive nature of the gaze further when he writes that  
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In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of 
vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is 
transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it—that 
is what we call the gaze.93 
One should notice the three attributes of the gaze that Lacan points to in this passage. First, the 
gaze determines the subject’s relationship to the world insofar as vision is concerned. Second, the 
gaze functions at the level of signification or representation, and not at the level of concrete 
material objects. Third, the gaze is that which is always missed in the visual field; that is, the gaze 
is at work where the signifying consistency of the visual field fails or ruptures. In other words, the 
gaze is that object in the visual field which—since it resists representation—is always wanted. 
 The conception of the gaze as the perennially wanted object has direct bearing upon the 
ways in which we want to understand the manipulation of the Other’s (scopic) desire in Tere Bin 
Laden. As the plot of the film reveals, the entity that is always wanted by the Other/US is Osama 
Bin Laden. Ali, the putative subject, does not initially realize that this lack is the key to the 
Other’s desire. Thus, his repeated attempts to be included in the US social structure as another 
(ordinary) signifier—as evidenced by his efforts to Americanize himself—fail. Eventually, Ali 
realizes that it is Osama Bin Laden that the US wants, and delivers exactly that in the form of the 
first video tape, but his desire to be accepted by the US still fails. To be sure, Ali’s consecutive 
failures would remain inexplicable if one were to apply to it the bi-univocal correspondence of 
the oppositional logic evident in phenomenology. The inadequacy of these two analytical 
schemas can be expressed in this way: Ali delivers exactly what (he thinks) the US would want—
namely, an Americanized individual, and the tape where Osama Bin Laden directly addresses 
America—but nonetheless remains unsuccessful. Yet, he inexplicably succeeds when his attempts 
at dissimulation fails—i.e. when it is revealed to the US that he is neither Americanized, nor does 
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he really have access to Osama Bin Laden. It is this paradox of succeeding-by-failure that the 
abovementioned schemas cannot explain. I propose that this paradox is resolved—a resolution 
that would lead us to the central question of Tere Bin Laden, namely, why does Ali succeed?—in 
Lacan’s explication of the subject as a stain in the visual field through which the gaze is 
represented. 
 After pointing out the location of the gaze as the missing or wanted object in the visual 
domain, Lacan proceeds to demonstrate where the subject falls in this topological map. He 
theorizes subjectivity in relation to the gaze in two steps: first, by pointing out that the subject is 
solicited when an anamorphic stain appears in the field of visual representation; and second, by 
indicating that the subject comes into being by assuming onto itself (like a screen) the structure of 
this stain. To substantiate the first step, Lacan refers to Hans Holbein’s painting, The 






Fig. 25. Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors, 1533. Oil on oak, National Gallery, London94 
In reading this painting, Lacan argues that the anamorphic skull floating in the foreground is 
intrinsically linked to the advent of Cartesian subjectivity. To be sure, the skull—which is a 
distortion or stain in the visual field—is not the gaze as such in Lacan’s estimation. Rather, the 
anamorphic figuration of the skull represents the gaze by forcing the subject to regard the 
painting from an oblique point of view. Thus, the skull-stain in the painting captures the subject 
not as an intentional being, but precisely as a skewed or awry subject. Referring to the subject’s 
relation to the distorted skull, Lacan writes that 
[A]s subjects, we are literally called into the picture, and represented here as 
caught. […] [T]he secret of this picture is given at the moment when, moving 
slightly away, little by little, to the left, then turning around, we see what the 
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magical floating object signifies. It reflects our own nothingness, in the figure of 
the death's head. (Lacan 1998, 92) 
It is crucial to note that the painting captures the subject—that is, precipitates that which is the 
subject—precisely at the moment of the subject’s turning away. In other words, the subject does 
not arrive in a direct, centered, coherent relation with the painting; rather, the subject appears due 
to its failure to comprehend the painting from a centered position. This de-centering of the subject 
is what Lacan indicates to when he reads the skull as a reflection of nothingness. One should also 
note that the anamorphic skull, in its materiality, is not the gaze, i.e. nothingness. The distorted 
image is there merely to reflect the lack in the Other that the subject assumes in the place of its 
originary splitting. The surface of the canvas, on which the awry skull is painted, is a screen 
where the subject’s image coincides with the (inverted) image of what the Other lacks, namely, 
the objet petit a. 
 Lacan further verifies that the place in which the subject appears as a sign is precisely this 
screen-which-contains-the-stain, which holds on either side of it the subject of representation and 
the gaze. This schema is presented in the following graph of the visual field: 
 
Fig. 26. Graph of the visual field95 
To explicate this graph, Lacan recounts a personal anecdote in which he, while a taking a boat-
ride on a lake, is surprised by the boatman who, pointing to a floating, gleaming sardine can says 
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to Lacan: “You see that can? Do you see it? Well, it doesn’t see you!” (95). Lacan goes on to 
explain that the point of this statement is not that Lacan was somehow ignored; rather, the point is 
that insofar as the location of the gaze is occupied by something (in this case, the gleaming can), 
the subject cannot appear in the scene or on the screen as the subject of signification. Hence, it 
follows that precipitation of subjectivity does not subsist in bi-univocal correspondence with the 
Other. Instead, the subject is precipitated in an inverted form where something goes missing from 
the field of the Other. It is in this way that the subject comes into being as an inverted 
representation of the lost object (objet petit a) in the domain of (symbolic) language—that is, in 
the domain of the Other. It is not surprising that a mirror image of the graph shown above appears 
in Lacan’s 1954-55 seminars on Freud’s theory of the unconscious, when he explicates Freud’s 
statement Wo Es war, soll Ich werden in the form of Schema L. 
 
Fig. 27. Schema L96 
Here, the subject (Es, or S) appears when the imaginary relation between the ego (would-be-
subject) and the little other (objet petit a) is cut by the manifestation of the Other in the 
unconscious, thereby displacing the ego (supposed, centered subject) into the position of 
subjectivity. This is why, Lacan argues, the subject appears by assuming the image of this cut—
i.e. break in signification—in the Other. In other words, the subject’s appearance, at once, hides 
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Technique of Psychoanalysis (New York: Norton, 1988),243. 
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that which is always wanted in the Other and gestures toward this wanting-ness in the Other. 
Thus, Lacan writes that if I [the subject] am anything in the picture, it is always in the form of the 
screen, which I earlier called the stain, the spot (Lacan 1998, 97).  
 Now, if we apply this understanding of the subject as the stain on the screen that gestures 
toward the gaze, we will be able to better comprehend why Ali succeeds in spite of the obvious 
failure of his initial plan.  Consider the following reworking of Schema L: 
 
Fig. 28. Modified Schema L 
As noted in the plot summary of the film, Ali’s plan to find the passage money to the US by 
selling the video tape of Osama Bin Laden fails. Indeed, he gets the money that he needs to buy 
his immigration status, but this money is of no avail. This is because Ali has given too much: his 
video tape is so similar to what the US wanted, namely Osama Bin Laden, that the appearance of 
the tape throws the US into anxiety, as evidenced by the escalated security measures that prevents 
Ali from flying to the US. The video tape—structurally speaking—has closed up the gap 
(wanting-ness) in the Other. Thus, the only way Ali’s plan can succeed is by revealing the 
fakeness of the first tape, and by presenting himself as the one who mediates between the wanted 
Osama Bin Laden and the US. This is precisely what he does in the second video tape of 
Noor/Osama, where the fiercely direct address of the first tape is tamed into a submissive love 
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letter. The crucial difference between the two tapes is that while Ali is not present in the anxiety-
producing first tape, he appears in the second tape as the only reporter delivering Noor/Osama’s 
message of peace. It is in this way that Ali succeeds by giving up the (misrecognized) role of the 
centered subject, and assumes the role of the intermediary stain on the screen, directly beyond 
which lies the empty specter of the wanted Osama Bin Laden. Of course, the film as a whole is an 
elaboration of Ali’s trajectory in learning that insofar as he is, he is a decentered or awry subject. 
This lesson is most clearly elaborated in the title song of the film, where Ali’s initial attempt(s) to 
immigrate to the US is represented. 
Section IV: Bi-univocal Identification; or, A Good-looking Jackass 
 The title song of Tere Bin Laden, which is also the expository sequence of the film, does 
not spare a moment to demonstrate—in a decidedly ironic way—that attempted bi-univocal 
identification with one’s Other does not succeed in soliciting recognition. The song-sequence, 
aptly titled Ullu Da Pattha (A Good-looking Jackass), shows on the formal register the ways in 
which such identification always fails. As the song title suggests, the central character of the film, 
Ali, behaves like a jackass, in the sense that he acts stupidly without paying any attention to the 
ramifications of his action. This stupidity is also Ali’s history as a subject-under-misrecognition, 
as the song sequence shows—through rapid, rhythmic intercuts—the coordinated of his diasporic 
desire. At the outset of the song number, we find Ali leaving for the US on the first plane taking 
off from Karachi after the September 11 attacks. Ali’s designation as the only Pakistani on board 
is declared by a news reporter covering this historic moment of reinstated transnational migration. 
As the song starts in the audio track, the camera—flouting the convention of establishing the 




Fig. 29. Screenshot from Tere Bin Laden97 
But of course, in the logic of the song number, what Ali looks like is far less significant than the 
way in which he has decided to define himself in a direct, one-to-one correspondence with what 
he perceives as American-ness. The ironically exaggerated mise-en-scene of this shot undercuts 
precisely this logic of direct identification. At the center of the shot is Ali’s luggage, drawing the 
viewer’s attention via its color-scheme and the various signifiers that appear on it. The yellow 
color of the luggage is set against the dark colors that cover the rest of the shot—it stands out in 
its difference. Prominently visible on the surface of the luggage are the following: a message 
drawn in the likeness of a t-shirt slogan that says I (heart) Amreeka, and an iconic pop-culture 
image of a white skull with wings. We should not fail to notice what these images clearly reveal: 
Ali is intent on broadcasting that not only does he love America, but also he is aware of the 
cultural milieu of America. The signifiers on his luggage are, in way, a pre-emptory address to his 
Other that says: I know what you want from me. Noticeably, Ali’s message is not coded in terms 
of nationalism or patriotism; it is the kitschy aspects of pop-culture that is his repository. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 97 . Tere Bin Laden, directed by Abhishek Sharma (2010; Mumbai, India: Cinergy 
Studio, 2010), DVD. All subsequent screenshots are from the same source. 
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Moreover, this luggage-message also appeals to the supposed cultural hybridity of cosmopolitan 
America, where the catchphrase I (heart) X can be easily repurposed in the vernacularized form 
of I (heart) Amreeka. Hence, if Ali is mimicking his notion of American culture, he does so in a 
highly self-conscious manner. To put it in another way, Ali thinks of himself as a conscious or 
centered subject who is trying to appeal to its Other. 
 Of course, his luggage is not the only way in which Ali tries to shape himself in the 
likeness of the Other. The other part of his fantasy is to become a news reporter for the fictional 
News America. He knows that this part of his desire requires the mediation of a camera, and 
therefore, during the flight he vide- records himself reading news materials that would cater to an 
American audience. Holding a camera in his outstretched right hand, Ali reads bits of news from 
a newspaper in order to practice his American accent while his co-passengers begin to look at him 
with growing suspicion. 
 
Fig. 30. Screenshot 
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In the aural background of this sequence of Ali recording himself is the song that declares Ali’s 
stupidity. On the aural foreground, however, we hear Ali practicing variations of the American 
accent. Since he thinks that terrorism is at the center of American news discourse, Ali tries to say 
relevant words such as bomb, Muslims, terrorist, hijack etc. Unsurprisingly, the repetition of 
these words first makes his co-passengers suspicious and then fearful. This move in the film—
one that foregrounds language in a prominent way—is standard comic bit appearing in 
Hollywood films such Harold & Kumar Escape from Guantanamo Bay (2008). However, even as 
a repetition, this sequence of mistaken identity calls attention to the ways in which the synchronic 
sliding of the signifier can be summarily arrested via the function of the ideological quilting 
point. More crucial in this shot, however, is the presence of Ali’s video camera. The inclusion of 
the camera in the act of recording in the frame of the narrative camera of Tere Bin Laden opens 
up the possibility of a distortion in the (so far) stable visual field. The camera in Ali’s hand is 
recording something, that is, it has a point of view. The point of view of this camera is clearly not 
Ali’s point of view, since he is the one being recorded. This leaves open the possibility of another 
point of view that is not yet occupied by anyone. This empty position in the visual field—which 
is very similar to the structure of the gaze—takes over the narrative camera’s point of view in the 





Fig. 31. Screenshot 
 The distortion of the visual field is prominent in this shot. The stabilized color-scheme of 
the narrative camera is no longer present. In its place, we find a blue-tinted shot, customary of the 
hand-held camera aesthetics. The shot is also differentiated from the previous one with the 
appearance of recording apparatus—i.e. the letterbox and the REC sign—of the hand-held 
camera. More crucially, Ali’s face is severely distorted in the frame—he is simply too close to the 
camera. The framing and the camera angle of this shot is decidedly unprofessional, invoking in its 
visual style elements of a home movie. However, in this home movie no one is looking at Ali 
through the lens of the camera. Instead, it is the inverted return of his message to the Other that 
regards him in this way. To express this in a Lacanian formulation, this is what unmediated gaze 
looks like in the Other’s domain. Naturally, Ali’s face appears monstrous, distorted and 
threatening. In other words, this shot reveals that even though Ali thinks he is recording himself, 
he appears to the US in this particularly distorted way.  
It is no surprise that in a subsequent shot—from the point of view of the flight attendant 
whom Ali approaches to return a butter knife that she had dropped with the implied hope of a 
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romantic liaison—Ali appears in an attacking pose. This shot continues the color-scheme and 
camera angle of the previous shot and in first glance looks exactly like a shot from Ali’s handheld 
camera. Ali is still too close to the camera, leaning towards it in a particularly threatening way, 
wielding the butter knife. The shot, like the previous one, is blue-tinted. However, the significant 
difference is that there is no visual proof in this shot regarding the presence of the video camera. 
Its letterbox frame and the REC sign have disappeared from the frame. In effect, the unstable 
point of view of the video camera has taken over the stable framing of the narrative camera of 
Tere Bin Laden. This displacement of the narrative camera raises a crucial and interesting 
question: which space is signified in this shot? Surely this shot cannot take place in the diegetic 
space of the film, since the diegetic camera is no longer available. Neither is this the space that 
Ali’s hand-held camera captured, since its traces are also not present in this shot. This also not the 
point of view of the flight attendant, since the narrative camera has already revealed her point of 
view. In whose point of view, then, Ali appears in this way? I would argue that this point of view 
is that of the Other who is caught in a deep anxiety, since something has appeared in the place of 
its lack. In other words, this is the way in which Ali appears to the US. Quite naturally, the US 




Fig. 32. Screenshot 
 Consequently, when Ali is processed by the police, the threat of his contingency is 
negated by signifying him with a universal signifier. At the end of a series of police headshots, 
where the supposed criminals hold up their identification cards, Ali appears as South Asian, while 
a nondescript white male holds up a card that says Peter. Ali’s card is later replaced with cards 




Fig. 33. Screenshot 
We should not fail to notice Ali’s facial expression in this shot. The bulging eyes, raised 
eyebrows and gaped mouth with which Ali expresses his surprise, fear and uncertainty look eerily 
similar to the ways in which his handheld camera had captured him earlier in the plane. The 
crucial difference is that Ali no longer has the security of his video camera. He is being looked at 
by a machine that he cannot shut off, unlike his video camera. One should also notice that Ali no 
longer appears threatening. With his identification properly in place, he can no longer disrupt the 
signifying fabric of America. He has been marked as a criminal belonging to, simply, another 
place. In other words, now that he has been identified as a South Asian and a terrorist, he can be 
expelled from the US. We should also note the blood-splatter on the wall behind Ali’s head in this 
shot. What is this if not a visual representation of the declaration that to the US, Ali is already 
dead? 
 As the song sequence continues, we find Ali back in Karachi, persistent in his desire to 
migrate to the US. Moreover, his methods of appealing to the US as his Other remain unchanged. 
He applies for visas six times—assuming a different identity each time. However, he still 
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functions under the misrecognition that in order to be recognized by the Other, he must define 
himself in direct relation to the Other. This becomes painfully evident when, for his last visa 
interview—following which he would banned for life—he assumes the identity of a cowboy. 
 
Fig. 34. Screenshot 
This shot, taken from the point of view of the visa interviewer (who represents the US), is quite 
revealing. Of course, Ali’s outfit and appearance clearly reveals that he is not a cowboy. This 
obvious fakery aside, what is interesting in this shot is Ali’s choice of identity. I would argue that 
Ali is not dressed up as any ordinary cowboy; he is, instead, the iconic cowboy from a Spaghetti 
Western. In fact, I would go so far as to say that he looks very similar to Lee Van Cleef. Again, in 
his appeal to the Other, Ali has missed the mark by trying to mimic too closely. In an ironic 
juxtaposition, Ali’s headshot from his first encounter with the US appears in the frame, visible 
only to the interviewer. Even though Ali attempts to construct himself as an American by 




Section V: The Other’s Lack 
 If Ullu Da Pattha chronicles the attempted construction of subjectivity that misses its 
mark, then the second song sequence—namely, Shor Sharabba (Make some noise)—presents the 
construction of the gaze in the transformation of Noor into Osama Bin Laden. It is at this point 
that Tere Bin Laden begins to reveal that which is at its core; namely, a clear understanding of the 
ways in which the subject’s acceptance of its de-centered nature leads to a successful 
manipulation of the Other’s desire. Hence, this song sequence not only marks the inauguration of 
Ali as a skewed subject, but the sequence also shows that, in the game of desire,  the crucial 
element that incites desire—namely, objet petit a—is constructed through the representational 
status of (symbolic) language, in the way that a text constructed. 
 Shor Sharabba begins after Ali has discovered the chicken farmer, Noor, who looks 
somewhat similar to Osama Bin Laden. In his quest for the money that he needs to buy his 
passage to the US, Ali decides to create a video message where Noor, dressed as Osama, would 
threaten the US. For this purpose, Ali recruits a make-up artist and a voice-over artist who would 
transform Noor into the likeness of Osama in the tape. This transformation requires the help of 
the others because the uniqueness of Noor’s subjectivity has to be emptied out so that other 
signifiers (the ones that identify Osama Bin Laden) could be posited onto his empty shell. In this 
song sequence, the film foregrounds that Noor is eminently malleable, seemingly unperturbed by 
the process of his transformation and its possible ramifications. In other words, the film presents 
Noor as a subject that is singularly closed upon itself—that is, an entity that is not subjected to 
desire. Thus, Noor is blissfully unaware of the meaning of his utterances when Ali’s Urdu-
speaking accomplice writes his Osama-speech for him. He is also not bothered when the make-up 
artist dresses him up to look like Osama Bin Laden. In other words, Noor behaves like the ideal 
actor who can fully assume the role of another subject without puncturing the texture of this 
assumed subjectivity with his own. 
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 In very prominent ways, Shor Sharabba declares the film’s awareness of the ways in 
which subjectivity is constructed in cinema, specifically in Bollywood cinema. Thus, the 
production of the first Noor/Osama video tape mimics the steps necessary in such endeavors. Just 
like the standard practice of Bollywood cinema, where actors do not move beyond the parameters 
of the thoroughly-written script, Noor merely mouths the lines that Ali’s accomplice has written 
for him. Similarly, Noor’s own voice is dubbed over with that of the voice artist, just as in 
Bollywood cinema voice is added in the post-production stage. These processes, that the song 
sequence foregrounds, establish that the film clearly sees the symbolic connection between 
cinematic representation and (Cartesian) subjectivity, and does not attempt to produce itself as 
meta-cinema. Rather, the film carefully weaves the text of a message on behalf of the putative 
subject that would appear in this act of representation by appealing to the Other, whose desire is 
solicited or anticipated in the text of the message. A shot that appears halfway through Shor 
Sharabba clearly elucidates this point. 
 
Fig. 35. Screenshot 
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This shot presents Ali’s Urdu-speaking accomplice in the act of writing the script of Noor/Osama. 
We should not fail to notice what this shot so clearly reveals: the fact that, in cinema, subjectivity 
is created like a text at the level of language where proper assignation of signifiers is a matter of 
constant retroaction and anticipation (that is, the work of revision). We should note that the shot 
foregrounds pieces of paper on which the accomplice has written Noor/Osama’s purported 
message. The whiteness of the papers dominates this shot, set against the spatial indeterminacy of 
the dark surroundings. Noticeably, the author is also garbed in white, almost indistinguishable 
from the papers that surround him. What does this mise-en-scene represent if not the fact that in 
the creation of a text (the purported subject’s message) the author-subject must ultimately recede 
and become indistinguishable from the text that he allegedly wrote? Considered in this way, the 
outstretched arms of the accomplice reveal their significance. It is clear that this is a gesture of 
appeal. However, this supplication has no immediate addressee. One does not have to go too far 
to see that this plea is directed to the dimension of language itself, that is, to the dimension of the 
Other.  
 Just as the song sequence presents the total immersion of Ali and his accomplices in the 
creative process of the video message, it also allows us a brief glimpse into Noor’s point of view. 
Noor, the cipher, is blissfully unaware of the larger picture, that is, what his transformed self 
would mean in the domain of the other. He is completely caught up in the immediacy of his 
sense-experience. As the make-up artist dresses up Noor as Osama Bin Laden, and as the setting 
of the video shoot is gradually populated with props that would transform him into Osama, Noor 
is transfixed by what is immediately in front of his eyes. Noor is unawareness of his position in 
the signifying chain that is being created around him. Tere Bin Laden reveals this discrepancy in 
a marvelous two-shot structure. In a shot and reverse-shot, we see how Noor appears to the 




Fig. 36. Screenshot 
Allow me to present three observations regarding this shot before moving on to Noor’s point of 
view in the subsequent reverse shot. First, the whiteness of the text-in-the-process-of-writing in 
the previous shot is directly continued in the color of the turban that is being tied around Noor’s 
head. In other words, he is literally being covered over by the message that would eventually 
transform him into the blank object Noor/Osama. Second, the elements of Noor’s own unique 
identity—namely, his beloved chickens—appear in the backdrop; but, crucially, this scene in 
which Noor-the-idiot-subject belongs is cut up and put together as a collage. Quite naturally, this 
backdrop will be momentarily replaced with that of a world map. Third, Noor is transfixed by a 
new object that has entered his self-enclosed world of chickens. It is this new object that Noor 
intently looks at, thereby disregarding the radical transformation of the surrounding space. The 




Fig. 37. Screenshot 
Although it is a comic moment in the film, this shot is it revealing in ways more than one. No 
doubt, evidently it is the make-up artist’s cleavage that becomes the focal point of Noor’s 
attention. However, the apparent sexual attraction demonstrated in this shot has significant 
bearing upon Noor’s eventual escape from a self-enclosed subjectivity into a desiring subject. 
Before this moment in the film, Noor does not have an object/cause of desire and therefore is a 
lost or idiot subject. It is for this reason that he could be so easily transformed into the cipher that 
is Noor/Osama. In contrast, the insertion of the cleavage in his visual domain eventually leads 
Noor into the path of desire. It is not surprising that, according to Lacan, breast is a prime 
manifestation of objet petit a around which subjectivity is precipitated. Noor’s escape from 
cipher-hood becomes evident at the conclusion of Tere Bin Laden, when the film depicts him—
sans his tell-tale beard—as the make-up artist’s life partner. 
 Since Noor remains a cipher until the end of the film, the song sequence proceeds with 
his transformation into the message of Noor/Osama, after supplying us with this brief glimpse 
into Noor’s future. Through the narrative camera of Tere Bin Laden, which also coincides with 
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the point of view of the camera that Ali uses to shoot the video message, we see Noor completely 
transformed. 
 
Fig. 38. Screenshot 
In this medium shot—tightly framed so that the bizarre surroundings of the studio are not 
revealed—we see a close reproduction of Osama Bin Laden’s numerous video messages as they 
appear on TV. Thus, this shot is triply mediated: what we see here is Tere Bin Laden’s 
representation of a TV screen broadcasting the tape made by Ali’s camera. Of course, Noor is lost 
in this triple mediation, and what emerges can only be designated as Osama Bin Laden’s 
message. Along the same line, we should not fail to notice the subtitle that reads in Iraq, 
Afghanistan & rest of the middle east is not extra-diegetic. That is, this subtitle is not the same as 
the ones in the previous shots that are added to the film in post-production. The subtitle in this 
shot is an essential part of the visual coding. It reveals that the message has been received by the 
US (and the rest of the world) and is in the process of being decoded. In other words, the 
message—which is in Arabic—is being translated in the Other’s domain. Among all the props 
that mark this image as Osama’s tape—i.e. the AK 47, the world map etc.—the most remarkable 
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is the pointed index figure of Noor/Osama. This gesture—which is highly symbolic in its 
indexing effect98—is widely circulated in the world media as Osama Bin Laden’s gesture. Thus, 
in reproducing this gesture, Tere Bin Laden gestures to all the other Osama Bin Laden tapes that 
preceded it. This is, in effect, an inter-textual gesture. It is as if without this gesture no tape can be 
designated as an Osama tape. We should also take note of the expressionlessness of 
Noor/Osama’s face. While in the previous shots Noor’s confusion and fascination are writ large 
on his face, this triply mediates shot does not reveal his intentions. This blank face, I would 
argue, is the face of terror as far as the US is concerned. The image of Noor/Osama appears in the 
signifying system of the US as—at once—a message loaded with threat and an intention whose 
coordinates are unknown. Thus, this shot can be understood in relation to Lacan’s conception of 
the anamorphic skull in Holbein’s painting. The image of Noor/Osama is that which flares up or 
stains the symbolic universe, and the blank expression is the chasm of lack that petrifies the 
Other. Naturally, when the US responds to this image by escalating its offensive, we can easily 
read this act as an expression of anxiety through which the US tries to protect itself. It is for this 
reason that the appearance of this image effectively arrests the possibility of Ali’s migration to 
the US. Therefore, it is this fierce expression of the gaze that must be dampened for the success of 
Ali’s desire.  
This is precisely what happens towards the end of the film, when the representative of US 
Intelligence directs the second video tape of Osama’s peace offering after discovering that the 
first tape was faked. The double mediation of faked fakeness is clearly represented in the 
following shot. 
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Fig. 39. Screenshot 
In this shot, the narrative camera of Tere Bin Laden captures mediation in action: we see Ali’s 
camera recording another tape of Noor/Osama. Significantly, it is framed in a long shot, so as to 
reveal all the mechanics by which the Noor/Osama’s message is constructed. Included in the shot 
are: the voice artist in the act of dubbing, the make-up artist and Ali-as-reporter mediating this 
exchange. Through the figure of the US intelligence representative, the US is caught overseeing 
this act of fake production. In order to compensate for the reduced turgidity of the first tape, the 
setting of this tape includes fake boulders, signifying the hilly regions of Afghanistan where 
Osama Bin Laden is thought to be located. Noticeably, the pointed finger of the first tape is 
absent in this shot, as is the radical indeterminacy of the address. The message, this time, has a 
particular addressee—George W. Bush—and bears a signature in the diminutive form (Binny L.). 
This message, in other words, is a love letter rather than the anxiety-producing representation of 
the gaze. The figure of Noor/Osama appears unthreatening in this message precisely because the 
Other has successfully enclosed this lack or gaze in its signifying chain. The threatening gaze is 
softened in this act of mediation, as Osama Bin Laden is posited exactly where he should be—in 
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Afghanistan, far away from the US and its allies. In other words, the signifier of Osama Bin 
Laden regains its status as the missing object in the signifying chain. However, the subject who 
emerges from this scene of mediation is Ali. Ali is effectively the screen upon which the drama 
between the Other and its lack is reflected. Hence, following this shot, Ali finds his way to the US 
quite easily—not as the subject-of-intention of his initial attempts, but as an awry subject that 
falls in between the Other and its lack. 
Section VI: A Doubly-deceptive Disclaimer 
 My purpose in reading Tere Bin Laden as a film that insists on the primacy of double-
deception in the interplay between the triad of the subject, its Other and the gaze is the following: 
I want to show that Tere Bin Laden is keenly aware of cinema’s potential to deconstruct the 
notion of centered (Cartesian) subjectivity. This film fulfills this goal by underscoring the futility 
of a-symbolic, direct and bi-univocal identification. The form of subjectivity that this film offers 
is one that is aware of its inaugural misrecognition, and therefore manipulates the Other’s desire 
to find a signifying position for itself from where it can articulate its own desire in an oblique and 
ironic way. Naturally, this notion of de-centered subjectivity demands that Tere Bin Laden 
unfolds at that level of symbolic language where the possibility of the failure of signification is 
always and already included. That is, this film is eminently aware that in symbolic domain, one 
can dissimulate by letting on that one is, in fact, dissimulating. Allow me to conclude this chapter 
by substantiating this claim by presenting in order of appearance the two disclaimer slides that 




Fig. 40. Screenshot 
As a standard practice, such disclaimers appear before most fictional or narrative films. However, 
this disclaimer, I would argue, performs its function in a particularly tongue-in-cheek way. The 
first sentence is typical; however, it is remarkable irony inherent in the second sentence that 
makes this disclaimer truly significant. It identifies itself as belonging to the genre of satire, and 
in so doing releases itself from the traumatic dimension of truth. Through this excuse of satire 
does this film not arrive uncomfortably close to the truth about Osama Bin Laden, in that he was, 
in fact, hiding in plain sight in Pakistan? It is somewhat of a general consensus in the 
international media community that one does not approach truth about Osama Bin Laden. In other 
words, one must lie or dissimulate where the topic of international terrorism is concerned. Tere 
Bin Laden, however, lies about this dissimulation itself, and in so doing reveals the truth. The 
second disclaimer slide calls attention to the modus operandi of Tere Bin Laden: namely, such 




Fig. 41. Screenshot 
The words Kukduk Pencho, uttered by a rooster (the subtitle of the film identifies it as a cock) in 
the general direction of Noor/Osama, indeed sound a lot like a common Hindi expletive. This 
trivial information aside, what this slide does is the remarkable work of a film-text reading itself. 
By announcing in this slide that it does not want to offend anyone with these words and by 
invoking an obscure reference as an apology for this expression, the slide effectively compels the 
viewer to look for this moment of offense in this film. What is this if not a bold declaration of the 






THE SUBJECT AND THE OBJECT VOICE 
Section I: Sound and Voice in Cinema 
The previous chapters of this dissertation have elaborated on the ways in which the 
subject, whose arrival is supposed in and as a function of the intersection or interference of the 
synchronic and the diachronic axes of signification. So far, I have discussed the subject’s arrival 
in relation to the interferences or disturbances in the process of signification in terms of 
temporality, spatiality and visuality. However, these dimensions of the subject’s skewed relation 
to signification are relevant insofar as they run through spectatorial experience. Since such an 
assumed spectatorial position is necessary in the analysis of the subject’s split-being, the 
experience of cinema provides a way to think about the structure of the subject who is supposed 
in the disturbance of signification. However, one prominent experiential register that this 
dissertation has not addressed so far is that of aurality. Hence, examining the subject’s relation to 
signification in terms of aurality is the overall purpose of this chapter. Specifically, this chapter 
offers a two-fold argument: 1) that one factor in the subject’s arrival is aurality—i.e. the domain 
of sound, which is constituted of audible and inaudible elements alike; and 2) that the subject’s 
appearance is predicated upon distortions or disturbances in this domain, whereby the 
signification of sound remains only partially completed. The first part of the argument suggests 
that seeing oneself look alone is not sufficient as the basis for subjectivity—there must  
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also be the condition of hearing oneself speak. Similarly, the second part of the argument 
proposes that just as seeing oneself look becomes possible only when an empty object is 
introduced as a distortion of disturbance in the field of vision, in the same way, hearing oneself 
speak becomes possible only when another manifestation of the empty object disturbs the 
supposed consistency of the field of audition or hearing. The former model of the empty object—
as the previous chapters have established through Lacan—is the gaze; in the same vein, the latter 
expression of the empty object is voice. The gaze is a form of the Lacanian objet petit a in the 
visual field, and thus should be properly called object gaze; likewise, voice is a form of objet petit 
a in the aural field, and thus should be properly called object voice. Thus, the question at the heart 
of this chapter is this: what is the subject’s topological relation to object voice? 
 It is not surprising that one of the best ways to examine the spectator-subject’s—or, more 
properly speaking, the auditor-subject’s—relation to aurality is through the study of cinema. After 
all, cinema is the audio-visual medium par excellence, and audition plays a significant role in 
one’s experience of cinema. Naturally, film theorists have examined the role of aurality in cinema 
from the very beginning of sound cinema. For instance, Rudolf Arnheim, in his book Film as Art, 
suggests that the incorporation of sound takes away from the artistic or aesthetic quality of 
cinema, since the conjugation of image and sound turns cinema “nearer to nature” and therefore 
away from its artistic potential.99 He further argues in “Film and Reality” that “only after one has 
known talkies is the lack of sound conspicuous in a silent film.”100 Arnheim’s strongest criticism 
of sound cinema appears in “A New Laocoön: Artistic Composites and the Talking Film.” In this 
essay, Arnheim argues that sound cinema is formally unstable because two mediums of art—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 99 . Rudolf Arnheim, “The Making of a Film,” in Film as Art (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1957 [1933]), 75. 
 




namely, sound and image—which should be autonomous, compete for the spectators’ attention.101 
More specifically, he identifies speech as that which is utterly incompatible with the expression 
of the image. Arnheim writes: 
The two elements whose rivalry the motion picture cannot reconcile are, of 
course, image and speech. It is a surprising rivalry, if we remember that in daily 
life talk rarely keeps us from seeing, or seeing from listening. But as soon as we 
sit in front of the movie screen we notice such disturbances. Probably we react 
differently because we are not used to finding in the image of the real world the 
kind of formal precision that in the work of art presents—by means of the 
sensory data—the subject and its qualities in a clear-cut, expressive way.102 
To be clear, Arnheim criticizes the incorporation of sound because it makes cinema too close to 
real life, and it is his estimation that art needs to be autonomous from what he calls “daily life.” 
However, the central part of his charge against cinema-sound is that it causes a split in the 
spectator’s experiential register, and that this split appears as a disturbance of sensory 
comprehension. In other words, on the one hand, the incorporation of sound disturbs the 
signifying consistency of the filmic image, and on the other hand, the presence of the image 
distorts the coherence of the aural domain. This disturbance is particular to cinema, Arnheim 
argues, because—unlike daily life, where one forecloses such disturbance of the sensory 
registers—cinema presents the sensory data with a high degree of formal precision. 
 It is noteworthy that Arnheim’s examination of sound in cinema takes place with the 
inception of sound technology in cinema. However, as sound technology became more 
formalized and integrated into the practice of film-making, such consideration of aurality was 
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gradually replaced by a developing interest in the mechanics of sound design and production in 
cinema. This new line of inquiry about cinema sound was taken up by film scholars such as 
André Bazin in 1967 and Christian Metz in 1980. Bazin—in his essay “The Evolution of the 
Language of Cinema”—argues that the introduction of sound technology has given cinema the 
capability to reveal the contours of reality in a more extensive way. Addressing the concerns that 
preceding film theorists—such as Arnheim—had about film-sound, Bazin writes that 
By 1928 the silent film had reached its artistic peak. The despair of its elite as 
they witnessed the dismantling of this ideal city, while it may not have been 
justified, is at least understandable. As they followed their chosen aesthetic path 
it seemed to them that the cinema had developed into an art most perfectly 
accommodated to the “exquisite embarrassment” of silence and that the realism 
that sound would bring cou1d only mean a surrender to chaos. In point of fact, 
now that sound has given proof that it came not to destroy but to fulfill the Old 
Testament of the cinema, we may most properly ask if the technical revolution 
created by the sound track was in any sense an aesthetic revolution.103 
Bazin goes on to argue that the incorporation of sound in cinema made visible two “opposing 
trends” in film-making—namely, “directors who put their faith in the image and those who put 
their faith in reality.”104 Of course, it is Bazin’s contention that the purpose of cinema is not to 
create art for art’s sake, but to reveal—via the arsenal of stylistic elements of cinema—that which 
the spectator cannot normally grasp about reality. Hence, Bazin writes: 
Undoubtedly, the talkie sounded the knell of a certain aesthetic of the language of 
film, but only wherever it had turned its back on its vocation in the service of 
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realism. The sound film nevertheless did preserve the essentials of montage, 
namely discontinuous description and the dramatic analysis of action. What it 
turned its back on was metaphor and symbol.105 
Thus, according to Bazin, the use of sound allows cinema to describe and analyze action, rather 
than provide metaphors and symbols with which reality is approximated. From this, Bazin 
concludes that with the incorporation of sound cinema has truly fulfilled its potential, and thus the 
“film-maker is no longer the competitor of the painter and the playwright, he is, at last, the equal 
of the novelist” (Bazin 2005 [1967], 40). 
 Bazin’s study points out the ways in which the incorporation of sound enhances cinema’s 
capability to describe and analyze the material-objective world. However, it was Christian Metz 
who sought to establish the autonomy of sound in the domain of the object: thus, for Metz, film-
sound should be thought of as an aural object, separate from the visual object or source that 
corresponds to this sound.106 Metz points out that although sound has its distinct objective 
presence, the identification and description of the aural object requires another—usually visual—
object as the source of this sound. Metz writes: 
When I have recognized a “floor lamp” and can name it, the identification is 
completed and all that I could add would be adjectival in nature. But, on the 
contrary, if I have distinctly and consciously heard a “lapping” or a “whistling”, I 
only have the feeling of a first identification, of a still incomplete recognition. 
This impression disappears only when I recognize that it was the lapping of a 
river, or the whistling of the wind in the trees.107 
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Metz argues that the recognition and description of sound appears to be incomplete—as opposed 
to the sense of completion that the visual object provides—because the “subject-predicate 
structure” of the “Western philosophic tradition” rigidly distinguishes between “the primary 
qualities that determine the list of objects (substances) and the secondary qualities which 
correspond to attributes applicable to these objects.”108 Thus, Metz argues that in the Western 
philosophic tradition, the attributes or qualities of the aural object are considered tertiary to the 
attributes of the visual. Metz goes on to point out that the assumed tertiary nature of the aural 
object leads film theory to posit the problematic notion of off-screen sound. According to Metz, 
the notion of off-screen sound, and by extension off-screen voice, is flawed because 
We tend to forget that a sound in itself is never “off”: either it is audible or it 
doesn’t exist. When it exists, it could not possibly be situated within the interior 
of the rectangle or outside of it, since the nature of sounds is to diffuse 
themselves more or less into the entire surrounding space: sound is 
simultaneously “in” the screen, in front, behind, around, and throughout the 
entire movie theater. (Metz 1980, 29) 
To be clear, Metz’ analysis gives sound or the aural object primacy over the visual object: while 
the representation of the visual object is limited within the two-dimensional surface of the screen, 
the aural object undergoes “no appreciable loss in relation to the corresponding sound in the real 
world” (27). This leads Metz to claim that “nothing distinguishes a gun shot heard in a film from 
a gun shot heard on the street” (27). Of course, Metz is interested in the aural object because the 
assumed fullness of the aural experience strengthens his project of ideological analysis of cinema. 
According to Metz, the examination of the aural object shows that 
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the perceptual object is a [socially] constructed unity [of] the conditions of 
possibility of the lived, the structures of production which create the lived and are 
abolished in it, which simultaneously find in it the site of their manifestation and 
their negation: the objective determinants of subjective feeling. (32) 
Metz’ interest in the ideological dimension of the aural object is an excellent example of the ways 
in which early Lacanian film theory engaged with the question of sound in cinema. Just as the 
gaze was considered to be the way in which the subject identifies with the misrecognized fullness 
of its specular image, the aural object offers a false immediacy or directness of experience. Thus, 
even though it cannot directly express the experience of sound without taking recourse in 
symbolic language, the subject falsely believes that such direct access is possible. Given that 
early Lacanian film theorists—and Metz is a prominent member of this group—were deeply 
invested in ideological analysis as a way to dispel the false or Imaginary plentitude that cinema 
promises the subject, it is understandable why Metz wants to examine the ways in which the 
experience of sound is ideologically constructed as the aural object that suffers no loss in its 
representation in cinema. Thus, Metz’ goal is to study the aural object following early Lacanian 
film scholars’ interpretation of Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage: a stage in the subject’s 
development in which the subject identifies with its specular image which has the false 
appearance of fullness. 
 This interpretation of Lacan’s notion of the mirror stage—an interpretation that 
contemporary Lacanian scholars have sought to rectify—is applied to the study of film-sound by 
Kaja Silverman. In her book, The Acoustic Mirror, Silverman argues that even though film 
theorists have amply examined the “construction of woman as the object of the male gaze … it 
has somehow escaped theoretical attention that sexual difference is the effect of dominant 
cinema's sound regime as well as its visual regime, and that the female voice is as relentlessly 
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held to normative representations and functions.”109 Silverman’s goal in this book is to provide an 
ideological analysis of the ways in which the male subject in cinema is identified with the—albeit 
false—sense of presence or fullness that voice provides, while the female subject’s voice is 
presented as partial or incomplete. In this way, Silverman considers the aural domain of cinema 
as akin to the Imaginary visual domain of the Lacanian mirror stage. Silverman’s psychoanalytic 
interpretation of voice as a category of sound holds a significant place in the theorization of film-
sound following Lacan’s conception of voice as objet petit a.  
 Silverman’s argument about the female voice in cinema, in The Acoustic Mirror, is vast 
in scope. However, I will engage with only her interpretation of voice as objet petit a. 
Silverman’s explication of voice in cinema set the tone for the subsequent psychoanalytic 
examinations of sound in cinema in the same way that Laura Mulvey’s interpretation set the tone 
for the discussion of the gaze in cinema. Even though a significant number of contemporary 
Lacanian film theorists have sought to revise Mulvey’s analysis of the gaze, no such concerted 
effort exists regarding the revision of Silverman’s interpretation of voice as objet petit a. The only 
contemporary film theorist who has engaged with the notion of voice following Lacan is Mladen 
Dolar—the following sections of this chapter will present Dolar’s argument at length. Since Dolar 
engages with Silverman only marginally—he mentions Silverman twice in his two-hundred and 
thirteen page book, A Voice and Nothing More—I will provide a brief summary of Silverman’s 
account of voice as objet petit a. 
 In The Acoustic Mirror, Silverman points out that film theory relies upon the 
psychoanalytic notions of castration, fetishism and disavowal to account for the fact that 
underlying the spectators’ experience of cinema is always a sense of loss, in the sense that cinema 
presents the spectator with an image of the objective world, while no object is actually available 
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to the spectator. This sense of loss of the object, Silverman argues, is also a loss of and in the 
subject. Silverman writes: 
The history of the subject who rediscovers him-or herself within cinema unfolds 
through a series of “splittings” or divisions, many of which turn on the object. 
Indeed, the case can be even more forcefully stated: These splittings or divisions 
produce both subject and object, constituting the one in opposition to the other. 
The child's entry into the symbolic order is made only at considerable cost, not 
merely through the loss of numerous “parts” of itself, which are relegated to the 
status of objects, but through the sacrifice of its own being.110 
Clearly, what Silverman is referring to in this passage is Lacan’s conception of the mirror stage, 
which supposedly marks the subject’s entry into the symbolic order or the domain of ideology. 
The loss felt by the spectator of cinema is compared to the loss or sacrifice that the subject 
undergoes in the mirror stage. Of course, Silverman is correct in pointing out that in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis the subject of the symbolic order is always a split subject. However, the 
oppositional logic between the subject and the object—a logic that, for Silverman, constitutes 
both the subject and the object—is far more problematic. Silverman argues that the objects which 
are produced as a result of the splitting—and Silverman calls them “part objects”—are numerous 
parts of the subject, which the subject must sacrifice—i.e. give up—in order to enter the symbolic 
order. This would mean that the part objects initially belong to the subject; it is only when these 
parts are lost to the subject that they become objects. Naturally, Silverman concludes that the 
production of the part objects is a kind of relegation or degradation. However, when Silverman 
identifies voice—specifically, maternal voice—as a manifestation of this degraded, part object, 
her misreading of the mirror stage and the subject’s relation to objet petit a becomes apparent. 
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 In her attempt to explain why the part objects are foundational to the subject of the 
symbolic order, Silverman directly invokes Lacan’s notion of objet petit a. She writes: 
The child's as yet unsteady grasp of its own boundaries becomes firmer with the 
severance of various objects it previously experienced as parts of itself—the 
breast, the feces, the mother's voice, a loved blanket. However, these objects 
retain their aura of presence even after they have absented themselves, and are 
consequently described by Lacan as objets petits autres (objects with only a little 
“otherness”). Since these objects are carved out of the subject's own flesh, they 
attest with unusual force to the terms under which the subject enters the 
symbolic—to the divisions through which it acquires its identity, divisions which 
constitute the world of objects out of the subject's own self. Although its full 
impact will not be felt until later, with the entry into language and the Oedipal 
matrix, the partitioning off of the part objects from the infant subject is 
experienced as a castration.111 
Silverman takes exceptional liberty in adapting Lacan’s example of objet petit a: for Lacan, objet 
petit a is a topological structure or an empty object—rather than material objects, such as the 
mother’s voice or a loved blanket. However, in Silverman’s interpretation, objet petit a loses its 
structural emptiness and becomes concrete, material objects that once belonged to the subject. In 
Lacan’s formulation, the objet petit a is precisely what the subject never had and never will have. 
The objet petit a signifies that no matter how much or how many different material objects is had 
by the subject, something always remains unattained. The discussion of the various 
manifestations of objet petit a in “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire” 
clearly demonstrates how Silverman’s interpretation of objet petit a deviates from Lacan’s 
formulation. In this essay, Lacan introduces the graph of desire, which clearly shows that the 
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objet petit a is always inaccessible to the subject—not because it is an object which the subject 
has lost, but because objet petit a indicates the incomplete or partial nature of the process of 
signification. Lacan elaborates the nature of the objet petit a with the following examples: 
The objects [the objet petit a] described by analytic theory [are]: the mamilla, 
faeces, the phallus (imaginary object), the urinary flow. (An unthinkable list, if 
one adds, as I do, the phoneme, the gaze, the voice—the nothing.) For is it not 
obvious that this feature, this partial feature, rightly emphasized in objects, is 
applicable not because these objects are part of a total object, the body, but 
because they represent only partially the function that produces them?112 
The graph of desire shows that the objet petit a is produced as a function of the process of 
signification. Thus when Lacan says that the objet petit a is partial because “they represent only 
partially the function that produces them,” he means that the process of signification or the 
signifying chain never reaches completion. Because the signifying chain remains incomplete, the 
process of signification produces a remainder or a left-over: this remainder is the objet petit a. As 
a remainder of the structural operation of signification, the objet petit a can only signify the 
partial or incomplete nature of the signifying chain. Thus, contrary to Silverman’s interpretation, 
objet petit a cannot signify the various objects that the subject previously experienced as parts of 
itself. When the subject experiences an object as its former part, that object is already signified: 
i.e. in order to experience something as absent, one must first experience it as present. However, 
according to Lacan, objet petit a is never fully present to the subject. 
 The difference between Silverman and Lacan becomes more prominent when one 
compares their discussion of the salient features of objet petit a. For Silverman, the various 
manifestations of the objet petit a retain an aura of presence even though the subject experiences 
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these objects as former parts of itself. Silverman argues that the subject experiences the objet petit 
a as fragments of its own, formerly whole, self. In this way, Silverman claims that the 
fragmentation caused by objet petit a compels the subject to create the world of objects in the 
image of its own lost wholeness. In contrast, Lacan points out that the crucial feature of objet 
petit a is that it has no specular image or corresponding object in the material world. Lacan 
writes, referring to the objet petit a: “These objects have one common feature in my elaboration 
of them—they have no specular image, or, in other words, alterity. It is to this object that cannot 
be grasped in the mirror that the specular image lends its clothes” (Lacan 2001, 241). Thus, when 
the subject can be said to experience objet petit a, the result is not felt as a loss; rather, the 
manifestation of objet petit a in the experiential register is the production of desire. In contrast to 
Lacan’s view that the objet petit a is an object that designates what never belongs on the side of 
the subject, Silverman sees objet petit a as belonging to the subject. It is this misconception 
regarding the structure of objet petit a that leads Silverman to argue that voice in cinema 
functions as a lost aural object to which the subject once had full access.  
 In contrast to the designation of voice as a material object which once belonged to the 
subject, I argue in this chapter that voice is best understood as the object-cause of desire in the 
aural domain. I argue that object voice or voice as objet petit a is foundational to the subject, 
because it seductively appears—in the form of a slight disturbance—as the constitutive 
disjunction between the visual and the aural register of cinema. I substantiate my argument 
through the analysis of three Bollywood films—namely, Alam Ara (1931), Abhimaan (1973), and 
Sholay (1975)—in which voice appears as the object-cause of desire that propels the narratives. 
My attempt in this chapter is twofold: 1) to point out specific stylistic elements of cinema-sound 
in Bollywood; 2) to theorize the relationship between the lack of audio-visual synchrony and the 
precipitation of a skewed form of subjectivity. 
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Section II: Between the Voice and the Face 
Mladen Dolar’s study of the topology of voice as it appears in the aural experiential 
register of the human subject opens with an anecdote of the Italian soldiers who, upon receiving a 
vocal command from their leader to attack, fail to respond appropriately. More significantly, the 
soldiers remain transfixed, bound in a profoundly appreciative veneration of the sound of their 
commander’s voice: Che bella voce! is their response to the chief’s command. It appears that the 
soldiers fail to receive and decode the linguistic message—in other words, the meaning—of the 
chief’s command because the beauty of the commander’s voice captures them in its aura. The 
point of this anecdote, for Dolar, is not whether the commander’s voice was really beautiful. The 
crucial point of the story is that the soldiers acknowledge the beauty—that particular sonic 
quality, which appears to be aesthetically appealing—of the commander’s voice at the cost of 
acknowledging the meaning of the message that the voice carries.113  
One can be cynical about the soldiers’ act of replacing the message or meaning of the 
voice with its particular sonic quality, and say that the soldiers knew only too well what the vocal 
command meant. As stereotypical, cowardly Italian soldiers, they chose to pretend 
incomprehension because that would have necessitated their engagement in combat. Not prepared 
to do so, the soldiers acted as if the sonic quality and the message of the command are two 
distinct entities, among which, only the sonic entity of the command is worth acknowledging. 
Conversely, one can also appreciate the soldiers’ (in) action as a function of the culture to which 
they belong: after all, they are Italian soldiers, who are culturally mandated—through opera—to 
acknowledge and enjoy the aesthetic appeal of the sonic qualities of voice. No matter which 
stereotype of Italians—cowards or aesthetes—one wishes to subscribe to, one point becomes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




amply clear from this anecdote: meaning and aesthetic enjoyment may not be perfect bedfellows 
insofar as voice is concerned. 
Although the disjunction between meaning and aesthetic enjoyment apropos the aural 
entity may be specific to the Italian soldiers’ anecdote, one should not fail to note the two terms 
in this disjunction: voice and meaning. While the soldiers disregard the meaning of the command, 
what they appreciate is the voice that carries the meaning. In this sense, Dolar argues, what the 
soldiers appreciate as che bella voce is the medium, which is the voice.114. At the other end of this 
disjunction is the meaning of the chief’s command, which,—had the soldiers acknowledged their 
understanding of it—would have prevented the aesthetically pleasing voice from appearing to the 
soldiers. Although Dolar, following the anecdote, places voice and meaning at two mutually 
exclusive loci, he points to a third level where voice is an “object voice which does not go up in 
smoke in the conveyance of meaning, and does not solidify in an object of fetish reverence, but 
an object which functions as a blind spot in the call and as a disturbance of aesthetic 
appreciation.”115 
My point in recalling anecdote about the Italian soldiers leading up to Dolar’s 
introduction of a third level in which voice belongs, is to lay the conceptual groundwork for a 
discussion of the role voice in the third level—i.e. object voice—plays in the experience of 
cinema. Object voice functions neither as the imperceptible medium that is eclipsed by the 
meaning that it carries, nor does it function as an object of aesthetic pleasure that has no 
connection whatsoever with meaning. Rather, existing in the third level, voice qua object voice 
seduces the viewer-subject by introducing a disturbance—a bar, a veil that prevents immediate 
access—in the subject’s experiential domain. In other words, object voice in cinema seduces 
precisely because it does not allow the subject to have full access to the audio-visual experience 
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that cinema promises. In this sense, object voice in cinema is neither merely an instance of 
aesthetically pleasing sound sans meaning, nor is it the seamless juxtaposition of sound and its 
source leading to a flawless understanding of the specific meaning of the sound. A third 
possibility, I propose, exists: object voice occupies that locus apropos the viewer-subject’s 
relation to cinematic pleasure, which is never fully integrated in the subject’s experiential 
domain. In other words, where object voice is concerned, the viewer is presented with the 
possibility of a partial failure of experience. Extending Dolar’s formulation of object voice as a 
disturbance, I will argue that the partial failure that object voice posits in the experiential domain 
of the viewer is at the very core of the seductive power of mainstream cinema. More specifically, 
the seduction of mainstream cinema subsists in neither the sound of beautiful voice nor the visual 
representation of beautiful face individually, nor does it subsist in the perfect synchrony of the 
face and the voice; rather, the pleasure of cinema comes into being, via object voice, when the 
visual and the aural registers are slightly mismatched. More specifically, this essay neither is an 
attempt to theorize cinema-sound per se, nor is it an attempt to examine the visual aspect(s) of 
cinema; rather, at its core, this essay is an attempt to interrogate and theorize the complex role 
voice qua object voice plays in our engagement with cinema. 
Section III: In the Rear View Mirror 
 It is crucial to understand clearly the exact nature of object voice before launching into a 
discussion of its seductive function in specific Hindi films. Let us consider, at this point, the 
specifics of Dolar’s formulation of object voice as an object which functions as a blind spot in the 
call and as a disturbance of aesthetic appreciation. Several features of object voice become 
apparent in this statement: object voice is—an object, a blind spot in the aural register, and a 
disturbance. In order to recognize the topography of our engagement with cinema vis-à-vis object 
voice, one needs to explore the three features of object voice at length.  
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One could easily fail to recognize in this formulation the specific sense in which Dolar 
considers voice as an object. Object voice, in this sense, is always beyond the reach of the 
subject. Therefore, object voice, as such, introduces a blind spot, a disturbance in the subject’s 
experiential domain: it always exists as a remainder of the structural operation through which the 
subject attempts to constitute itself as a subject-in-the-act-of-knowing. Dolar addresses the 
specific logic, which points to the status of object voice as a remainder or leftover in the 
following way: 
There is the signifying chain, reduced to its minimal features, which yields, as a 
result or as a leftover, the voice. It looks as though there is a reversal: the voice is 
not taken as a hypothetical or mythical origin that the analysis would have to 
break down into distinctive traits, not as a diffuse substance to be reduced to 
structure, a raw material to be tamed into phonemes, but, rather, the opposite—it 
stands at the outcome of the structural operation. (Dolar 2006, 35)  
Here, Dolar refers to Jacques Lacan’s formulation of the graph of desire in “The Subversion of 
the Subject and the Dialectics of Desire.” It is crucial to understand the precise sense in which 
Dolar designates to voice the status of a leftover object. 
 In Lacan’s formulation of desire, the object occupies a very specific locus: the object is 
what the subject does not possess, and therefore it is something that initiates the subject’s desire. 
It might appear that the object, which the subject does not possess, is a finite object, which the 
subject looks for to fulfill his desire. However, Lacan also points out elsewhere that satisfaction 
of desire does not subsist in its conclusion: desire, Lacan points out, is the desire for desire.116 
The subject remains satisfied as a subject of desire insofar as desire, per se, remains possible. 
However, if the object—one that the subject apparently looks for—becomes available to the 
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subject, then the subject’s desire comes to a conclusion. Thus, as a condition of satisfaction of the 
subject’s desire as such, the object cannot be materially available to the subject. The object, in 
this sense, is always to be missed by the subject: apropos the subject’s desire, the object must 
always remain non-material, unavailable as a finite object. Insofar as the Lacanian object remains 
beyond the subject’s access, it keeps the possibility of desire qua desire for something else alive. 
In its very structure, the Lacanian object, via its unavailability to the subject, holds the promise of 
a beyond, which appears to the subject as the locus of plentitude—complete satisfaction of its 
desire—which is never fully actualized. As the Lacanian object prevents the subject from 
reaching this locus of plentitude, it gestures to the possibility of something that the subject did not 
quite get. In this structure, the Lacanian object appears to the subject as that which is always-to-
be-had. What the Lacanian object offers the subject is an intensely luring promise: the possibility 
that if the subject had access to the always-to-be-had object, the subject’s desire would be 
fulfilled. In this sense, the Lacanian object is what the subject can never fully possess: it is always 
left out of the equation as a remainder, or a leftover. Therefore, if the structural operation that 
Dolar refers to is understood in terms of the logic of desire, the object—which, in this case, is 
voice—must remain beyond the subject’s access. In this sense, object voice—insofar as it does 
not terminate the structural operation of desire by becoming fully available to the subject—is also 
a leftover. However, the question that remains unanswered at this point is that if object voice is an 
object in the precise Lacanian sense, what plentiful beyond it promises to the subject if the subject 
had access to it. 
  In order to investigate the exact nature of the promissory beyond that object voice offers 
to the subject, one needs to recall the second feature of object voice that Dolar points out: object 
voice is a blind spot in the aural register. In terms of the Italian soldiers’ anecdote, object voice 
appears when the commander’s call fails to invoke any response from the soldiers: as if the 
soldiers did not hear—and therefore did not understand—what the commander ordered them to 
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do. This moment of apparent aural failure prevents the soldiers from the possibility of fully 
understanding the command and acting accordingly. What the soldiers avoid in this scenario is 
the declaration that they are in full cognition of the commander’s call: they feign misrecognition. 
Interestingly, Lacan speaks to the role of misrecognition in the constitution of the subject in the 
act of knowing itself when he formulates the graph of desire that Dolar uses to define object 
voice. Lacan writes:  
Here arises the ambiguity of a misrecognizing that is essential to knowing 
myself. For, in this rear view, all the subject can be sure of is the anticipated 
image—which he had caught of himself in his mirror—coming to meet him.117 
In this passage, Lacan refers to that vector in the graph of desire, which Dolar chooses not to 
address; i.e. the line that represents the movement that produces the subject qua subject of self-
knowledge. This vector takes the subject through that line in the graph of desire which yields, as a 
result or as a leftover, the voice (Dolar 2006, 35). Therefore, voice—or more specifically, object 
voice—as a leftover, produces the subject in the act of knowing itself: although the act of 
knowing is fundamentally a misrecognition. In order to explain why misrecognition is essential to 
the subject’s self-knowledge, Lacan posits the schema of the subject’s anticipated image captured 
in the rear view. The subject’s image in the mirror refers to Lacan’s formulation of the mirror 
stage as a formative juncture of the subject’s unconscious—but that is not our point of inquiry at 
this moment. Consider instead, the specific locus of the image vis-à-vis the subject: the self-
image is something that the subject is never fully cognizant of. Although the subject’s encounter 
with the image is always in the past—denoted by Lacan’s rear view metaphor—in the sense that 
the image has already appeared in the subject’s experiential domain, something is always left 
over in that encounter. The subject’s cognition of the image, in this sense, is never complete: the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




subject’s encounter with the image is always irrevocably in the past, and not in the present. In 
other words, the subject never possesses the image fully: while the subject’s encounter with the 
image has already taken place, the subject continues to expect that it will be able to fully possess 
the image in future. The self-image, for the subject, is always to-be-had. This recognition, on the 
part of the subject, that there exists—albeit in future—a locus where the self-image will be fully 
available is therefore a fundamental misrecognition: the subject’s encounter with the self-image is 
always a missed encounter.  
 If it appears strange that Lacan describes a visual missed encounter while formulating the 
role of object voice in the constitution of the subject in the act of knowing, for clarification one 
needs to look no further than Dolar’s definition of object voice: it is a blind spot in the aural 
register. In what sense does voice qua object voice indicate a disjunction between the visual 
(blind spot) and the aural register? It is precisely because the blind spot in the visual register and 
voice are both objects in the specific Lacanian sense: they are, what Lacan calls, objets petit a. In 
terms of desire, objet petit a is that promissory object which, insofar as it remains beyond the 
subject’s immediate access, makes desire possible for the subject. Thus the other name for objet 
petit a is object/cause of desire. However, if object voice is an instance of objet petit a—and 
therefore remains beyond the subject’s immediate access—what does it cause, or make possible, 
for the subject? The answer to this question leads us to the heart of Lacan’s formulation of objet 
petit a, via Dolar’s definition of object voice as a disturbance. Insofar as object voice appears to 
the subject as a disturbance, the subject finds itself in a situation in which sonic or aural 
component of sound does not fully coincide with the source of the sound, leading to a lack in the 
subject’s comprehension of the sound qua meaningful sound. However, precisely because object 
voice prevents the complete juxtaposition of sound with its source, it prompts the subject to 
attempt to bridge the gap between the sound and its source, and thereby make comprehension 
possible. In other words, object voice—as an instance of objet petit a—insofar as it remains 
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beyond the aural register of the subject, makes meaningful hearing possible. Thus object voice, 
when it appears as the fissure between the aural and the visual register of cinema, makes 
enjoyment possible for the viewer. In this sense, object voice is at the constitutive core of 
cinematic enjoyment. 
Section IV: The Conjeevaram Incident  
 An interesting example of the crucial role object voice plays in cinematic enjoyment 
appears in Neepa Majumdar’s study of sound in Indian cinema. Majumdar writes, quoting from 
T. S. Mahadeo: 
In Conjeevaram the talkie people were beaten to the draw by a showman who, at 
his ‘talkie display’, hid interpreter, harmonium, female singer, all behind the 
screen. But the trick discovered, chairs were broken, screen torn. A justifiably 
suspicious audience was only asked to pay for admission after the Select Pictures 
party showed them the real thing.118 
Majumdar argues that this incident points up to the unique cinema-viewing practice of the Indian 
populace with regard to sound cinema, in that for early sound film audiences, audio realism was 
understood not in terms of a sound quality that effaced its technological underpinnings, but rather 
in terms of the verifiable and visible marvels of sound technology, no matter how reduced their 
actual audio experience might be. While Majumdar’s argument quite significantly points out that 
the cinema-viewer can have varying degrees of lines of established tolerance with regard to 
sound-image synchrony, it fails to take into account a more radical significance of the incident. I 
will argue, extending Majumdar’s observation, that the cinema-viewers at Conjeevaram were 
responding violently not because the aural domain of the film show was diminished in any way 
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by the live music; they became violent precisely because the live music took away from them the 
unique seductive appeal of cinema. Consider the timing of the audience’s violent behavior: they 
smashed chairs after the trick was discovered. What else did they lose but the trick itself—the 
pleasure that cinema offers by withholding full access to the source of sound? I will argue that 
what the audience lost in this case was the object voice qua objet petit a, which only the trick 
could offer. 
 Although Hugh Manon interrogates the role of trick as a constitutive element of 
cinematic pleasure in slightly different terms—his critical engagement with the cinematic trick 
considers it as trompe-l’oeil, a visual trickery—it will be fruitful for us to take into account 
Manon’s formulation of the cinematic trick. Manon defines the trick as an inherently reflexive 
strategy that seduces audiences precisely by making them aware that they are being fooled.119 The 
crucial distinction being made here is between being tricked and being fooled. While being 
fooled, Manon argues, involves deception in the first degree, being tricked requires a double-
layered deception, where an apparent failure in the process of deception hints at the presence of 
something original or truthful beyond the manifest ruse. Insofar as the trick discloses to subject 
that, there’s more to it than meets the eye by calling attention to the fact that deception is taking 
place, the subject is presented with possibility that beyond the apparent fakery there must exist 
something genuine. This promissory locus where the genuine is hiding, instigates the subject’s 
attempt to find the truth, leading to the subject’s enjoyable engagement. In this sense, the trick—a 
calculated failure of deception—functions as the Lacanian object: it is the objet petit a that makes 
the subject’s enjoyment possible. 
 In the light of Manon’s formulation of the cinematic trick, one could argue that, while the 
Conjeevaram incident by no means represents the totality of Indian cinema-viewing audience, it 
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does point to the fact that in sound cinema, a partial failure in sound’s fidelity to the moving 
image constitutes the unique, seductive pleasure for the viewer. My point in referring to this 
somewhat obscure incident is to indicate the radically important role object voice plays the 
experience of cinema: The lack of sound-image synchrony in Hindi cinema unabashedly declares 
to the audience that deception is taking place. By making the deception manifest, Hindi cinema 
captures the audience through the cinematic trick, whereby the inherently fake juxtaposition of 
sound and image is recognized as such, leading the audience to the possibility that something real 
must exist beyond the ruse. 
Section V: All Talking, All Singing, All Dancing  
A foundational example of the use of object voice, in the form of the cinematic trick, in 
Hindi cinema appears in the first full-length sound (talkie) film, Alam Ara (1931) that was 
advertised as all talking, singing, dancing. Corey K. Creekmur, pointing to Alam Ara, argues that 
while The Jazz Singer (1927) had already suggested that the future American cinema might often 
be musical, Alama Ara effectively demanded that the Indian cinema should always be so120. 
Creekmur’s claim with regard to Alam Ara—while it might appear too broad, too much of a 
sweeping generalization—is quite significant to my argument. By unabashedly declaring that its 
focus does not lie with the reality of the cinema narrative, Alam Ara foregrounds its fidelity to 
object voice in all its dys-synchronous effects in cinema. In this sense, Alama Ara’s unique 
tagline—All Talking Singing Dancing—deserves a closer and more critical consideration. 
Consider the signifiers in the tagline individually, as well as in relation to each other. While All 
lends an all-pervasive presence to Talking Singing Dancing, at the same time it calls attention to 
the fact that Alam Ara is nothing else but Talking Singing Dancing. The signifier of totality, All, 
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does not make any claim vis-à-vis the truth of the film: the tagline does not claim that Alam Ara 
is an entirely true story. 
While Talking primariliy forgrounds the technological marvel of sound cinema, it also 
calls attention to the fact that talking, as such, takes place in the movie. No effort is taken to 
connect the talking with the characters that will engage in the act of talking, indicating a blatant 
disregard for complete sound-image synchrony. In the same vein, Singing and Dancing, while 
constitutively related to each other, are in no way connected with the filmic diegesis: they exist as 
somewhat autonomous entities. It appears as though the Talking Singing Dancing, rather than 
being ancillary to the filmic reality, is the cause for the audience’s engagement with Alam Ara. 
How else can one understand this frank admission of fakeness but as an inherently reflexive 
strategy that seduces audiences precisely by making them aware that they are being fooled—i.e. 
the cinematic trick? 
 Alam Ara’s engagement with the cinematic trick is not only limited to its posters. 
Trickery is also at work in terms of the narrative that Alam Ara follows. Filmed at a historical 
juncture when India was struggling with the colonial rule of the British Empire—while other 
performative art forms, such as Jatra (vernacular theatre), never failed to comment, however 
obliquely, on the current political condition of the country—Alam Ara narrates the mythical story 
involving Kings, Queens, numerous failed love-plots, revenge and retribution. The apparent lack 
of attempt to place the cinematic narrative in any context with the present time not only allowed 
Alam Ara to engage in a mythical-historical spectacle, but more importantly, the mythical-
historical mode allowed for the insertion of numerous song and dance numbers. The bold refusal 
to engage with its time places Alam Ara decidedly in an irrevocable past-ness: it hails the 
audience from that locus which is always already unavailable for the audience. However, Alam 
Ara’s interpellation proved to be immensely seductive for the audience, neither because it offered 
an interesting story, nor because of the technological marvel of speaking, on-screen human 
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bodies. The audience saw through the first level of deception, identified the storyline as 
predictable, and noticed that while the sound-image synchrony was syllable perfect, the sound 
production was somewhat patchy (Times of India). However, by allowing the audience to 
discover the inherent fakery of cinema as such, Alam Ara plays the cinematic trick on them. It is 
as if Alam Ara boldly declares, “You sit there expecting entertainment, and I will give you 
entertainment and nothing but.” Insofar as the audience is able to identify the entertainment of 
cinema as such, the cinematic trick hooks the audience with the lure of something genuine, 
something true that exists in the promissory locus beyond the clearly visible ruse. This promise of 
a beyond, which appears to hold the key to the audience-subject’s full enjoyment, is never 
actualized, nor does the viewer subject wish for the promise to deliver. As in the Conjeevaram 
incident, it is the trick that the audience finds enjoyable; in fact, when the trick is missing, the 
viewer’s enjoyment is—often violently—prohibited. In this sense, the somewhat patchy sound 
production, the decidedly arcane, boldly fantastic plotline, and manifestly foregrounded Talking 
Singing Dancing of Alam Ara function as the Lacanian objet petit a: they act as 
disturbances/partial failure in the viewer’s experience of the film, and thereby make enjoyment 
possible. 
 Slavoj Žižek formulates object voice in talking films—in terms of the Lacanian objet 
petit a—as a partial failure in the sound-image synchrony. Žižek writes: 
when we’re talking, whatever we say is an answer to a primordial address by the 
Other—we’re always already addressed, but this address is blank, it cannot be 
pinpointed to a specific agent, but is a kind of empty a priori, the formal 
condition of possibility of our speaking.121  
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The blank address, sound sans a specific agent that Žižek refers to can be understood as a failure 
in the aural register. It is precisely when hearing fails—the aurality becomes blank—that one 
encounters object voice. However, the subject’s encounter with object voice is by no means 
analogous to the encounter with other, finite objects. As Lacan’s formulation of the objet petit a 
points out, the subject encounters it precisely as a blank: the encounter is always already a missed 
encounter. It is in this sense that Žižek formulates object voice as the formal ‘condition of 
possibility’ of our speaking. Žižek, referring to Lacan, further clarifies the foundational position 
of object voice qua object/cause of desire in engendering the subject’s experience of reality in the 
following way: 
the consistency of our experience of reality depends on the exclusion of what he 
calls the objet petit a from it: in order for us to have normal access to reality, 
something must be excluded, primordially repressed. In psychosis, this exclusion 
is undone: the object (in this case, the gaze or voice) is included in reality, the 
outcome of which, of course, is the disintegration of our sense of reality, the loss 
of reality.122 
Crucial to our understanding of this statement is the significance of the phrase, our experience of 
reality. For Lacan, the exclusion of the objet petit a from the subject’s experiential domain is the 
ultimate proof that reality—insofar as it is experienced by the subject—is engendered by a 
misrecognizing that is essential to knowing myself. This misrecognition that full access to the 
object/cause of desire will be possible is fundamental to the subject’s enjoyment. In other words, 
if objet petit a becomes available, then the subject loses the cause of desire, leading to the loss of 
enjoyment: this logic operates in the Conjeevaram incident. In this way, object voice, as the 
disjunction between the visual and the aural registers in cinema, engenders the viewer’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




enjoyment not in the form of a successful juxtaposition of sound and image, but as a failure. This 
is precisely what Žižek means when he says, “what is the effect of adding a soundtrack to silent 
film? The exact opposite of the expected naturalization, that is, of an even more realistic imitation 
of life.”123 This de-naturalization in sound cinema, or the missed encounter between sound and its 
source, is analogous to the subject’s relation to the objet petit a, which Žižek formulates as “that 
which can never be attained … is always missed; all we can do is encircle it.”124 The objet petit a 
is therefore not the finite object after which the subject runs; rather, it is the infinite structure that 
frames—as a closed set—all the possible finite objects after which the subject might run. Insofar 
as the objet petit a holds the infinite number of (infinitely repeatable) finite objects within its 
frame, it lures the subject with the possibility or promise of complete satisfaction—although the 
objet petit a always remains, autonomously, beyond the finite objects. In this sense, object voice 
qua the objet petit a is always autonomous: it is always disconnected from its visual source, and 
as such, is at the core of the pleasure of cinema. 
Section VI: Basanti, what is your name? 
 To facilitate our understanding of the structural autonomy of object voice as the core of 
sound cinema’s unique seductive appeal, let us jump, somewhat abruptly, to the first Indian 
cinema made with stereophonic sound recording—G.P. Sippy and Ramesh Sippy’s Sholay 
(1975).125 An extremely popular film in India, Sholay narrates the violent story of a righteous 
police officer’s revenge against a notorious bandit. Although the revenge plot in Sholay stages the 
familiar good-against-evil trope, it becomes clear, early in the film, that the ethics of the good-
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against-evil trope is problematic. The police officer, Thakur, employs two petty criminals—Jay 
and Veeru—to take revenge against the formidable bandit, Gabbar, on his behalf. The criminal 
duo arrives in the village, where Thakur is the patriarchal landowner, to launch a battle against 
Gabbar. When Veeru and Jay arrive at the village, they are greeted by a female tangawali—the 
driver of a horse-drawn cart—Basanti. Basanti’s unique screen presence is bound up in the 
endless talking that she engages in, in spite of the very different responses she receives from each 
of her passengers: while Jay’s vexation is clearly visible, Veeru is profoundly seduced, not by 
Basanti’s physical beauty, but by her endless talking. Infact, at the end of the ride, a clearly 
besotted Veeru declares to his partner, Kya pyaari baatein karti hain! (How beautifully she 
speaks!)—a sentiment that Jay clearly does not share. During the tanga ride, as Basanti continues 
to talk, without paying any attention126 to either Jay’s cynicism or Veeru’s infatuation, it becomes 
clear that her enunciation is not directed at the two men at all. The men only provide her with an 
occasion to engage in all talking; it does not matter to her whether they respond to her speech or 
not. At one point, a visibly irritated Jay asks Basanti—after she had identified herself as 
Basanti—“Basanti, what is your name?” 
My point in referring to this somewhat comedic moment in Sholay has a crucial bearing 
on how sound is used in the film. The inherent paradox in Jay’s statement brings to the 
foreground the disjunction between sound and meaning, rendering Basanti’s speech-act 
essentially meaningless. In other words, even though—and precisely because—Basanti engages 
in endles talkingqua talking, both Veeru and Jay fail to hear it: they encounter the sonic medium 
of Basanti’s speech-act. Veeru and Jay’s response to Basanti’s talking is evidently analogous to 
the soldiers’ reaction to the commander’s voice in the Italian soldiers’ anecdote: in both the 
instances, the listener-subject is caught up in the particular sonic quality of the sound at the cost 
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of comprehending the meaning of the message that the voice carries. However, there is also a 
significant difference between the Italian soldiers’ response and the response of Veeru and Jay to 
the beautiful voice. While the soldiers are transfixed in the aura of the beautiful voice, Veeru and 
Jay regard Basanti’s voice as an obstacle, which, if they could overcome, would render Basanti’s 
speech meaningful for them. Again, Veeru and Jay has unique positionalities vis-à-vis Basanti’s 
voice as an obstacle. Veeru actively attempts to catch Basanti’s attention so that he becomes the 
sole addressee of her enunciations, and therefore gains full access to the beauty that Basanti’s 
voice holds. Jay, who is more cynical, is clearly after the truth of Basanti’s identity—which he 
believes is hidden beyond the endless sound that constitutes Basanti’s speech—by asking her to 
reveal her symbolic identification, inspite of  her already-declared name. What Veeru and Jay—
and along with them, the audience—encounter here is the cinematic trick, in accordance with 
Manon’s formulation of the trick as an inherently reflexive strategy that seduces audiences 
precisely by making them aware that they are being fooled. Let us recall then the exact nature of 
the cinematic trick: in this sense, what else is the trick but object voice qua the Lacanian objet 
petit a? Insofar as the subject (Veeru, Jay, and the audience) sees through the primary flaw (the 
endless sound of Basanti’s speech), the trick captures the subject by promising a locus beyond the 
apparent flaw, where meaning and/or beauty is perfectly juxtaposed with aural object. The subject 
is profoundly lured in this economy because object voice, following the seductive logic of the 
objet petit a, initiates the subject in the immensely satisfying path of desire. Therefore, it does not 
appear surprising when later in the film, object voice, in the form of an autonomous entity—
disconnected from it visual source—plays a significant role in the way the romance between 
Veeru and Basanti plays out.  
 In his attempt to win Basanti’s love, Veeru hides himself behind a statue of a deity in a 
local temple as Basanti arrives there to engage in her daily worship. From this hidden locus, 
Veeru speaks in the (fake) disembodied voice of god that commands Basanti to fall in love with 
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Veeru. Although Basanti is well aware of the unique aural quality of Veeru’s voice, it appears 
that she initially fails to realize that the disembodied voice of god belongs to Veeru in reality. 
However, after a few moments of confusion, with the help of Jay, Basanti discovers Veeru, 
hidden behind the statute, speaking to her in the voice of god. Although Basanti appears to be 
annoyed, and initially rejects Veeru’s amorous advances, it becomes clear in her body language 
that her interest is now aroused. Precisely through the structure of a trick, Veeru is able to draw 
basanti’s attention, and now can proceed to become the sole addressee of her pyaari baatein 
(beautiful speech). The crucial point here is not that Basanti begins to reciprocate Veeru’s love 
because god’s voice has commanded her to do so; she does so precisely because Veeru’s use of 
the trick, in the form of disembodied voice has given her the occasion to engage in the satisfying 
game of finding something more beyond the disembodied voice. It is precisely this promise of 
something more beyond what immediately meets the senses that seduces the subject: the lure does 
not subsist in realism—the sonic quality of Veeru’s/god’s voice—but in the act of hiding itself. 
 Let us recall—to understand how the obstacle itself lures the subject—a story that Lacan 
introduces in his 1964 seminar, “The Line and Light.” In this seminar, while formulating the co-
ordinates of the gaze as the objet petit a, Lacan tells the story of Zeuxis and Parrhasios. As the 
story goes, Zeuxis and Parrhasios, two accomplished artists, engaged in a competition where 
Zeuxis painted a bunch of grapes, so lifelike that they duped even birds. However, Parrhasios 
triumphed over his friend by painting on the wall a veil, a veil so lifelike that Zeuxis, turning 
towards him said, Well, and now show us what you have painted behind it127. Parrhasios’s success 
is not painting a veil that appears to be real, however. What he succeeds to do is present his friend 
with the representation of the veil, which, in its very structure, indicates the possibility of a 
beyond. Zeuxis’s enjoyment of the painted veil—which is the proof of Parrhasios’s success—is 
caused by the structure of impossibility posited by the veil, not by its realism. Insofar as the 
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painted veil—as such—withholds, Zeuxis can engage in a satisfying game of positing, via his 
fantasy, something more in the place that the veil indicates to in its beyond. In this sense, the 
painted veil is analogous to the Lacanian objet petit a: the object/cause of desire. A minuter—yet 
radically crucial—distinction needs to be made in the context of this story: Zeuxis’s enjoyment of 
the painted veil does not subsist in a purely visual pleasure; his enjoyment also draws from the 
aural experiential register. In other words, Zeuxis would not have enjoyment, had he not been 
able to capture the structural impossibility of the painted veil via speech. When Zeuxis asks his 
friend to reveal what lies beyond the painted veil, he is fully aware that—in terms of his friend’s 
painting—there is nothing beyond the veil. Nonetheless, he proceeds to ask the question precisely 
because the answer is blank: there is nothing there. In this sense, what lures Zeuxis is not only 
object gaze, but also object voice—a failure in the field of vision, as well as a blank spot in the 
aural register—in the form of a blank answer coming to meet him from the painting. In this way, 
one could understand the validity of Žižek’s formulation of object voice as a gap in the field of 
the visible (Žižek 1996, 92-3). 
 Object voice, as a disjunction between the visual and the aural registers, appears in a 
more sinister form in Sholay via the character of the bandit, Gabbar. In the scene where Gabbar 
appears in the filmic diegesis for the first time, the disembodied sound of his voice plays a 
significant role. In this scene, Gabbar walks on a block of stone, his boots making emphatic 
clicking noise, as he talks to the members of his gang. The gang members are transfixed by his 
voice, even before his face appears in the visual domain. However, even before Gabbar utters a 
single word, the audience hears his maniacal laughter. As the gang members visibly cringe in the 
presence of this—so far—disembodied voice, the audience’s attention is called to the fact that 
Gabbar’s power does not lie with his physical prowess so much as it lies with what he withholds. 
In the following moments of this scene, Gabbar shoots three of his gang members immediately 
after he assures them that their life will be spared. The shooting scenario plays out in the 
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following way: Gabbar, in order to be just with the three gang members, takes out three bullets 
from his six-shooter revolver, spins the bullet chamber, and proceeds to shoot at the three bandits 
one by one. This set-up follows the logic of the Russian roulette, by turning chance into an act of 
ethics—what Gabbar calls insaafi (justice). Although the bandit characters show tension in their 
facial expression, the audience is well aware—at least after the revolver does not kill the second 
bandit—that the scene is being staged, quite self-consciously, as a set piece vis-à-vis the 
Spaghetti Western genre. The audience, in this sense, sees through the self-referential ruse of the 
Russian roulette scenario, and following the conventions of the genre, expects to hear resounding 
gunshots and see three dead bodies after the three blank shots. The film, quite specifically, 
delivers this promise: Gabbar shoots the bandits exactly at the conventional moment. However, 
because the audience has already experienced an overload of both sound (Gabbar’s shouts) and 
silence (the dull click of the revolver indicating that everything else is silent), the deadly pistol 
shot sounds profoundly unimpressive. Following the amplified—too perfect—representation of 
the generic set-piece of the bandits’ Russian roulette, the audience expects the pistol sound to be 
equally generic, pistol sound. What they get instead is a low amplitude, low reverb sound, 
coupled with the visual representation of the pistol firing and killing the bandits. Faced with this 
disturbance in the audio-visual domain, the audience pauses to consider whether the sound of the 
gunshot is real. Insofar as the film is able to engage the audience in this guessing game, it 
succeeds in seducing the subject: the film performs the cinematic trick on the audience. In effect, 
this sonic disturbance in the viewer’s audio-visual experience acts as object voice by pointing to 
the gap in the audience’s visual experiential domain: a gap that the viewer-subject then attempts 




Section VII: Song for the Self, Sung for the Other 
 A particularly apt example of an autonomous sonic entity can be found in the form of the 
song sequence of mainstream Hindi cinema. Most Hindi films add songs sung by vocal artists to 
the on-screen lip-syncing of the actor(s) in post-synchronized dubbing. As in the case of Alam 
Ara, the song sequence is usually the raison d’être for filmmaking in Hindi cinema. The songs, as 
well as the singers of such film-songs, have an autonomous existence beyond the scope of 
cinema. While the entertainment quotient of the song sequence is quite high on its own, it would 
be a mistake to overlook the symbiotic relationship between cinema and the song sequence in 
terms of entertainment. While cinema draws in the crowd through the popular appeal of the song 
sequence, the song sequence gains popularity as film-songs. In other words, when the audience 
encounters such songs outside of cinema, they encounter the film-songs as such: film-song is 
always referential to the cinema in which it belongs. The key to the immense popularity of film-
songs in the domain of Hindi cinema is not whether the songs sound beautiful; the songs gain 
popularity only insofar as the audience is able to engage, via the song sequence, in a referential 
framework where the song sequence gestures to the filmic space, and the film refers to the songs. 
Thus, the audience’s encounter with the song sequence is never complete in itself: the song 
sequence always gestures to something else that escapes the operation. If the song sequence and 
the cinema always exist as an infinitely repeatable referential structure, the topology of the song 
sequence itself follows the seductive logic of the cinematic trick. The audience of Hindi cinema 
and Hindi film-songs is always well aware that, in the song sequence within the filmic space, the 
aural element (i.e. the singer’s voice) does not belong to the visual element (i.e. the actor’s face). 
Thus, the song sequence manifestly plays out what Žižek calls an unbridgeable gap that separates 
forever a human body from its voice. By boldly declaring that the audio-visual representation of 
an actor singing a song is, in fact, inherently fake, Hindi cinema initiates a guessing game where 
the audience is presented with the promise qua promise of something else—beyond the apparent 
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deception—that must be genuine. This lure of the genuine object—one that is never actualized—
proves to be profoundly seductive for the audience. In this sense, the seduction of the song 
sequence in Hindi cinema subsists in the autonomous existence of the voice qua object voice: it 
is, to an extent, what Michel Chion calls an acousmatic voice, a voice without a body. 
Michel Chion addresses this disembodied voice in his formulation of the acousmatic 
voice with regard to sound in cinema. Chion’s interests lie with the human voice—more 
specifically, with that form of (human) voice in cinema, which is neither entirely inside nor 
clearly outside of the audience’s audio-visual experiential domain.128 In other words, Chion seeks 
to theorize the ontology of voice as that particular sonic event which does not fully coincide with 
the representation of the cause of the sonic event in the visual domain. Borrowing from Pierre 
Schaeffer, Chion uses the word acousmatic to signify the partial status—in the experiential field 
of the human subject—of the voice that is neither entirely inside nor clearly outside. Although it 
might appear, prima facie, that Chion’s formulation insists on the placement of the acousmatic 
voice within the aural register only, it soon becomes clear that Chion’s conceptualization of the 
acousmatic voice engages the aural register with the visual register. However, the nature of this 
engagement—and consequently the ontological status of the acousmatic voice—is deeply 
problematic, as Chion’s definition of the complete acousmêtre points out: the one who is not-yet-
seen, but who remains liable to appear in the visual field at any moment.129 The acousmatic voice, 
according to this formulation, is what stages an aural missed encounter in the visual domain: it is 
a point in the field of vision that has yet to reveal itself to the subject.  
Although Chion’s definition of the acousmatic voice might appear to be analogous with 
Žižek’s formulation of object voice as that which points toward a gap in the field of the visible, 
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there exists a crucial difference between the two that makes Chion’s formulation deeply 
problematic. Chion’s definition of the complete acousmêtre demands that there is no manifest 
juxtaposition between the aural and the visual registers. However, in the example of the song 
sequence of Hindi cinema, it is evident that even though the aural and visual registers are 
diegetically juxtaposed (that is to say, within the filmic diegesis, the actor is supposed to sing the 
song), the viewer immediately identifies this juxtaposition as fake. Curiously, this fake 
juxtaposition, rather than making the voice de-acousmatic, lends objectal autonomy to the 
aurality of the song sequence. In fact, following the logic of the cinematic trick, one can argue 
that precisely because the aural and the visual registers are juxtaposed in the song sequence, there 
arises a gap—a disturbance in Dolar’s sense—in the audience’s experiential domain, that lures 
the audience by inviting them to fill up (overcome) this breach. In this way, the gap itself—the 
veil in Lacan’s sense—addresses the viewer-subject qua subject-of-knowledge. In other words, 
the gap allows the subject to come into being as subject-of-knowledge. Reconsider Žižek’s 
formulation—previously invoked in this chapter to clarify the empty, or blank structure of object 
voice—of the gap as a blank address: 
it is as if, when we’re talking whatever we say is an answer to a primordial 
address by the Other—we’re always already addressed, but this address is blank, 
it cannot be pinpointed to a specific agent, but is a kind of empty a priori, the 
formal condition of possibility of our speaking. (Žižek 1996, 90-1)  
It is crucial that the Other’s address remains blank, not directed to a specific subject. In its 
blankness, the Other’s address draws out, as it were, my speech. Because the address is also not 
directed to any specific subject, I can respond to the Other, as if the address is directed at me. In 
this sense, the blank address—object voice—is the formal condition upon which I am able to 
speak. Thus, one could arrive at a formula of the audience’s enjoyment vis-à-vis the song 
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sequence: the audience enjoys the song sequence only insofar she recognizes that the actor is, in 
fact, not singing the song only for herself. 
 An interesting example of Hindi cinema that utilizes, as its theme, the deep problem of 
the singer-actor singing for herself, is Abhimaan (1973). In this popular family drama, one finds 
Subir Kumar, a popular male singer who performs music onstage, and records songs for a living. 
Subir Kumar is not self-conscious about his musical stardom—he enjoys singing for his audience. 
In this sense, a character in the film says, Subir’s music is geet: song performance for others. 
Eventually, Subir meets a village belle, Uma, who, as a classically trained singer, sings only for 
herself. In this sense, the same character in the film claims, her music is sangeet: song sung for 
the self. Subir is charmed by the intensity of Uma’s personality, proposes to her, and marries her 
eventually. However, the way Subir’s proposal plays out is quite unique. Rather than admitting 
that he will miss him once he goes away, Subir makes Uma confess that she will miss him. 
Following Uma’s disclosure, Subir presses Uma to declare the reason for which she will miss 
him; Uma does not say anything at all. Uma’s silence, which appears to be a resounding 
declaration of her love for Subir, allows Subir to constitute himself as the sole addressee or 
recipient of Uma’s love. In this way, Subir is able to institute himself—as the only other 
audience—within the narcissistic structure of Uma’s sangeet. However, what Subir introduces in 
Uma’s song for the self is the Other: after all Subir’s relationship to music is always already 
mediated by the Other in the form of his audience. 
 Trouble in Subir and Uma’s marriage ensues following Subir’s attempt to establish his 
wife as a performing and recording singer. Since Uma’s music is essentially a song for the self—
apropos which, Subir is the only audience—she sings for Subir, while Subir continues to sing for 
the audience. In a scene where Subir and Uma records a song together, Uma does not take her 
eyes off Subir, who keeps looking at the sound recordists for direction. The paramount 
importance of this moment becomes clear later in the movie, when Subir discontinues his 
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performing and recording career, due to a wane in his popularity—popularity that Uma now 
enjoys. The crucial point in this scenario is not that Uma and Subir sings differently, or that one 
sings better than the other: their dissimilarity subsists in the radically different ways in which they 
relate to their audience. While Subir’s songs take into account—while performing or recording—
the audience as such, they are not addressed to any specific member of the audience. Thus, each 
member of the audience can relate to Subir’s songs as if the songs were addressed to them. 
Significantly, Subir’s songs are most popular as recorded songs: songs, which—although they 
always exist in reference to Subir as the singer—have an autonomous aural entity apart from the 
corporeal presence of Subir. The audience of Subir’s songs finds the gap that exists between 
Subir as the star singer, and his recorded songs immensely seductive because each of them find 
themselves addressed by the gap. Therefore, as is evident in one particular scene in Abhimaan, 
Subir’s audience members try to call up Subir—right after one of his songs is played in the 
radio—to get to know the real Subir: they attempt to access the real man beyond the beautiful 
songs. In contrast, Uma’s songs—before she met Subir—were directed only to herself. 
Afterwards, when she attempts to record a song with Subir, the only audience that exists for her is 
Subir: the audience, as such, is always excluded from her songs. Even when she records a solo 
song number, she continues to look away from the glass window in the recording booth that is a 
stand-in for the audience. Therefore, it does not appear surprising that when Subir refuses to 
listen to Uma’s songs—played on the radio—Uma does not only stop singing, but she also stops 
speaking. Uma’s song for the self cannot structurally withstand being sung for the Other. 
 While Abhimaan plays out the structural difference between the song that takes into 
account its audience as a constitutive element of its performance (geet) and its opposite (sangeet), 
the viewer is keenly aware of a deception taking place. The viewer of Abhimaan knows only too 
well that in fact neither Subir, nor Uma is singing: as actors, they are lip-syncing to vocal artists 
whom the audience can also identify. However, precisely at the point in which the viewer exposes 
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the simple deception, Abhimaan captures them via the cinematic trick. The discovery of the 
deception gestures to the presence of something genuine beyond the apparent fakery. This 
promissory locus where the genuine is hiding, instigates the subject’s attempt to find the truth, 
leading to the subject’s enjoyable engagement with the film. In this way, Abhimaan, quite self-
consciously, draws attention to the constitutive gap that the song sequence of Hindi cinema 
introduces in the viewer’s experience of the audio-visual domain of cinema. As a gap—a 
disturbance according to Dolar’s formulation—the song sequence functions as the voice qua objet 
petit a, and promises the viewer a locus of imaginary plentitude—beyond the apparent failure—
that will guarantee the viewer’s unbarred access to truth. In this sense, the ubiquitous song 
sequence, as an instance of object voice, holds an extraordinarily significant place in shaping the 
viewer’s enjoyment vis-à-vis popular cinema. 
Section VIII: Gyrating Bodies 
 Through the discussion of some examples of mainstream Hindi cinema, I have pointed 
out the ways in which cinematic pleasure is always brought into being as a function of object 
voice qua the Lacanian objet petit a. Hindi cinema, in its popular form, never endeavors to 
achieve complete audio-visual synchrony—although technology to do so is entirely available in 
multi-million dollar Bollywood cinema industry. In fact, mainstream Hindi cinema succeeds by 
steadfastly refusing to engage in high-fidelity aesthetics in terms of the formal aspects of cinema, 
as well as in terms of content. By emphatically staging the song sequence as such, by 
unabashedly dubbing the actors’ dialogues in post-synchronized sound editing, by boldly using 
the same vocal artist for lip-syncing actors of any age and any vocal quality, Hindi cinema 
blatantly declares its ulterior motive to the viewers. Since the viewer expects entertainment, Hindi 
cinema forthrightly declares, it will provide the viewers with entertainment and nothing but. 
Thus, the entertainment that Hindi cinema offers is always self-consciously entertaining. Therein 
lies the hook of mainstream Hindi cinema—the cinematic trick that appeals to the viewer-subject 
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on a fundamental level. In this way, at its core, Hindi cinema captures the way in which the 
Lacanian object/cause of desire is constitutive of the subject qua symbolic subject of desire. Thus, 
mainstream Hindi cinema—rather than aiming for more realism—heightened, over the years, the 
ways in which the disjunction between the aural and the visual registers seduces the viewer-
subject. 
 A case in point is a particular development of the song sequence, known currently as item 
numbers. These item numbers are essentially song sequences within the film—often without any 
diegetic connection to the narrative—to which lithe actors gyrate, while exposing their bodies to 
the limits of censorship. In many cases, the actors dancing to these song numbers do not appear in 
the diegesis either before or after the item number. The item numbers, following the logic of the 
song sequence, prove to be the raison d’être for making the films in which they appear. Although 
the seductive appeal of the item numbers remains structurally similar to the cinematic trick, I 
would argue that they indicate an inconceivably bold development along the same lines. While 
encountering the item number, the viewer is abundantly aware—more so than in the case of the 
song sequence—that it is impossible to sing such intricately aspirated songs while gyrating so 
wildly. In fact, the item number does not even attempt to show the so-called singing actor’s face, 
concentrating instead on the deeply sexualized visual representation of the actor’s body. 
Crucially, the item number does not discriminate between genders in this representation: male 
and female actors alike are sexualized in item numbers. In doing so, the item number captures the 
viewer on a more fundamental level: it appeals to the viewer’s desire for what is prohibited. The 
quasi-pornographic visual representation of the actors’ (usually female) bodies that accompany 
the item numbers allow the viewer to engage with the obscene qua off-scene: if the item numbers 
make what is prohibited accessible, it does so precisely by calling attention to the representational 
status of the bodies, as well as of the singing voices that accompany the bodies disjunctively. The 
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viewer, faced with the gyrating bodies, and throbbing, pulsating songs—two elements that never 






LACANIAN FILM THEORY BEYOND THE SYMBOLIC AND THE REAL 
 This dissertation discussed the trajectory of Lacanian psychoanalysis in the field of film 
theory. Even though Lacanian film theory was prominently influential in the 1960s and 1970s, 
currently it has almost disappeared from the field of film and media studies. Early Lacanian 
theorists established numerous methods for the analysis of film, such as Apparatus theory, 
Feminist film theory, Suture theory, Marxist film theory, to name a few. However, in its current 
state, Lacanian film theory is severely marginalized, as evidenced by the limited number of books 
and journal articles devoted to this approach. Moreover, this endeavor is undertaken by only a 
handful of scholars. These contemporary Lacanian scholars—such as, Slavoj Žižek, Joan Copjec, 
Todd McGowan, Mladen Dolar, Alenka Zupančič, Lee Edelman—remain dedicated to the 
Lacanian field, but are rarely included in the so-called mainstream of film studies. The validity of 
Lacanian theory has been challenged in numerous ways. For instance, Gender theorists and 
Feminist film theorists have pointed out that Lacanian psychoanalysis is patriarchal in nature. 
Similarly, proponents of historical-materialist analysis of film have argued that the subject or the 
spectator invoked in Lacanian film theory is not historically verifiable. Proponents of Post-
Theory have criticized Lacanian film theory on the grounds that this model of thinking about film 
works to affirm certain a priori concepts or assumptions—rather than testing such hypothesis—
whereby films become mere examples and not an avenue to produce new and verifiable  
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knowledge. In other words, Post-Theorists accuse Lacanian film theory for the lack of scientific 
rigor in its methodologies. 
 However, contemporary Lacanian film theorists have attempted re-establish the 
significance of their discipline by pointing out that the early version of Lacanian film theory 
overemphasized Lacan’s arguments regarding the ways in which subjectivity is completely 
determined by the Symbolic and the Imaginary order. In contrast, contemporary Lacanian 
theorists argue—through Lacan’s notion of the Real—that the Symbolic order is not flawless. 
They argue that subjectivity is best understood as a result of the failure or partialness of the 
Symbolic order. Thus, the key term in contemporary Lacanian film theory is the Real, which 
designates the point at which the alleged consistency of the Symbolic order breaks down. For 
contemporary Lacanians, the notion of the gaze is one prominent way to think about the 
appearance of the Real in the Symbolic order. While early Lacanians theorized the gaze as the 
way in which the spectator-subject identifies with the image on the screen, contemporary 
Lacanians define gaze as the point at which the purported smoothness of the subject’s perception 
of the image is interrupted. Thus, contemporary Lacanians claim that one can provide a more 
accurate analysis of spectatorship through this revised notion of the gaze as a manifestation of the 
Real in the Symbolic order. Similarly, a limited number of Lacanian film scholars have attempted 
to reformulate the notion of voice as the interruption of the aural domain of cinema. The common 
theme that runs through both early and contemporary Lacanian film theory is this: the subject has 
no agency. For early Lacanians, it was the Symbolic order that wielded complete control over the 
subject. For contemporary Lacanians, it is the Real—manifested in the Symbolic order as part 
objects, such as the gaze and the voice—that renders the subject powerless.  
 In this dissertation I have argued that the subject comes into being in relation to failures 
or disturbances that are inherent in the functioning of the Symbolic order. As a result, the subject 
comes into being not as a mere puppet of the Other; rather, the subject comes into being by 
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manipulating the inconsistencies in the field of the Other. Of course, the subject manipulates the 
Other because it desires to come into being—albeit retroactively—as a subject; or, more properly 
speaking, the subject manipulates the Other because it desires. Thus, in this process, the subject is 
also manipulated or lured by something that it sees as lacking, missing or inconsistent in the 
Other: essentially, a gap in the Other that only the subject can fill, and thereby can come into 
being. Thus, the subject in my formulation is a skewed subject: one that undoubtedly exists in 
relation to an Other, but one whose relation to this Other is off-kilter. Thus, my interpretation of 
subjectivity draws on the contemporary Lacanians’ discussion of the ways in which the Real 
interrupts the smooth functioning of the Symbolic order. However, my analysis of subjectivity 
departs from that of the contemporary Lacanians in one significant way: while they suggest that 
the Real is a category of experience which renders the subject powerless, I argue that that it is 
possible to conceive of a kind of subjectivity that comes into being via an oblique relationship 
with the space of signification, by recognizing the Real qua objet petit a as that which is lacking 
in the Other, and then by manipulating the Other to reveal its lack. 
 I propose this re-thinking of the subject’s agency through the analysis of seven 
Bollywood films. This choice is guided by two primary concerns: first, much of my conception of 
culture is mediated by my experience with Bollywood films; that is, these are the film that I grew 
up watching, and therefore I relate to these films beyond the conscious, analytical level; and 
second, in my experience, Bollywood films seem to solicit the kind of spectatorial identification 
with which early Lacanian film theorists extensively engaged, whereby the rupturing of narrative 
and stylistic signification—such as, the prolific use of song-and-dance numbers that break up the 
narrative—is included in the process of signification as a routine. Moreover, the seven Bollywood 
films that I discuss demonstrate a kind of subjectivity that actively manipulates the domain of the 
Other to reveal its inconsistencies. Thus, these films challenge the contemporary Lacanians’ 
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notion that the subject lacks agency in relation to the Real. In other words, these films allow me 
to push Lacanian concepts to their limit.  
 The conjunction of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Bollywood cinema, in my view, is 
eminently fruitful for the future of a psychoanalytic film theory. Bollywood cinema challenges 
the analytical schema of Lacanian psychoanalysis, as the discussion of the films in this 
dissertation shows. As a result, Bollywood cinema broadens the scope of Lacanian film theory. 
By analyzing Bollywood films, Lacanian film theory can reclaim its relevance in film studies—
not because Bollywood films affirm the already-established notions of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
but because the inherent oddness of Bollywood compels Lacanian psychoanalysis to constantly 
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